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Lauren E. Willist
In a growing number of consumer transactions, firms exploit consumer con-
fusion and promote poor buying choices. Consumer law generally responds with
disclosure and design rules aimed at aligning consumer and firm interests. But
with modern experimental and data-analysis techniques, firms can run circles
around these rules. The process for enacting disclosure and design rules leaves
regulators tied to slow, circumscribed responses. What is needed is a new regulato-
ry instrument that can accomplish two objectives. First, it should unite the inter-
ests of firms with the goals of regulators through performance standards for con-
sumer comprehension or suitable consumer product use, thereby redirecting the
creative potential of the private sector (much like emissions standards do for pollu-
tion reduction). Second, the new regulatory instrument should institutionalize a
monitoring system that provides feedback on actual consumer comprehension and
product choices, which can be used to improve both the marketplace and regula-
tion in a virtuous cycle.
This Article suggests a fresh approach to consumer law, one that has been
tried piecemeal in consumer regulation but without an express intellectual founda-
tion-until now. The principal aim of the approach is modest-to bring consumer
transactions in line with consumer expectations. Its broader objective is more am-
bitious-to make the law as agile as firms are. Performance-based consumer law
has the potential to incentivize firms to educate rather than obfuscate, develop
product designs that align with consumer expectations rather than defy them, and
channel consumers toward products that are suitable for the consumers' circum-
stances. Moreover, even if performance-based regulation does not directly lead
to dramatic gains in consumer comprehension or to marked declines in un-
suitable uses of consumer products, the process of establishing and imple-
menting such regulation promises dividends for improving traditional forms
of regulation. But performance-based consumer law is more than a technocratic
exercise. It is based on-and its operation would reinscribe-a normative vision of
consumer law that places consumers at the center.
This Article is particularly timely in at least three respects. First, it answers
the question implicitly asked by recent critiques of mandated disclosure: What
should we do instead? Second, it plots a promising course for the young Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau that is plainly authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act.
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Third, the policy structure it proposes would be helpful in several areas in which
policymakers are currently at a loss for what to do, including personal-data priva-
cy, opaque consumer-product pricing schemes, and drug marketing to consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
In a growing number of consumer transactions today, firms
exploit consumer confusion and promote poor buying choices.
The resulting transactions are often lousy, whether one uses
autonomy, welfare, or fairness as the metric. Disclosure and
product-design1 rules, both of which focus on the actions of
firms, have failed to solve this problem. While regulators seem
intent on doubling down on disclosure, firms' ability to frame
consumer reception of mandated disclosures ultimately ham-
strings this project. Regulation of transaction terms can be im-
potent as well, because firms often reformulate products to
evade prescriptive design rules. Moreover, the speed with which
firms foil disclosure and design regulation will only increase in
the device-mediated world of big data. Consumer law-limited
institutionally to slow, circumscribed responses-trails behind
firms. The time is ripe for a fresh approach.
In other areas, most notably environmental regulation, pre-
scriptive regulation has been supplemented with performance-
based regulation monitored through ongoing field-testing. Ra-
ther than the law dictating that a factory smokestack must
incorporate a particular scrubber, the law sets limits on a firm's
emissions and the firm can then determine how to meet those
limits. By uniting the goals of the firm with the goals of the reg-
ulator, the regulator is able to harness the firm's innovation in
finding ways to meet those goals. By continually monitoring the
outcome of interest, regulators obtain systematic information
that they can use both to stop problems before substantial harm
is done and to make regulation more effective. Performance-
based regulation is thus more functional and more adaptive
than prescriptive regulation.
Two ways in which we might apply this regulatory para-
digm to consumer transactions are comprehension standards
and suitability standards. Consumer-comprehension standards
that firms could meet by whatever means they see fit are an in-
tuitive move from disclosure mandates. Field-testing of each
1 "Product" as used herein includes services and other consumer market transac-
tions, such as the exchange of personal data for website access. "Product" and "transac-
tion" are used interchangeably.
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firm's customers 2 would assess whether consumers understand
the key costs and risks of the transactions in which they are en-
gaged. If every customer were tested, firms could be prohibited
from imposing on a customer those product features that she did
not understand. If samples of customers were tested, perfor-
mance benchmarks for the proportion of customers who must
demonstrate comprehension could be set based on, for example,
the nature of the market. Firms could be penalized for failing to
meet benchmarks and rewarded for exceeding them. Alterna-
tively, evidence that a firm's customers were engaging in trans-
actions that they did not comprehend might trigger scrutiny for
or constitute proof of unfair, deceptive, or abusive conduct or be
used as a remedy for such conduct.
What would this look like in practice? Take fees, such as
overdraft fees on bank account debit card transactions, for ex-
ample. While the law requires that fees be disclosed to consum-
ers, nothing ensures that consumers understand each fee or are
aware of each fee at the time that they could use this knowledge.
A comprehension performance standard might require that at
least 80 percent of consumers who are paying a given fee know
the existence and amount of the fee at the time that they are de-
ciding whether to take the action that will commit them to pay-
ing it. To assess performance, regulators or third-party auditors
might survey a random sample of a firm's customers who have
just incurred the fee. Failure to meet the 80 percent benchmark
might result in a penalty, such as requiring the firm to disgorge
fees or portions thereof over a look-back period. Exceeding the
benchmark might result in a longer interval before the firm's
next performance test.
Comprehension performance standards do not aspire to
create a world in which all consumers understand everything
about the transactions in which they engage. Consumers do not
want to live in such a world.3 But when consumer decisional
2 "Customer" as used herein means a consumer who has exchanged money or per-
sonal data in a transaction with a firm.
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose *26 (Feb 10, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/2K8U.WW84 (stating that active choosing among all possible features of
a product imposes a large burden on consumers); Barry Schwartz, The Tyranny of Choice,
Scientific Am 71, 73 (Apr 2004). See also Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More
Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 64-66 (Princeton 2014)
(discussing evidence that consumers do not want to know everything about the decisions
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autonomy is our paramount goal, either because that autonomy
is intrinsically valuable or because it is a cost-effective way to
assure consumer welfare, firms ought to be required to ensure
that their customers comprehend what the firms have sold
them.
Suitability requirements are more appropriate when con-
sumers do not want to decide for themselves, or when the cost of
achieving comprehension exceeds its benefits. Suitability stand-
ards would be closer to traditional substantive regulation but
more flexible. Regulators or firms themselves (with public over-
sight) might define suitable and unsuitable uses of products.
Suitability might be required of every transaction (as securities
law currently requires for broker and investment-adviser rec-
ommendations to retail investors4). But testing every transac-
tion for suitability would often be prohibitively expensive, and
ad hoc and ex post enforcement would create only limited incen-
tives for firm compliance. It would be better to set performance
benchmarks for the proportion of the firm's customers that must
use the products or features suitably (or at least not unsuitably)
and then field-test a sample of the firm's customers to assess
whether the benchmarks are met. Enforcement levers could in-
clude, for example: fines; rewards; licensing consequences; reg-
ulator scrutiny; or liability for unfair, deceptive, or abusive
conduct.
An example of suitability-performance regulation would be
to extend the existing system for moving a drug from prescrip-
tion to over-the-counter (OTC) status. Before a drug can be
broadly sold without a prescription today, it must be offered
OTC on a trial basis in a few OTC settings. 5 Purchasers are then
tested to determine whether the drug is indicated for their
symptoms and not contraindicated by their personal conditions,
and whether they are taking the drug as the label directs. If the
drug passes this "actual use" testing, it can be broadly sold OTC.
they make). The paradox here is that consumer meta-autonomy requires that consumers
not exercise complete decisional autonomy.
4 See Hanly v Securities and Exchange Commission, 415 F2d 589, 597 (2d Cir
1969). Rather than being subject to periodic field-testing, securities' suitability forms the
basis for ex post enforcement actions and litigation.
5 See Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill, and Lewis A. Grossman, Food and
Drug Law: Cases and Materials 531 (Foundation 3d ed 2007); Andrea Leonard-Segal, et
al, Unique Role of Consumer Studies in Nonprescription Drug Development, 49 J Am
Pharmacists Assoc 670, 671 (2009).
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A fulsome performance-based system would require that this
testing be periodically repeated in the field after the drug is re-
leased for OTC sale. This would capture the effects of marketing
and changes in consumer beliefs or habits over time. Fines or
suspension of OTC-sales privileges might be imposed as a penal-
ty for failing to meet suitability benchmarks.
Performance-based consumer law moves regulators' focus
from firms' actions to the effects of those actions on consumers.
Rather than asking whether a firm delivered a disclosure or
structured a product in a particular manner, performance-based
regulation asks whether consumers understand the transaction
and whether the transaction is appropriate for the consumers
engaged in it. This is not the first article to suggest imposing
consumer-comprehension6 or suitability requirements on firms,7
nor is it the first to suggest testing consumers for comprehen-
sion.8 Some areas of consumer law already incorporate elements
of performance-based regulation. 9 But this Article is the first to
6 Professors Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, and Steven C. Salop suggested the
use of comprehension standards for regulating consumer product claims thirty years ago
but did not develop the idea. See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, and Steven C. Salop,
The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J L & Econ 491, 530 (1981) (ex-
plaining that firms can convey information to consumers more effectively and at a lower
cost than regulators). See also Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises through
Consumer Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrow-
ers, 71 Ohio St L J 761, 821 (2010) (suggesting that lenders be barred "from completing
[mortgage] loans until they could demonstrate that a significant proportion of their bor-
rowers understood the terms of their loans," but not developing the idea); M. Ryan Calo,
Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 Notre Dame L Rev 1027, 1067
(2012) (suggesting comprehension goals for privacy disclosures but not developing the
idea). Professors Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir suggest mov-
ing from financial-product disclosure rules to a standard requiring firms to "meaningful-
ly convey[ ] the information required for a typical consumer to make a reasonable judg-
ment," but they suggest that compliance be assessed using a judge- or regulator-made
"objective reasonableness test" rather than using comprehension testing of firms' actual
customers. Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally In-
formed Financial Services Regulation *7 (New America Foundation, Oct 2008), archived
at http://perma.cc/BJF7-9W3Y.
7 Professors Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy have suggested that ex post
enforcement of suitability standards be used to regulate consumer mortgage lending. See
Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Eco-
nomics of Predatory Lending, 80 Tex L Rev 1255, 1337-38 (2002).
8 Professors Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz have suggested periodic field-based
consumer-comprehension testing in the specific context of information privacy. See Ian
Ayres and Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 Stan
L Rev 545, 579-80 (2014). The remedy they propose-clearer and more-conspicuous dis-
closure-is not in keeping with a performance-based approach to law.
9 See Part II.A.
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develop a broad performance-based approach to consumer law in
which comprehension and suitability standards and consumer
testing are productively located.1o
Performance-based consumer law together with ongoing
field-testing has the potential to incentivize firms to educate ra-
ther than obfuscate, to develop simple and intuitive product de-
signs that align with, rather than defy, consumer expectations,
and to channel consumers toward products that are suitable for
consumers' circumstances. Performance-based regulation ought
not supplant disclosure and design regulation. Among other
things, disclosure rules serve a standardizing function that facil-
itates comprehension and design regulation addresses third-
party harms that are likely to persist even when consumers en-
gage in transactions that they comprehend well and that are
suitable for their own situations. Thus, Part I of this Article
makes the case that comprehension and suitability standards
should supplement the consumer law regulatory toolbox. Part II
roughly maps how these instruments might operate, using pri-
vacy, overdraft, OTC drugs, and other examples.
Because the aim of this Article is conceptual, it leaves de-
tailed execution plans to future work-and the devil may well lie
in those details.11 But in addition to examining potential pitfalls
of performance-based consumer law, Part III suggests payoffs
that the process of designing and implementing comprehension
10 A type of performance-based regulation of consumer markets has also been sug-
gested by Professor Stephen D. Sugarman and his coauthor Nirit Sandman in the con-
text of foods that pose high health risks. See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, Salt,
High Blood Pressure, and Performance-Based Regulation, 3 Reg & Governance 84
(2009); Stephen D. Sugarman and Nirit Sandman, Fighting Childhood Obesity through
Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56 Duke L J 1403 (2007). However,
their proposals focus on minimizing social costs, whereas the proposal here focuses on
the particular goals of consumer law: maximizing consumer decisional autonomy, en-
hancing individual or household welfare, and assuring intraconsumer fairness.
11 This Article also sets aside political economy issues. Firms are not going to like
consumer law performance standards, at least in the short run. Slapping a disclosure
on a product is easier than ensuring that consumers understand a product. Although
suitability standards can allow firms to meet a broader range of consumer needs than
product-design regulation permits, firms will often prefer the certainty of design regula-
tion, particularly while the mechanics of suitability standards are being worked out.
Thomas P. Brown, a leading financial-services attorney, has already registered his oppo-
sition to comprehension standards. See Thomas P. Brown, Disclosure-an Unappreciated
Tool in the CFPB's Arsenal, 8 Berkeley Bus L J 209, 215-18 (2011). But restricting poli-
cymaking to regulations that firms do not oppose allows firms rather than citizens to
govern, a result that is incompatible with democracy.
2015] 1315
The University of Chicago Law Review
and suitability standards would produce even if performance-
based regulation does not directly lead to dramatic gains in con-
sumer comprehension or marked declines in unsuitable uses of
consumer products. The process of establishing performance
standards would provide a new lens through which to focus on
the goals of consumer law, a lens that places consumers rather
than the actions of firms at the center. The process of testing for
compliance with performance standards would produce data
about how to meet those goals in a continually evolving market-
place, even if performance-based regulation is not the best way
to do so. The Article ends by concluding that performance-based
regulation should be undertaken as a purposeful experiment,
one that promises to be a bridge to more efficacious forms of con-
sumer law.
I. WHY EXPAND OUR CURRENT TOOL SET?
The metagoals of consumer law include consumer decisional
autonomy in the marketplace; 12 market transactions that opti-
mize consumer welfare; 13 and intraconsumer fairness, particu-
larly for disadvantaged consumers. 4 The primary tools conven-
tionally used to achieve these ends are disclosure and design
regulation. This Part discusses the challenges posed by the
12 Consumer decisional autonomy is the ability, within resource constraints and the
limits of market offerings, to select which market transactions to engage in based on an
accurate understanding of the costs, benefits, and risks of a transaction. Complete deci-
sional autonomy is never possible. One will never know and be able to incorporate into
decisions all the costs, benefits, and risks of a product-but that is the aspiration.
13 Optimizing consumer welfare is also beyond what consumer law can achieve, but
consumer law can be used to help consumers shop among products to ensure that the
market tends to produce consumer surplus. More conservatively, consumer law aims to
eliminate unsuitable product transactions (the purchase of a product by a consumer for
whom the product's expected costs and risks outweigh its expected benefits).
14 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), for example, has a statutory
purpose of "ensuring ... that markets for consumer financial products and services are
fair, transparent, and competitive." 12 USC § 5511(a). The fairness metagoal is reflected
in the antidiscrimination laws applicable to consumer transactions. See, for example, 15
USC § 1691 (prohibiting discrimination in consumer lending); 42 USC § 2000a (prohibit-
ing discrimination in certain retail consumer transactions); Cal Civ Code § 51.6 (prohib-
iting gender-based price discrimination in consumer transactions). The fairness meta-
goal is also demonstrated in the felicity of various consumer doctrines for the vulnerable
consumer. See, for example, 15 USC § 1692e (prohibiting the use of a "false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt");
Clomon v Jackson, 988 F2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir 1993) (adopting the widely used 'least
sophisticated consumer" standard for § 1692e violations).
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modern consumer marketplace and explains why disclosure and
design regulation are unlikely to meet these challenges.
A. The Problem: Misaligned Interests
In broad-brush terms, the premise of consumer market
transactions is that consumers will make welfare-optimizing de-
cisions, either because individuals have an accurate understand-
ing of the costs, benefits, and risks of transactions and can com-
pare these to their own needs and tastes to arrive at the best
choice, or because consumers' needs and tastes are relatively
homogeneous and there is a sufficient proportion of savvy con-
sumers in the marketplace to incentivize firms to design their
products to maximize consumer welfare. 15 This premise holds for
some subset of consumer transactions or attributes thereof. For
example, if a payment product does not function well on a day-
to-day basis, such as when a particular prepaid debit card is not
accepted by many merchants, consumers will switch to another
card, giving issuers an incentive to create broad merchant net-
works for their cards.
There is, however, an expanding universe of transactions in
which the interests of consumers and firms are not well aligned.
This universe is expanding for two technology-related reasons:
consequential features of transactions are becoming too opaque
and changeable for many consumers to shop well for themselves,
and market structure renders consumers unable to benefit from
other consumers' shopping. Consumer law currently facilitates
rather than ameliorates the effects of these technological changes.
For consumers to understand and take adequate account of
consequential costs and risks of transactions, the transactions
must be transparent and usable at the dashboard. A product or
transaction exhibits "dashboard transparency" when what
must be understood to make a welfare-enhancing decision
about the transaction is simple, intuitive, and quickly per-
ceived. "Dashboard usability" is the quality of not demanding
15 See Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va L Rev 1387,
1462 (1983) (suggesting that an informed minority can ensure that the market provides
terms that benefit all consumers). But see R. Ted Cruz and Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My
Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Infor-
mation, 47 Hastings L J 635, 672-75 (1996) (explaining the limits of an informed minori-
ty's ability to ensure that other consumers receive beneficial terms).
20151 1317
The University of Chicago Law Review
that consumers exercise a great deal of self-control or overcome
heuristics and biases in their reasoning processes to select
transactions well. In many instances, dashboard transparency
and usability require "under-the-hood complexity," meaning
complexity that the consumer does not need to understand to
make a good product choice. For example, a fully amortizing,
fixed-rate, level-payment mortgage has only a few simple mov-
ing parts that consumers need to understand even though amor-
tization and maintaining a fixed rate when the cost of funds is var-
iable are both financially complex. A nonamortizing adjustable-
rate mortgage is simpler under the hood, but less transparent
and usable at the dashboard-consumers must understand
more, exercise greater self-control, and avoid common decisional
biases such as excessive time discounting in order to make good
decisions about these loans.
Firms have incentives to offer products that are opaque and
unusable at the dashboard. As work by Professor Oren Bar-Gill
and joint work by Professors Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson
famously show, firms shroud prices and other undesirable prod-
uct features and design products to exploit willpower and ra-
tionality limits.16 For example, because consumers often poorly
account for long-term or uncertain consequences when making
decisions, firms have an incentive to sell products laden with
contingent or back-end costs-this is why printers are cheap,
but toner cartridges are expensive, for example. Even when a
firm does not intentionally design its products or marketing and
sales methods to impede consumer decisionmaking, firms rarely
have incentives to help consumers make better decisions with
respect to opaque terms. For example, issuers use dozens of pric-
ing structures for prepaid debit cards, making it difficult for
consumers to understand and compare card prices. 17
Moreover, as Professor Russell Korobkin explains well, to
survive in a competitive market, firms must often design non-
salient product features to benefit firms at the expense of
16 See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in
Consumer Markets 19 (Oxford 2012); Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson, Shrouded At-
tributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q
J Econ 505, 510 (2006).
17 See Loaded with Uncertainty: Are Prepaid Cards a Smart Alternative to Check-
ing Accounts? *2, 7-8 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, Sept 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/U4MC-VJZW.
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consumers. 8 This is not the firms' fault; it is the result of lim-
ited consumer knowledge, skills, rationality, and cognitive-
willpower bandwidth, 19 combined with the market imperative on
firms to exploit these weaknesses or lose out to competitors who
do. For example, when banks attempted to replace a loss in re-
gressively distributed overdraft revenue with a transparent and
more fairly distributed monthly fee for using bank account debit
cards, consumers fled.20 Consumers who incurred overdraft fees
fled because they did not incorporate into their decisions an ac-
curate projection of the overdraft fees that they would pay and
therefore misperceived accounts with monthly fees as more ex-
pensive. Consumers who did not incur overdraft fees fled be-
cause they accurately perceived the monthly fee as more expen-
sive than "free" banking subsidized by overdraft fees paid by
other consumers.
When firms receive an advantage due to consumer misun-
derstanding, all three metagoals of consumer law are frustrated.
Consumers cannot exercise decisional autonomy because they do
not understand product costs and risks and therefore do not in-
corporate these into their decisions accurately. Consumers can-
not capture transaction surplus and will at times even engage in
negative-value transactions because they cannot make good
product decisions. Regressive cross subsidies from generally
poorer to generally wealthier consumers can result, because
poorer consumers usually have less cognitive-willpower band-
width with which to navigate dashboard complexity and take
contingent or future consequences into consideration.21 To the
extent that the wealthier end of the market is competitive, com-
petition can drive firms to offer products that subsidize wealthi-
er consumers at the expense of poorer consumers. 22
18 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Un-
conscionability, 70 U Chi L Rev 1203, 1234-36 (2003).
19 Willpower and cognitive capacity function as a single resource in the brain, such
that if willpower is taxed then so is cognition, and vice versa. See Roy F. Baumeister, et
al, Free Will in Consumer Behavior: Self-Control, Ego Depletion, and Choice, 18 J Con-
sumer Psych 4, 8-11 (2008).
20 See Eric Dash, Banks Quietly Ramping Up Costs to Consumers (NY Times, Nov
13, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc[WWE9-S2ZL ("Bank of America abandoned its $5 a
month debit card usage fee in late October amid a firestorm of criticism.").
21 See Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, Scarcity:' Why Having Too Little
Means So Much 65 (Times Books 2013).
22 See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U Chi L Rev 1155,
1184-85 (2013) (explaining the regressive cross subsidy created by overdraft fees); Scott
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Transactions presenting this misaligned-interests problem
are increasing in frequency for several reasons. First, technology
and market structure allow firms to make more complex prod-
ucts and more variations of them, and to alter these products
more quickly. Whereas once there were just a couple standard-
ized types of mortgages, the late 1990s brought a profusion of
mortgage types and the life cycle of each formulation was short.
Consumers could not use information provided by firms, social
knowledge, or personal experience to select a mortgage well.
Second, firms can selectively target this multitude of com-
plex and volatile product offerings using diverse marketing
scripts to ever-narrower consumer segments, allowing firms to
better exploit individual consumer knowledge, skill, rationality,
and cognitive-willpower bandwidth limits. With big data and the
presence of computers, cell phones, and other devices intermedi-
ating consumer transactions, firms can tailor marketing, prod-
ucts, and prices to a single consumer in real time. As marketers
explain, "To fully understand your customer or prospects re-
quires a collection of multiple data points that can include de-
mographic, purchase history, customer service requests, lifecycle
stage, [and] browse and cross-channel engagement behavior da-
ta."23 In addition, marketers suggest that
you must have real-time data [about] ... what your custom-
ers are doing now, where they are located, and how they are
engaging with your brand (which channels and devices)-all
of this data allows the marketer to understand their cus-
tomer's current context ... which in turn enables them to
engage customers with hyper-personalized communications
that fit their needs in the present moment.24
For example, firms now engage in "price optimization," the use
of real-time consumer data to determine who will likely price
Schuh, Oz Shy, and Joanna Stavins, Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Pay-
ments? Theory and Calibrations *2 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Aug 31, 2010), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/93JQ-GK2R (documenting the regressive effect of credit card
rewards programs).
23 Katrina Conn, Moving beyond Basic Personalization to Real-Time Marketing
(ClickZ, Jan 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/SXHJ-4WKQ. "Channel" refers to paper
mailing, internet browser, mobile phone, or other means through which marketers reach
consumers.
24 Id. See also Present Tense Marketing: Engaging Consumers for a Constantly
Connected World (StrongView), archived at http://perma.cc/RE84-RXSP.
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shop and who will not, based on their personal characteristics,
predicted mood, and behavior in the moment. 25 Such tactics pre-
vent consumers from relying on the market to push quality up
and prices down. Instead, each consumer must navigate the
market alone.
B. The Regulatory Race: Disclosure Mandates
The disclosure model of regulation contemplates various
transmission paths through which disclosed information might
improve consumer well-being. The most obvious is that consum-
ers-or at least enough of them to discipline the market-might
each use informational disclosures combined with knowledge of
their own situations, needs, and preferences to make welfare-
enhancing decisions.26 However, as most comprehensively and
entertainingly described by Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and
Carl Schneider, mandated disclosure routinely has little or no
positive impact on consumer marketplace decisions and can
even lead consumers astray.27
Scholars and regulators have generally attributed disclo-
sure's failures to bounded consumer rationality and willpower.28
Yet they continue to tinker, trusting that they can overcome
25 See Herb Weisbaum, Data Mining Is Now Used to Set Insurance Rates; Critics
Cry Foul (CNBC, Apr 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9LRC-EWW5 (explaining
that the insurance industry has started using price optimization to set rates); Price Op-
timization (Earnix), archived at http://perma.cc/HYF6-N77P (offering a service that al-
lows banks to "[a]nalyze the price elasticity of each customer profile and uncover the effi-
cient pricing frontier for each product in [their] portfolio").
26 Alternatively, uninformed consumers might follow advice from third parties who
have digested the information in disclosures. But third parties are often misinformed or
biased and consumers often cannot or do not use the third parties well. See The Truth
about Angie's List, Yelp, and More: Ratings Services Promise Unbiased Reviews of Local
Businesses. Do They Deliver?, Consumer Rpts 6, 6-7 (Aug 2013) (finding that businesses
commonly manipulate user reviews to positively skew their own ratings).
27 See generally Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know (cited
in note 3). A recent study indicates that a new disclosure of the monthly payment
amount necessary to pay off a credit card's balance in thirty-six months increased the
number of cardholders who made a payment of that size. However, the study was unable
to conclusively determine "whether the nudge affected overall repayment behavior" be-
cause some cardholders may have increased their payments while others decreased
them. Sumit Agarwal, et al, Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from
Credit Cards, 130 Q J Econ 111, 152 (2015).
28 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U Chi L
Rev 249, 260-61 (2006).
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these bounds.29 What remain surprisingly underappreciated are
the dynamic effects of firms' responses to disclosures. Firms sab-
otage disclosures by: (1) ferreting out situations in which con-
sumers are particularly unlikely to be influenced by disclosures;
(2) physically framing consumer receipt of disclosures to mini-
mize their influence; (3) psychologically framing consumer re-
ceipt of disclosures to minimize their influence; (4) altering the
product to make disclosures less useful; and (5) offering consum-
ers alternative ways to select the product, rather than through
examination of the disclosure. Disclosure regulation can control
the format in which selected information is presented, but it
cannot control the frame in which the consumer receives-and
ultimately may not perceive-this information.
The first method for sabotaging disclosure-ferreting out
consumers in situations in which disclosure is likely to be inef-
fective-is becoming increasingly sophisticated in the device-
mediated age. The late twentieth century saw mortgage sellers
fishing for disclosure-insensitive prospects by mailing "live
checks" that, when cashed, would result in loans at exorbitant
interest rates; the consumers who cashed the checks were good
prospects for a high-priced mortgage. 30 Firms today leverage big
data to reach the consumers who are most likely to be receptive
to advertising at the precise moments when they are most likely
to be receptive and most likely to ignore disclosures.31 For exam-
ple, positive moods can lead consumers to ignore risks, poten-
tially making disclosures of risks ineffective.32 Therefore, firms
track consumers as they play online games and then target ad-
vertisements to the moments when consumers are experiencing
29 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U Chi L
Rev 1349, 1366-87 (2011).
30 See Promoting Homeownership by Ensuring Liquidity in the Subprime Mortgage
Market, Joint Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit and the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity of the
Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong, 2d Sess 104, 110 (2004) (statement of Assis-
tant Attorney General Pamela Kogut, Office of the Attorney General of Massachusetts)
(explaining that the practices of mortgage lenders included "luring" mortgage customers
through live checks).
31 For a nice overview of how firms engage in market manipulation, see generally
Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 Geo Wash L Rev 995 (2014).
32 See Punam Anand Keller, Isaac M. Lipkus, and Barbara K. Rimer, Depressive
Realism and Health Risk Accuracy: The Negative Consequences of Positive Mood, 29 J
Consumer Rsrch 57, 65-67 (2002); Eric J. Johnson and Amos Tversky, Affect, Generali-
zation, and the Perception of Risk, 45 J Personality & Soc Psych 20, 29-30 (1983).
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success or defeat to take advantage of the consumers' likely posi-
tive or negative moods in the advertising pitch.33 As experi-
mental manipulations of user mood by social networking and
dating sites have highlighted, firms can even influence consum-
er mood.14
Firms can also hide disclosures or divert consumer attention
from them. Paper disclosures are surrounded by a stack of other
documents and online disclosures can appear below or beyond
the first screen. A more sophisticated example comes from
AT&T's addition of a mandatory arbitration clause to its con-
tract with its customers: it designed the envelope, cover letter,
and amended contract through extensive market testing to en-
sure that most consumers would not open the envelope, or that if
they did open it, they would not read beyond the cover letter.35
To take another example, a reminder about privacy concerns de-
livered just before subjects make a choice that will determine
whether their personal information is revealed leads subjects
to behave in more privacy-protective ways. But adding just a
fifteen-second delay between the privacy disclosure and the
loading of the next webpage where the subjects make the choice
that implicates privacy eliminates the privacy-protective effect
of the disclosure on a subject's choices.36 Even idle conversation
reduces a subject's comprehension of disclosures. 37
33 See Michael Carney, MediaBrix Enables Targeted Advertising during Moments of
Positive and Negative Emotion in Social Games (PandoDaily, Apr 18, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/5N7T-NLZK. See also New Beauty Study Reveals Days, Times and Occa-
sions When U.S. Women Feel Least Attractive (PHD Media, Oct 2, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/6C6T-QUES (reporting on research showing that women feel the least
attractive on Mondays between the hours of 5:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., or after 10:00 p.m.,
as well as when they are sick, stressed, or tired, and suggesting that marketers of beauty
products take advantage of these windows).
34 See generally Adam D.I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory, and Jeffrey T. Hancock, Ex-
perimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion through Social Networks,
111 Proceedings Natl Academy Sci 8788 (2014). See also Stewart Shapiro, Deborah J.
MacInnis, and C. Whan Park, Understanding Program-Induced Mood Effects: Decou-
pling Arousal from Valence, 31 J Advertising 15, 17 (2002) (describing the cognitive
mechanisms by which advertisements affect mood).
35 See Ting v AT&T, 319 F3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir 2003).
36 See Idris Adjerid, et al, Sleights of Privacy: Framing, Disclosures, and the Limits
of Transparency *8-9, archived at http://perma.cc/45R2-NB4Y.
37 See, for example, Debra Pogrund Stark, Jessica M. Choplin, and Mark A.
Leboeuf, Ineffective in Any Form: How Confirmation Bias and Distractions Undermine
Improved Home-Loan Disclosures, 122 Yale L J Online 377, 388-89 (2013) (finding
that disclosures previously developed by the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development to improve mortgage comprehension succeeded somewhat
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Psychologically, advertising and sales talk can frame con-
sumers' thought processes when they approach disclosures. Bla-
tant sales tactics such as claims of scarcity ("Better act fast!") or
"unbeatable" offers are common because they are effective.38
Persuasive sales methods can also be subtle. A former loan bro-
ker explains how apparently idle chitchat is not so idle:
[Y]ou tell the loan salesperson you want the loan to upgrade
a room. He or she will ask you why, and you innocently will
say that you want your daughter to have a nice new room.
"Oh, really, what color?" asks the loan arranger. Purple, you
say.
Rest assured, as the process moves along, the salesperson
... will continuously remind you that your goal is to "paint
a nice new purple room." The salesman seems to ... truly
care that the room is done professionally to ensure your
daughter's complete happiness.
It's easy to forget that your goal is not a purple room, it's a
loan at the best price and terms possible.39
Trust in a salesperson or in a brand may lead a consumer to
misinterpret a disclosure in a way that favors the outcome sug-
gested by the salesperson or advertising,40 or to skip looking at
disclosures at all.41 One study found that consumers' perception
and comprehension of contraindication disclosures decline when
a brand name is added to OTC-drug packaging.42
Firms design products and purchase processes to stymie
consumer comprehension of disclosures or to encourage consum-
ers to ignore disclosures. When some price components must be
when subjects examined the disclosures in silence, but that improvement diminished
when the experimenter engaged the subject in conversation).
38 See Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice 203-08 (Allyn and Bacon
4th ed 2006); Anick Bosmans and Luk Warlop, How Vulnerable Are Consumers to Bla-
tant Persuasion Attempts? *7, archived at http://perma.ccYZX4-WUCD.
39 Dieter Brunner, The Mistakes Borrowers Make, and How to Avoid Them: A Mort-
gage Geek Tells All (ConsumerAffairs, June 6, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/Y7N6
-A99M.
40 See Cialdini, Influence at 238 (cited in note 38).
41 See Jesse R. Catlin, Cornelia Pechmann, and Eric P. Brass, The Influence of
Need for Cognition and Principal Display Panel Factors on Over-the-Counter Drug Facts
Label Comprehension, 27 Health Commun 264, 268-70 (2012).
42 See id.
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prominently disclosed, firms fold more of the cost of the product
into less-visible components.43 Comprehension of all relevant
features of a product that is complex at the dashboard requires
complex disclosures, and complex disclosures are poorly under-
stood.44 Firms shape purchasing processes to ensure that con-
sumers sink significant costs into the effort-and perhaps switch
from a decisionmaking to an implementation mindset-before
receiving the disclosure. For example, consumers must often se-
lect and download a device application ("app") before they can
learn how much personal data the app will collect about them;
by that time they may already be committed to the purchase and
will mindlessly click through the disclosure screen.45 Firms can
ensure that social pressures discourage consumers from examin-
ing disclosures. For example, at chronically understaffed car-
rental counters, consumers have serious social pressure from the
line standing behind them to not read the contract.
Perhaps most powerfully, firms can offer consumers alterna-
tive bases for making a decision that require less time and effort
than comprehension of a disclosure would entail. For example,
after the "nutrition facts" label appeared on packaged foods,
firms short-circuited this detailed mandated disclosure by offer-
ing consumers front-of-package nutrition claims, culminating in
the infamous "Smart Choices" checkmark that graced even
Fudgsicles and Froot Loops.46 Among other things, front-of-
package nutrition claims divert consumers from examining the
43 See, for example, Comments to the Federal Reserve Board: Truth in Lending-
Proposed Rule *32 (National Consumer Law Center, Dec 24, 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/EHZ5-MBT9 (explaining how the exclusion of third-party fees from the
calculation of the annual percentage rate (APR) that lenders must disclose under the
Truth in Lending Act has "led to an explosion of bizarre third-party fees, including $50
e-mail fees, multiple charges for courier fees, sometimes amounting to hundreds of dol-
lars, and 'fax review fees').
44 See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem
of Predatory Lending; Price, 65 Md L Rev 707, 790-91 (2006).
45 See Adrienne Porter Felt, et al, Android Permissions: User Attention, Com-
prehension, and Behavior *12 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/SXD9-4GZZ; Serge
Egelman, et al, Timing Is Everything? The Effects of Timing and Placement of Online
Privacy Indicators *6 (2009), archived at http://perma.cc/UR2G-7337.
46 See William Neuman, For Your Health, Froot Loops (NY Times, Sept 4, 2009),
archived at http://perma.cc/B6ML-EA4B; Christina A. Roberto, et al, Choosing Front-of-
Package Food Labelling Nutritional Criteria: How Smart Were 'Smart Choices'?, 15 Pub
Health Nutrition 262, 262 (2012) (finding that "[m]ore than 60% of foods that received
the 'Smart Choices' label did not meet standard nutritional criteria for a 'healthy' food
choice").
2015] 1325
The University of Chicago Law Review
mandated disclosures.47 Consumers use the very term "privacy
policy" as a decisionmaking shortcut. This is the heading that
firms affix to the website link or portion of a disclosure form that
explains their practices regarding personal-data collection and
use. But instead of reading the policies, consumers assume that
a firm with a "privacy policy" has a policy of keeping consumer
data private. 48
Sometimes firm efforts to sabotage disclosure are found to
violate general prohibitions on unconscionable, unfair, decep-
tive, and abusive acts and practices (UDAAP). But UDAAP en-
forcement today is largely complaint driven and biased toward
addressing the problems afflicting "wealthier, white, better edu-
cated, better informed" consumers 49 who feel entitled to com-
plain. Back-end enforcement often creates insufficient incentives
for front-end compliance due to corporate insolvency, uncertain
liability, problems of proof, dispersion of harm, and other barri-
ers to initiating and maintaining successful adversarial ac-
tions.50 Finally, current constitutional protections for commercial
speech immunize most marketing practices.
47 See Brian Roe, Alan S. Levy, and Brenda M. Derby, The Impact of Health Claims
on Consumer Search and Product Evaluation Outcomes: Results from FDA Experimental
Data, 18 J Pub Pol & Mktg 89, 99-101 (1999).
48 See Ilana Westerman, What Misconceptions Do Consumers Have about Privacy?
(Privacy Perspectives, June 3, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Y75J-M8VU. See also
Carlos Jensen, Colin Potts, and Christian Jensen, Privacy Practices of Internet Users:
Self-Reports versus Observed Behavior, 63 Intl J Human-Computer Stud 203, 226 (2005)
(noting that users interpret trust marks as the presence of a quality privacy policy).
49 Stephen Meili, Consumer Protection, in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer, eds,
The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 176, 180 (Oxford 2010) (summarizing
the findings of the empirical literature). See also Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil
Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 Ann Rev Soc 339, 347-52 (2008)
(documenting race, class, and gender disparities in the likelihood that a consumer who
experiences a civil justice problem will pursue a legal remedy); Arthur Best and Alan R.
Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving De-
fects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 L & Socy Rev 701, 723-24 (1977)
(finding that voiced complaints tend to underrepresent complex problems, poor consum-
ers, and racial minorities).
50 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J Legal
Stud 357, 360-63 (1984); Charles D. Kolstad, Thomas S. Ulen, and Gary V. Johnson, Ex
Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80
Am Econ Rev 888, 889 (1990).
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C. The Regulatory Race: Product-Design Regulation
A similar dysfunctional cycle afflicts consumer product-
design regulation. Design regulation is intended to eliminate
harmful products or features without eliminating those that
enhance consumer welfare. It presents a danger of being over-
inclusive because it effectively bans products that could be wel-
fare enhancing for some subset of consumers. But to avoid im-
peding innovation or constraining consumer choice, most design
rules are written narrowly. The result is that firms can evade
design regulation through changes in their products that meet
the letter but not the spirit of the rules. Regulators ban one
product feature only to have a similar feature pop up in its
place.
Any product or attribute that does not need a revamped as-
sembly line to effectuate a change is vulnerable to this shape-
shifting. For example, firms can change most consumer contract
terms virtually overnight. 51 The case is the same with financial
products. As the former CEO of a major credit card issuer frank-
ly explained, "Bankers will figure it out to comply and say, ...
'Tell me the rules, and then I'll outsmart you all.' . . . You make
the stupid laws, I'll comply and I'll make money."52
The archetype for evading regulation through shape-shifting
is high-priced, small-dollar lending, such as payday lending.
When product-design regulation intended to eliminate payday
lending has been implemented, firms have continued to lend at
the same prices through a parade of sleights. Lenders may
evade interest-rate caps by selling loans bundled with over-
priced ancillary services such as insurance, "membership plans,"
check cashing, or credit repair,53 or by acting as "Credit Service
Organizations" that charge exorbitant fees for arranging loans
from other lenders. 54 To escape statutory definitions of "payday
loans" and to avoid the 36 percent APR cap on loans to members
51 See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L Rev 605, 645 (2010); Brian Grow and Robert Berner, About
That New, "Friendly" Consumer Contract (Bloomberg, Apr 29, 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/76B3-LM4Q.
52 Lowell Bergman and Oriana Zill de Granados, The Card Game (PBS Frontline,
Nov 24, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/AX3A-X8J7 (quoting Shailesh Mehta, former
CEO of Providian Financial).
53 See Ronald J. Mann and Jim Hawkins, Just until Payday, 54 UCLA L Rev 855,
901-02 (2007); Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J Econ Persp 169, 180 (2007).
54 Stegman, 21 J Econ Persp at 180-81 (cited in note 53).
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of the military, lenders make loans that are just over size or ma-
turity rules, nominally structure lump-sum loans as installment
loans, or drop the requirement that borrowers provide a post-
dated check.55 One payday lender's response to a legal challenge
to its tactics to evade Ohio's ban on payday loans is telling. Ra-
ther than informing shareholders that a loss in court would end
its sales in Ohio, the lender stated that it would merely "have to
alter its short-term loan product in Ohio." 56 A recent study pro-
vides evidence that when payday loans are effectively banned,
consumers respond by shifting at least some of their borrowing
to similarly high-priced pawnshop or auto-title loans.67
Even the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and
Disclosure Act5s ("CARD Act"), which used product-design regu-
lation to enormously reduce the fees paid by consumers to card
issuers,59 has been undercut by a variety of pricing schemes not
covered by the Act. In the fine print, issuers have placed floors
on variable interest rates, added new fees, broadened the defini-
tion of transactions to which existing fees apply, and increased
fees not covered by the CARD Act.60 The CARD Act may be fur-
ther eclipsed by industry efforts to move consumers to cards not
covered by the statute. Banks are marketing prepaid debit cards
heavily, especially to students, to whom they can no longer mar-
ket credit cards.61 Many prepaid cards come with opaque fees
55 See Paul Kiel, How Payday Lenders Escape State Crackdowns (Mother Jones,
Aug 7, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/RGE5-ZQ8F; The Extension of High-Cost Credit
to Servicemembers and Their Families *9 (CFPB, Dec 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/6JLQ-3AEC.
56 Kiel, How Payday Lenders Escape State Crackdowns (cited in note 55) (quotation
marks omitted) (quoting an annual report of payday lender Cashland's parent company).
57 See Jacob Goldin and Tatiana Homonoff, Consumer Borrowing after Payday
Loan Bans *19-20 (Nov 5, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/87FA-ZBN6.
58 Pub L No 111-24, 123 Stat 1734 (2009), codified as amended in various sections
of Title 15.
59 See Agarwal, et al, 130 Q J Econ at 3-4 (cited in note 27) (estimating that, in the
two years after it became effective, the CARD Act reduced fees paid by consumers by
nearly $12 billion annually).
60 See generally Joshua M. Frank, Dodging Reform: As Some Credit Card Abuses
Are Outlawed, New Ones Proliferate (Center for Responsible Lending, Dec 10, 2009), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/2UNV-FYRK. See also Oren Bar-Gill and Ryan Bubb, Credit
Card Pricing. The CARD Act and Beyond, 97 Cornell L Rev 967, 997-99 (2012) (showing
that fees not regulated by the CARD Act, such as cash-advance fees, increased after the
passage of the statute).
61 See Catherine New, American Express Campus Edition Debuts as Prepaid Debit
Card for College Students (Huffington Post, May 10, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/YW2R-L4BA. In the year the CARD Act became effective, dollars loaded
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that consumers have difficulty avoiding and do not anticipate,
similar to the fees that were reduced by the CARD Act.62 Card
issuers have also been selling ordinary consumers business cred-
it cards, which are not regulated by the CARD Act.63
Broad standards, such as UDAAP prohibitions, can be ap-
plied to the design of a product. The formative unconscionability
case, after all, suggested that cross collateralization clauses se-
curing purchase-money loans with other household goods ought
not to be a feature of consumer contracts, at least those con-
tracts with disadvantaged consumers in which such clauses tend
to be written.64 UDAAP prohibitions are at times used to stop
firm evasion of narrow rules.
But broad standards are also frequently rewritten by regu-
lators and courts into narrow, evadable rules. For example, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently issued a fifty-three-
page handbook explaining how to design "clear and conspicuous"
disclosures to avoid engaging in deceptive or unfair online ad-
vertising.65 While the handbook states that "[t]here is no set
formula for a clear and conspicuous disclosure,66 it delves into
such minutiae as font size and color rules.67 In the courts,
UDAAP prohibitions are applied using an "objective" reasona-
bleness standard, which in practice relies on the subjective view
of the court as to what is reasonable. Firms can then take the
regulatory prescriptions and past holdings defining reasonable
conduct and design products around them. Courts do not always
let firms get away with this, but because unconscionability and
UDAAP enforcement is largely complaint driven-thus suffering
from both the biased case selection and ex post litigation weak-
nesses described above-firms have little reason not to engage
in this type of shape-shifting.
onto prepaid debit cards increased by over 40 percent. See Dana Dratch, 6 Things to
Know about Reloadable Prepaid Cards (CreditCards.com, Oct 27, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/W6VE-475A.
62 See Consumers Continue to Load Up on Prepaid Cards (The Pew Charitable
Trusts, Feb 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/27VE-XX2M.
63 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Beware That New Credit-Card Offer (Wall St J,
Aug 28, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/LV68-4YY7.
64 See Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F2d 445, 447-50 (DC
Cir 1965).
65 Federal Trade Commission, .Com Disclosures: How to Make Effective Disclosures
in Digital Advertising *6-7 (Mar 2013), archived at http://perma.ccfN6BQ-JJTV.
66 Id at*7.
67 Id at*17.
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II. BRINGING PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION TO
CONSUMER LAW
Regulators might improve disclosure and design rules, but
firms often quickly outpace improvements and regulators can
rarely stay caught up for long. Performance-based regulation
would intervene in this dysfunctional regulatory cycle and has
the potential to change its direction to a virtuous one. This Part
provides background on performance-based regulation, describes
the benefits that it could bring to consumer law, roughs out the
mechanics of both comprehension and suitability regulation, and
then applies the model to a few exemplar consumer-transaction
types.
A. Background on Performance-Based Regulation
What is performance-based regulation, why is it used, and
how is compliance measured? This Section answers each of these
questions in turn.
Regulation can be placed on a continuum, from the more
prescriptive to the more performance based.68 Prescriptive (or
proscriptive) regulation is typified by formal, concrete rules that
dictate what firms must (or must not) do. The classic (if apocry-
phal) example is a mandated scrubber system for an industrial
smokestack that would otherwise emit more air pollution. The
regulator dictates the design of the production processes with an
aim to push the regulated behavior toward the regulator's ulti-
mate goal. In contrast, performance-based regulation sets a
measurable standard closer to the regulator's ultimate goal and
allows the regulated entity to choose how to meet that standard.
The classic example is an air pollution emissions standard.
68 See Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash, and Todd Olmstead, Performance-Based
Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection,
55 Admin L Rev 705, 713 & n 20 (2003). Performance-based regulation can be combined
with market mechanisms to reduce total costs and promote innovation by allowing firms
with lower marginal compliance costs to trade with those with higher compliance
costs. See Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescrib-
ing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L & Socy Rev 691, 701 (2003). The
proposal herein rejects the addition of market mechanisms out of a concern that they
would undermine the intraconsumer fairness aim of consumer law in much the same
way that tradable pollution permits might lead to pollution hot spots in disadvantaged
communities.
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The labels reflect a difference of degree rather than kind. In
some sense, no regulation is ever purely prescriptive; even if a
particular type of smokestack scrubber were required for coal-
fired power plants, for example, the firm could produce power
using wind turbines instead. Likewise, what has come to be
called performance-based regulation does not give firms com-
plete discretion in meeting the regulator's ultimate goal, but ra-
ther sets an intermediate target that firms must meet. For ex-
ample, a regulator's ultimate goal might be to protect human
health. Performance-based regulation of pollution does not set a
standard keyed directly to human health or even to the amount
of a toxin that enters people's bodies, but to the amount of a tox-
in emitted into the air, a measure that is closer to the end goal
of human health than a scrubber. This approach confers on
firms both more flexibility and more responsibility to determine
how to meet the requirements of the law.
Performance-based regulation aspires to bring regulated
firms closer to regulators' ultimate goals, with more certainty
and at a lower cost than prescriptive regulation. A prescribed
scrubber may or may not be successful in meeting the inter-
mediate goal of limiting pollutant emissions to a particular
level. An emissions standard will reach at least that interme-
diate goal, provided that emissions are measured well and the
standard is enforced effectively. The flexibility that firms
have in meeting performance standards means that firms can
innovatively find the lowest-cost means of reaching the goal.
For example, in the air pollution context, firms may still
choose scrubbers or they may change other aspects of the pro-
duction process. 69 By aligning the firm's goal with the regula-
tor's goal, the performance-based approach brings to bear on
the regulatory problem the firm's greater knowledge of its
own processes, greater facility with experimentation, and
greater ability to adapt to changes in both the environment
and available technology.
Performance-based regulation is sometimes erroneously con-
flated with coregulation, self-regulation, or even deregulation,
69 See J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation:
The Case of Climate Change, 155 U Pa L Rev 1499, 1508 (2007) (describing performance-
based regulation in the environmental context as "end-of-pipe" standards that "permit
flexible compliance (perhaps by allowing installation of technology at a local facility, fuel
switching, or other strategies)").
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perhaps because performance standards are often set by regula-
tors in close consultation with industry and thus capture may
drive the standards down.7o Performance-based safety and
soundness regulation has even been advocated by the banking
industry, with performance measured by bank self-
assessments.71 But performance ought to be assessed by regula-
tors or independent auditors, and standards need not be watered
down. In some cases the move from prescriptive standards to
performance standards has stepped on the toes of entrenched
industries. Building codes, for example, moved from prescriptive
steel-pipe-building-material requirements to specified pressure-
per-square-centimeter performance-based standards72 that al-
lowed the use of less-expensive plastic pipe, despite the "kicks
and screams" of the steel industry.73
One important dimension on which performance-based reg-
ulatory systems vary in operation is the timing of compliance
testing. Compliance can be measured before the performance
that is the true target of the regulation, after the performance,
or at regular intervals during the performance. Only the last of
these can provide the full benefits of the performance-based law
paradigm, including the facilitation of adaptive regulation.
Some existing performance-based-consumer law schemes
employ testing only at the front end, prior to full release of the
product. The testing to establish evidence of suitable product use
that is a prerequisite for approving a drug for OTC sales, de-
scribed in the introduction, is one example. Another comes from
the European Union, where food sellers will soon be required to
demonstrate "scientifically valid evidence" of the "average"
70 See, for example, Jody Freeman and Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental
Regulation, 54 Duke L J 795, 816 n 58 (2005) (ascribing low performance standards in
the regulation of sulfur dioxide to the influence of powerful "special interests") (quotation
marks omitted).
71 See J. French Hill and John B. Lewis, Performance-Based Regulation: Making
Banks More Competitive, 16 Banking Pol Rep 5, 8 (1997).
72 See Maureen A. Breitenberg, The ABC's of Standards Activities *7 (National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology, Aug 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/DJ6J-5J42
(contrasting performance standards with design standards and explaining that "a per-
formance standard for water pipe might set requirements for the pressure per square
centimeter that a pipe must withstand," whereas "the requirement that a pipe must be
made of a given gauge of copper would be a design standard").
73 See Stephen R. Seidel, Housing Costs and Government Regulations: Confronting
the Regulatory Maze 82-83 (Center for Urban Policy Research 1978); Allied Tube & Con-
duit Corp v Indian Head, Inc, 486 US 492, 496-98 (1988).
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consumer's understanding of front-of-package nutrition claims
through up-front consumer-comprehension testing.74
When performance is measured at only the start of perfor-
mance, the regulator's goal may be met in the short term but not
the long term. As discussed above, this is a weakness of the OTC
regulation process, which cannot capture long-term consumer-
use patterns or the effects of marketing. A similar problem af-
flicts modern building codes, which measure compliance with
performance standards only at installation. No testing is done to
determine whether, after years of weathering and settling, the
materials continue to perform as desired, and the builder is not
responsible for ensuring performance over time. The lack of on-
going testing can create serious problems in a performance-
based regulatory system. For example, in New Zealand, perfor-
mance standards in building codes without ongoing surveillance
and accountability created substantial problems with leaky
buildings. 76
On the other hand, enforcing performance standards only ex
post (when something goes wrong) may be too late to avert prob-
lems and may result in systematic underenforcement. An exam-
ple of a performance standard applied ex post is the prohibition
in the Lanham Act 7  on deceptive advertising,77 which the courts
assess by reference to survey evidence showing whether con-
sumers were misled by the defendant's advertising.78 A similar
back-end enforcement scheme has been used for the requirement
that investment advisers ensure that their retail clients under-
stand when the adviser has a conflict of interest.79 The ultimate
74 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 Art 35 (Oct 25, 2011).
75 See Peter J. May, Performance-Based Regulation and Regulatory Regimes: The
Saga of Leaky Buildings, 25 L & Pol 381, 397 (2003).
76 Pub L No 79-489, 60 Stat 427 (1946), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1051 et seq.
77 15 USC § 1125(a)(1)(B).
78 See Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co v Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 19 F3d 125, 129-30 (3d Cir 1994) (explaining that, unlike an
FTC plaintiff, a Lanham Act plaintiff "cannot obtain relief by arguing how consumers
could react; it must show how consumers actually do react") (emphasis in original).
79 In the 1948 proceeding of In the Matter of Arleen W. Hughes, 27 SEC 629 (1948),
which found that an investment adviser violated the securities laws by failing to ensure
that her clients understood her conflict of interest, the SEC explained:
It is clear from th[e] testimony that certain of registrant's clients did not un-
derstand that registrant consistently proposed to, and in fact did, sell her own
securities to them. Accordingly, registrant did not fulfill her affirmative obliga-
tion to disclose the capacity in which she acted.... [N]o hard and fast rule can
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back-end performance standard is strict liability in tort, such as
consumer products liability. Holding builders strictly (and even
mortally) liable when a house they build later falls down and
kills a resident80 gives builders incentives to use materials that
will withstand the test of time. But back-end enforcement suf-
fers from the biased case selection and ex post litigation weak-
nesses described above.
By contrast, the performance-based approach to consumer
law promoted herein relies on ongoing periodic testing. Two areas
of consumer law in which regulators today are explicitly tasked
with using ongoing testing to assess compliance with perfor-
mance standards are food safety8l and children's product safe-
ty.82 The former is gravely underfunded83 and the latter too new
be set down as to an appropriate method for registrant to disclose the fact that
she proposes to deal on her own account. The method and extent of disclosure
depends upon the particular client involved. . . . The explanation must be
such, however, that the particular client is clearly advised and understands
before the completion of each transaction that registrant proposes to sell her
own securities.
Id at 641 (emphasis added).
80 See Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield, 1 The Human Record: Sources of
Global History 13 (Wadsworth 7th ed 2011), quoting The Hammurabi Code, Art 229
(1904) (Chilperic Edwards, trans) ("If a builder has built a house for a man, and his work
is not strong, and if the house he has built falls in and kills the householder, that builder
shall be slain.").
si The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) perform periodic and incident-triggered testing of food samples. See 21
USC § 374 (establishing FDA inspection authority); 21 USC §§ 603-06, 608-09, 615-16
(establishing USDA inspection authority for meats); Renie Johnson, The Federal Food Sys-
tem: A Primer *4-7, 11-13, 16-17 (Congressional Research Service, Jan 17, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/5RDR-LUDL; Department of Health and Human Services, Biennial Re-
port to Congress on the Food Emergency Response Network *5 (FDA, 2013), archived at
http://perma.ccIW6SZ-JENW (describing the FDA's emergency testing systems).
82 Manufacturers and importers of children's products have a duty to obtain period-
ic third-party safety testing. See 15 USC § 2063. See also Margaret Mikyung Lee, Con-
sumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008: P.L. 110-314 *10 (Congressional Re-
search Service, Sept 22, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/3QNY-M4LE (describing the
third-party testing requirement).
83 The FDA estimates that it conducts unannounced compliance inspections (at
which it can conduct pathogen and contaminant performance testing) of domestic food
producers every five to ten years. See Johnson, The Federal Food System at *12 (cited in
note 81). The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) will increase the frequency of these
inspections to once every three to seven years, depending on the risk posed by the facili-
ty. 21 USC § 350j. The FSMA also gave the FDA authority to implement a more thor-
ough performance-testing system, one that would require food producers both to engage
in regular pathogen testing of production facilities and finished products and to audit
suppliers. 21 USC §§ 350g, 2201. The FDA has proposed regulations that would require
such testing. Food and Drug Administration, Current Good Manufacturing Practice and
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to assess.8 4  The Gainful Employment Rule's graduate-
employment benchmarks promulgated by the Department of
Education for federal lending to students of for-profit schools are
a form of performance testing for suitability that is ongoing, alt-
hough the benchmarks are a lagging indicator of performances8
These benchmarks are just now taking effect.86 Emissions test-
ing provides a better model: performance is measured continu-
ously or at regular intervals such that regulators can detect
changes in performance over time and can address problems be-
fore substantial harm occurs.8 7
B. Benefits of Successful Performance-Based Consumer Law
More widespread use of performance-based regulation
promises several benefits over prescriptive regulation for con-
sumer law. These include the general benefits of performance-
based regulation described above: firms can meet performance
standards more quickly, more effectively, and at a lower cost
than can regulators using prescriptive regulation, particularly
over time. This Section describes additional benefits specific to
comprehension and suitability standards.
1. Comprehension standards: enlisting firms to educate
consumers.
A primary goal of disclosure is to give consumers the power to
make welfare-enhancing marketplace decisions while retaining
Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Preventive Controls for Human Food, 79 Fed Reg
58524, 58526, 58548 (2014); id at 58565-67 (proposed rule); id at 58568-69 (proposed
rule).
84 Ongoing safety testing for children's products is required only once every one to
three years, and the requirement came into effect in 2013. See Consumer Product Safety
Commission, Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification, 76 Fed Reg
69482, 69490 (2011); Periodic Testing (Consumer Product Safety Commission), archived
at http://perma.ccIB7D2-FU6T.
85 See Department of Education, Program Integrity: Gainful Employment-Debt
Measures, 76 Fed Reg 34386, 34386-34401 (2011).
86 The rules were vacated in 2012 when a court held that the loan-repayment-rate
benchmark was not supported by objective criteria. See Association of Private Colleges
and Universities v Duncan, 870 F Supp 2d 133, 152-55 (DDC 2012). New benchmarks were
promulgated in 2014, but they did not go into effect until July 1, 2015. See Department of
Education, Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 79 Fed Reg 64890, 64890 (2014).
87 See Continuous Emissions Monitoring Fact Sheet (EPA, Apr 14, 2009), archived
at http://perma.cc/8WC9-V5R9 (discussing a scheme requiring continuous monitoring);
40 CFR § 63.11220 (discussing another scheme requiring triennial compliance testing).
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substantial autonomy in determining which transactions are
welfare enhancing. One route by which disclosure is intended to
achieve this goal is through increasing consumer comprehension
of individual product features, of the differences among prod-
ucts, and, in some instances, of how consumer use of the product
will likely play out over time. A more dynamic goal is for the re-
sultant savvy consumers to use their demand to push firms to
provide products that best meet consumer needs and wants at
the lowest price.88
Why might we expect comprehension standards to move us
further toward these static and dynamic goals than disclosure
alone? Comprehension standards would radically change firm
incentives. Not only would comprehension standards capture the
effects of firm marketing and sales practices that might other-
wise confuse or mislead consumers, but these standards would
also enlist firms to educate consumers. Firms' marketing de-
partments would no longer have the goal of outsmarting the
consumer but rather would aim to make the consumer smarter.
Firms are better situated than regulators to perform this
task well, at a lower cost, and through changing conditions.
Firms know more about their customers because they collect and
analyze this information for marketing and product-
development purposes. Firms have access to their customers
through marketing, sales talk, and product packaging and
presentation; regulators have access only through mandated
disclosures and public-education campaigns. Firms have exper-
tise in educating consumers through marketing. In the device-
mediated age of big data, firms are able to tailor marketing to
ever-narrower segments of consumers and even to individual
consumers' real-time circumstances. Firms can experiment more
easily. Large firms already run thousands of randomized studies
88 For an example of informed consumers demanding higher quality, see Archon
Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Trans-
parency 50 (Cambridge 2007) (noting that the forced display of restaurant hygiene
grades in Los Angeles County resulted in consumer demand for higher-graded restau-
rants); Richard Craswell, Static versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge
Their Success or Failure, 88 Wash L Rev 333, 334 (2013). Whether consumers received
higher quality is less clear. See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure
and Restaurant Grading, 122 Yale L J 574, 591-95 (2012) (finding that restaurant
grades likely do not accurately reflect hygiene quality).
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annually;89 Facebook alone runs over a thousand experiments
each day.90 That is, the very tools firms currently use to sell
products (and even to sabotage disclosures) are tools they could
instead use to educate consumers.
Current hyperpersonalized real-time marketing is more so-
phisticated than this, but consider the following crude example.
Some consumers may be more likely to comprehend the cost of
credit if it is relayed to them by online video explanations from
bikini-clad models rather than by government-designed disclo-
sure documents. One study found that a photograph of even a
fully clothed, attractive woman, when added to a postcard ad-
vertising short-term loans, increased demand for the loans
among South African males to the same extent as a 2 percent
reduction in the monthly interest rate.91 Certainly firms could
experiment to determine whether the bikini method would be ef-
fective in educating consumers. Targeted marketing would en-
sure that few consumers who would be offended by such adver-
tising would ever see it.
Comprehension standards allow firms to bring the full force
of Madison Avenue to consumer education in a way that is not
possible for the government. Political and practical constraints
on the degree to which regulators can treat different consumers
differently, and therefore on regulators' ability to engage in
randomized experiments 92 or tailor disclosures to consumer
89 See Barack Obama, 2014 Economic Report of the President *276 (Mar 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/AX37-J52F ("Indeed, some companies run thousands of ran-
domized studies annually: by 2000, Capital One was running sixty thousand studies an-
nually using randomization methods, as they experimented with different strategies to
determine what works. Google has also run randomized experiments in the tens of thou-
sands in some years.").
90 See Eytan Bakshy, Dean Eckles, and Michael Bernstein, Big Experiments: Big
Data's Friend for Making Decisions (Facebook, Apr 3, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/TLS3-NPDK.
91 See Marianne Bertrand, et al, What's Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from
a Consumer Credit Marketing Field Experiment, 125 Q J Econ 263, 291 (2010).
92 Academics and even the president's Council of Economic Advisers have suggested
that regulators engage in randomized experiments with subpopulations to test different
regulatory approaches to a problem. See, for example, Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres,
and Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U Pa L Rev 929, 933 (2011); Obama, 2014
Economic Report at *297 (cited in note 89). However, government experimentation on
citizens and segmentation of citizen subpopulations raises ethical, legal, and political
concerns.
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segments,93 tie one hand of the government behind its back.
Public disapproval of bikini-laden public-service messages and
the First Amendment commercial speech doctrine tie the other.
Courts have invalidated some regulatory attempts to attain in-
formation comprehension and retention by means of required
graphic photographs on packaging.94 But evoking emotional
consumer responses and ensuring that consumers retain in-
formation are the bread and butter of marketing. Here, anoth-
er analogy with environmental law is apt: performance stand-
ards allow the law to incentivize firms to do what the
Constitution might prevent the government from requiring
firms to do directly.95
Firms can also respond more quickly than the government
to evolving consumer beliefs and changes in the market. Exist-
ing market and sales testing gives firms early warning of these
changes, and firms can respond without competitive bidding, no-
tice and comment, review by the Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs, or judicial review. It took the 2008 financial crisis
to motivate Congress to empower and direct regulators to im-
prove home-mortgage disclosures-disclosures that may have
been effective when first formulated decades earlier (when
mortgages were structured and priced nearly uniformly) but
that were ineffective once the market started offering mortgages
with individualized pricing and dashboard complexity.96 The
CFPB then spent three years developing disclosures that in-
creased, by about 15 percent, the proportion of subjects who un-
derstood some key mortgage features when examining the new
93 See generally Arial Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default
Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich L Rev 1417 (2014). For democratic-
governance reasons, limits on the degree to which the government can tailor legal rules
and disclosures to different citizens are desirable.
94 See, for example, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co v Food & Drug Administration, 696
F3d 1205, 1216 (DC Cir 2012). But see Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc v United
States, 674 F3d 509, 569 (6th Cir 2012) (upholding a regulation requiring that cigarette
packaging bear graphic warnings conveying the health risks of smoking).
95 See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Trading Schemes and the Constitutional
Leverage Effect, in Jody Freeman and Charles D. Kolstad, eds, Moving to Markets in En-
vironmental Regulation: Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience 386-88 (Oxford 2006)
(explaining how performance-based environmental regulation can sidestep constitutional
takings concerns).
96 For a description of the mortgage market's evolution in this regard, see Willis, 65
Md L Rev at 718-28 (cited in note 44).
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disclosures in lab conditions with no distractions, marketing, or
sales talk.97
Professional marketers can do much better. Marketers know
how to capture consumer attention and affect consumer behav-
ior. In February 2010, for example, an online marketing cam-
paign for a men's body wash with sagging market share gar-
nered 5.9 million views on its first day-which is more views
than President Barack Obama's victory speech received on its
first day, and orders of magnitude more than the daily views
logged by the FTC's consumer-education websites. 98 By the end
of 2010, the online campaign had received sixty-five million
views and the product was the best-selling brand of its class in
the United States99 Professional marketing has been successful-
ly used to promote social goals as well.100 A meta-analysis of re-
search on high-quality, high-intensity, paid-media anti-drunk
driving campaigns credits the campaigns with reducing drunk
driving accidents by over 10 percent. 101 The campaigns' benefits
were generally found to be at least an order of magnitude great-
er than their costs. 10 2 This is not to say that all anti-drunk driv-
ing campaigns succeed. One campaign designed to encourage
moderation in drinking was mistaken by many for a beer adver-
tisement.103 But campaigns that used professional marketing
techniques to develop and place the advertisements were both
effective and cost effective.
97 See Know Before You Owe (CFPB), archived at http://perma.cc/Q4LW.9UEL;
Know Before You Owe: Quantitative Study of the Current and Integrated TILA-RESPA
Disclosures *x-xi, 41 (Kleimann Communication Group, Nov 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/5F5H-BCJT.
98 The FTC reported in 2011 that all of its websites collectively (not just those di-
rected at consumers) garnered fewer than 75,000 hits each day and its videos collectively
garnered fewer than 2,500 views each day. See Federal Trade Commission, The FTC in
2011: Federal Trade Commission Annual Report *49 (Apr 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/2Y9J-HA2U.
99 See Case Study: Old Spice Response Campaign (D&AD), archived at
http://perma.cc/4GU6-9J8P.
100 See Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir, Behavioral
Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making among the Poor, 25 J Pub Pol &
Mktg 8, 16-18 (2006) (advocating the use of marketing to aid financial decisionmaking
among the poor).
101 See Randy W. Elder, et al, Effectiveness of Mass Media Campaigns for Reducing
Drinking and Driving and Alcohol-Involved Crashes: A Systematic Review, 27 Am J Pre-
ventive Med 57, 63 (2004).
102 See id.
103 See Lawrence Wallack and David C. Barrows, Evaluating Primary Prevention: The
California "Winners"Alcohol Program, 3 Intl Q Community Health Educ 307, 323 (1982).
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Many marketing efforts no doubt successfully change behav-
ior without improving comprehension. Facing performance-
based regulation, firms might opt for compliance with suitability
performance standards rather than comprehension standards
and use marketing to channel uncomprehending consumers to
suitable products. In other cases, firms are likely to determine
that increasing dashboard simplicity and usability is more cost
effective than educating consumers about existing complex
products. Because a product with simpler or more-intuitive fea-
tures is easier to understand, comprehension standards permit
firms to, in effect, lower their own bar by redesigning their
products. While regulators might ban complex or counterintui-
tive structures and features, firms can better innovate toward
dashboard simplicity and usability-particularly when this re-
quires an increase in under-the-hood complexity.104
Performance-based standards leave firms free to decide
whether consumers value a complex attribute highly enough to
cover the extra educational cost that the firm will incur, or
whether simplifying the product is the better course. Giving
firms the power and responsibility to decide which features are
worth the costs of comprehension will often be appropriate.
Firms already know more about consumer valuation of product
attributes than regulators and can learn more about these valu-
ations at a lower cost.
In the past, courts have resisted applying legal comprehen-
sion commands in a manner that would require changes in
product designs.105 In a notable opinion, then-Judge Samuel
Alito held that when an underlying concept is difficult to under-
stand, its disclosure meets the pertinent consumer law's com-
mand that the disclosure be "clear" if it could be understood by
someone with technical expertise. When "no one" could under-
stand the disclosure, it would not be "clear" as required by stat-
ute, but the disclosure need not be "in a form that the average
consumer can understand.106 Aito explicitly based this holding
104 On the other hand, regulators are able to achieve standardization that firms
cannot, and standardization facilitates-and in some cases may be key to-dashboard
simplicity. This is one reason that performance-based regulation should supplement, ra-
ther than replace, disclosure and design regulation.
105 For further discussion of failures to treat clarity and conspicuousness as perfor-
mance standards, see text accompanying notes 137-42.
106 Applebaum v Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp, 226 F3d 214, 220-22 (3d Cir 2000).
But see Lundquist v Security Pacific Automotive Financial Services Corp, 993 F2d 11, 15
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on the premise that a clarity command ought not force a firm to
alter the underlying transaction to render the transaction capa-
ble of being understood by the consumers engaging in it:
If [the requirement of the Consumer Leasing Act that the
disclosure of early termination charges be clear] meant that
any method of determining an early termination penalty
had to be capable of explanation in a way that the average
consumer could understand, [the law] would in effect im-
pose substantive restrictions on the methods that a lessor
could employ.107
The fact that the performance-based consumer law paradigm in-
tentionally seeks this design-altering effect must be understood
and accepted by both the courts and regulators. Achieving con-
sumer comprehension requires dashboard simplicity and usabil-
ity, and dashboard simplicity and usability are a function of
product design.108
The effect of successful regulation through comprehension
standards would be to bring products into alignment with con-
sumer expectations, whether because consumers become edu-
cated about the product or because firms simplify the product or
eliminate unintuitive features. Better-educated consumers
would also be better-informed citizens, a tertiary benefit of com-
prehension standards. Increased dashboard simplicity and us-
ability would reduce demands placed on consumers' attention,
time, and effort in selecting products and would give consum-
ers increased confidence in the marketplace. But the ultimate
benefit of comprehension standards is increased consumer de-
cisional autonomy: consumers would get what they think they
are getting, not whatever hidden features firms can slip into
the transaction.
2. Suitability standards: internalizing the cost of
dashboard opacity.
Substantive product-design regulation aims to increase con-
sumer welfare by eliminating products or product attributes
(2d Cir 1993) (finding that a lease provision that was "beyond the understanding of the
average consumer" was not "clear and conspicuous").
107 Applebaum, 226 F3d at 220, citing 15 USC § 1667a and 12 CFR § 213.4.
10 8 For a discussion of this phenomenon with respect to home mortgages, see Willis,
65 Md L Rev at 820-23 (cited in note 44).
2015] 1341
The University of Chicago Law Review
that produce more costs than benefits for consumers, or by re-
quiring products to incorporate particular terms that tend to
benefit consumers. The main weaknesses of design regulation
are overinclusiveness (some welfare-enhancing transactions are
banned) and underinclusiveness (products shift shapes).
Why might suitability standards increase consumer welfare
beyond what design regulation alone can do? First, suitability
standards can mitigate the underinclusiveness problem, both at
the lawmaking level and the enforcement level. The lawmaking
process for suitability standards can be more nimble than
product-design regulation because the former can be defined at
a higher level of generality by a legislative body and then fur-
ther specified by regulators. The higher level of generality in
suitability standards gives regulators the ability to quickly re-
spond to changes in product offerings that render a product un-
suitable, even when the product would not violate a narrowly
specified design rule.
The enforcement process for suitability standards can also
be more efficient, thorough, and evenly applied than the process
used for broad UDAAP rules. The Gainful Employment Rule
provides a good example. The Rule-which conditioned a
school's eligibility to receive federal student-loan funds on the
loan-repayment rates and debt-to-earnings ratios of its former
students-was promulgated in response to concerns about the
rising number of students with unaffordable debt levels and
poor employment prospects, due in large part to unfair and de-
ceptive recruiting practices at some for-profit colleges and uni-
versities.109 Rather than pursuing schools for their recruiters' de-
ceptive acts and practices through a multiplicity of ad hoc, ex
post, costly, witness-intensive, unpredictable enforcement ac-
tions biased toward higher-socioeconomic-status complainants,
the Rule establishes across-the-board performance standards
that can be more easily applied and enforced.
Second, suitability standards can be more accurate than de-
sign regulation, thus mitigating the overinclusiveness problem.
Many products have both appropriate and inappropriate uses;
product-design regulation cuts both out. For example, payday
loans are sometimes used to handle short-term cash flow
emergencies when other options for handling the emergency are
109 See 76 Fed Reg at 34386-88 (cited in note 85).
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inferior-this is an appropriate use. But payday loans are also
used when long-term cash flow problems will predictably lead to
repeated rollovers and deeper financial trouble-a use that both
of the national payday-lender trade associations agree is unsuit-
able. 110 Suitability standards allow and encourage firms to de-
velop methods to channel the right products to the right con-
sumers, satisfying the needs and preferences of a broader swath
of consumers. Further, the flexibility provided by performance-
based regulation avoids some of the innovation-retarding effects
of prescriptive design regulation. As Google's CEO Eric Schmidt
explained to regulators considering privacy regulation: "If you
have to regulate, try to regulate the outcome not the technology.
If there's an outcome that you don't like, don't specify in law a
technical solution because technology moves forward." '111
Third, successful performance-based regulation flips firm
incentives. As explained above, technology facilitates the sale of
consumer products with inscrutable, unsuitable features. If
firms had greater responsibility for downstream uses, however,
their incentives would be to design products that can be used in
only welfare-enhancing ways and to channel consumers toward
appropriate products.
Firms are better situated than regulators to do all these
things. To channel consumers to suitable products, regulators
are limited to largely ineffective product disclosure rules and
public-education campaigns. As explained above, firms can use
all the skills of Madison Avenue, experiment and adapt quickly,
and tailor efforts to different consumer segments. 112 When mar-
keting cannot guide consumers to the right products, field-tested
suitability standards would give firms an incentive to provide
intermediaries (for example, salespeople or digital "choice en-
gines"113) that would steer consumers appropriately.
110 See Is a Payday Advance Appropriate for You? (Community Financial Services
Association of America), archived at http://perma.cc/F784-RFKU; Code of Conduct in Of-
fering Access to Credit *2 (Financial Service Centers of America, 2007), archived at
http://perma.cc/J3WP-LUC2 ("[Playday advances are intended to satisfy short-term cred-
it needs and are not intended to be a long term solution for ongoing financial needs.").
111 Google's Schmidt Warns Regulators against Killing Innovation (Morning Chroni-
cle, May 9, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3NN9-GES6.
112 As noted above, many marketing efforts undoubtedly change behavior without
improving comprehension. See text accompanying notes 31-48.
113 Richard H. Thaler and Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Consum-
ers, 91 Harv Bus Rev 44, 54 (Jan-Feb 2013) (explaining how "choice engines" can
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Just as with comprehension standards, firms may deter-
mine that product reformulation is more cost effective than us-
ing marketing or sales to meet suitability standards. Suitability
standards would give firms incentives to make innovation and
complexity work for consumers, not against them. Firms are
better situated than regulators to design products that are not
amenable to unsuitable uses, whether by simplifying products so
that consumers can sort themselves well or by eliminating fea-
tures that are used unsuitably. Firms regularly redesign their
physical products when it becomes apparent that consumers are
misusing the products and sustaining physical injuries. Com-
mon examples include dead-man switches on lawnmowers to
prevent injury to consumers who put their hands in the path of
the blade114 and transformers on hair dryers to prevent injury to
consumers who drop them into water. 115 These redesigns may
have been partially motivated by tort liability and regulation,
but the redesigns also likely responded to reputational concerns
and market pressure. 116 When market pressure cannot be
brought to bear, suitability standards could provide pressure
instead.
Performance-based consumer law should not replace disclo-
sure and design regulation. Rather, each form of regulation
should retain its vitality for different reasons. Disclosure per-
forms a standardizing function that facilitates consumer com-
prehension. Design regulation is necessary to address harm to
third parties and consumers, and it can also perform a standard-
izing function. With respect to particular transaction types or
features, disclosure or design regulation might have a cost-
help consumers make better decisions). For an example of such a "choice engine," see
the website kayak.com.
114 See Mary McMahon, What Is a Dead Man's Switch? (wiseGEEK, 2003), archived
at http://perma.cc/XG6F-G5ZA.
115 See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Making a Safer Blow-Dryer: Progress, but at a
Snail's Pace, NY Times 50 (Aug 27, 1988).
116 See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Lia-
bility, 123 Harv L Rev 1437, 1443-50 (2010) (examining the impact of market forces,
including reputational concerns, on firms' decisions to redesign products); John C.P.
Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Product Liability, 123 Harv L
Rev 1919, 1946-48 (2010) (stating that tort liability grants consumers a type of govern-
mental power to demand redress and product redesign).
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benefit-calculus edge over performance-based regulation. More-
over, given the uncertainty involved when trying a new regula-
tory method, disclosure and design regulation ought not to be
abandoned. As with any regulatory technique used in a new con-
text, the learning curve for performance-based consumer law
will be steep.
C. Mechanics of Performance-Based Consumer Law
As a prerequisite for establishing performance-based con-
sumer law, there must be a legal basis for doing so. Next, a
choice must be made as to whether to use a comprehension
standard, a suitability standard, or both. Development of the
regulatory structure then involves several interlocking compo-
nents. The content of the standard (for example, what pollutant
will be measured) and the benchmarks that must be reached (for
example, how much of the pollutant can be produced over what
time period) must be specified. A valid testing process for de-
termining whether the benchmark is met must also be designed
and implemented-for example, emission-monitoring systems
must be created and put into operation. Standards, benchmarks,
and testing are interdependent; only measurable benchmarks
can be enforced. For example, emissions from nonpoint-source
contributors to water pollution are believed to be difficult to
identify and measure and are therefore regulated through pre-
scriptive rules about runoff management processes rather than
through emissions performance standards. 11 Finally, sufficiently
compelling enforcement sticks and carrots must be defined and
administered.
This Section discusses these mechanics of performance-
based consumer law in detail, notes the possibility of exemptions
for small firms, and ends with the suggestion that regulators
experiment with performance-based approaches through reme-
dial decrees entered against firms charged with engaging in un-
fair, deceptive, or abusive practices.
1. Legal authority.
For over two decades, it has been the policy of the United
States to favor performance-based regulation over prescriptive
117 See 33 USC § 1329.
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regulation. A 1993 Executive Order (which has since been reaf-
firmed and supplemented 18) directed all executive agencies, "to
the extent feasible, [to] specify performance objectives, rather
than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regu-
lated entities must adopt."119 Making this policy a reality could
be accomplished through new legislation120 that establishes
broad comprehension and suitability standards and explicitly
gives regulators the responsibility and authority to
(1) promulgate specific comprehension and suitability perfor-
mance rules for consumer products and (2) mandate and regu-
late third-party testing. New legislation could dictate an en-
forcement mechanism or give regulators a menu of enforcement
mechanisms from which to choose. Further, performance-based
standards would ideally be part of a purposefully evolving regu-
latory system, in which regulators have the responsibility and
authority to engage in adaptive management of the consumer
marketplace. This might require a grant of legal authority to
engage in modified administrative procedures.121
Even without new legislation, existing consumer law au-
thorizes performance-based regulation in multiple places. For
example, UDAAP prohibitions could be interpreted to require
that firms meet certain performance standards. When consum-
ers use products unsuitably, the sale of that product will often
meet the definition of an unfair and abusive practice; when few
consumers comprehend a product feature, the sale of a product
with that feature will often meet the definition of a deceptive
practice as well.
First, take unfairness. A practice is unfair if it is likely to
cause a substantial injury to consumers that is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and that is not outweighed
by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.122 A
118 See Executive Order 13,563, 76 Fed Reg 3821, 3821 (2011).
119 Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed Reg 51735, 51736 (1993). While this Executive
Order formally covers only executive agencies, it is consistent with the charges of the
independent agencies involved in consumer-transaction regulation (for example, the
FTC, CFPB, and Consumer Product Safety Commission).
120 Recall that this Article puts aside political economy considerations. See note 11.
121 See generally Robin Kundis Craig and J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law
for Adaptive Management, 67 Vand L Rev 1 (2014) (proposing an alternative to tradi-
tional Administrative Procedure Act rules for regulations that are enacted as part of an
adaptive-management regulatory strategy).
122 See In the Matter of International Harvester Co, 104 FTC 949, 1073 (1984) (FTC
1980 Policy Statement on Unfairness).
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comprehension performance standard would be appropriate
here, because a dashboard transaction feature that is not under-
stood by consumers will not be reasonably avoidable by them
and will rarely be outweighed by benefits to consumers, given
that competition over the feature will not take place.123 A suita-
bility standard may also be appropriate. Whether a harm is rea-
sonably avoidable can be assessed based on what real consum-
ers do. For example, civil justice liability waivers-classic fine
print terms of which few consumers are even aware, and virtu-
ally none avoids-likely lead firms to provide suboptimally low
levels of product safety, causing substantial injury to unlucky
consumers.1 4
An abusive practice is one that, for example, "takes unrea-
sonable advantage of-(A) a lack of understanding on the part of
the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the
product ... [or] (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the
interests of the consumer in selecting or using [the product]."125
Consumers who do not understand material product features of-
ten cannot protect their own interests, and selling a product
with material terms that consumers do not comprehend takes
advantage of both this inability and the consumer's underlying
lack of understanding. Unsuitable use of a product demonstrates
a consumer's inability to protect her own interests, and sales of
such a product take advantage of this inability. For example, a
firm selling an OTC drug to consumers who are suffering symp-
toms for which the drug is not indicated, who use the drug ex-
cessively, or in whom the drug is contraindictated 126 is increas-
ing its sales volume by taking unreasonable advantage of these
consumers' inability to protect their own interests.
A deceptive practice is a material act or omission that is like-
ly to mislead a reasonable member of the group of consumers to
whom the firm's sales practices are directed.127 A failure to ensure
123 But note that consumers need not understand everything under the hood, pro-
vided that their understanding of dashboard features effectuates competition over under-
the-hood features.
124 See Albert H. Choi and Kathryn E. Spier, Should Consumers Be Permitted to
Waive Products Liability? Product Safety, Private Contracts, and Adverse Selection, 30 J
L, Econ & Org 734, 754 (2014).
125 12 USC § 5531(d)(2).
126 See Part II.D.3.
127 See In the Matter of Cliffdale Associates, Inc, 103 FTC 110, 175 (1984) (FTC 1983
Policy Statement on Deception).
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that consumers comprehend all material features of a product is
thus a deceptive omission, and it is potentially amenable to a
comprehension performance standard. It might even call for a
suitability standard-for example, the antideception provisions
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934128 provide legislative
authority for securities suitability requirements.129
Even without new legislation or tapping UDAAP authority,
there are many places in which the law already places responsi-
bility on regulators or firms to ensure consumer comprehension
and a few other places in which the law does the same for suita-
ble use. Specifics are described in conjunction with the examples
presented below.
On the other hand, Congress, regulators, and the courts
sometimes eschew performance standards in favor of safe har-
bors and mechanically applied rules. Statutes often authorize,
and sometimes command, regulators to establish safe harbors.
For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consum-
er Protection Act130 ("Dodd-Frank Act") requires that firms origi-
nate mortgages only to consumers who have an ability to pay, a
mandate that could be interpreted as a performance standard.131
But the Dodd-Frank Act also requires the CFPB to develop de-
sign rules defining a "qualified mortgage," which creates a safe
harbor for compliance (or, for higher-priced mortgages, a rebut-
table presumption of compliance) with the ability-to-pay rule.132
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974133 per-
mits (but does not require) the Department of Labor (DOL) to
prescribe disclosures that defined-contribution retirement plan
administrators give to plan participants.134 The statute also con-
tains language that is most naturally read as a plan participant
comprehension requirement: it requires plan administrators to
"take steps to ensure ... that [] participants ... are provided
sufficient information ... regarding designated investment al-
ternatives, including fees and expenses attendant thereto, to
128 Pub L No 73-291, 48 Stat 881, codified as amended at 15 USC § 78a et seq.
129 See Hanly v Securities and Exchange Commission, 415 F2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir
1969) (finding a suitability duty in § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
130 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).
131 15 USC § 1639c.
132 15 USC § 1639c.
133 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
134 29 USC § 1021.
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make informed decisions.135 Rather than establishing a per-
formance standard by which plan administrators could
demonstrate compliance with this comprehension requirement,
DOL chose to use its discretionary authority to prescribe disclo-
sures and gave administrators that provide these disclosures to
participants a safe harbor from the requirement.136
Even when regulators do not create a formal safe harbor,
courts often succumb to the attraction of easy enforceability in
interpreting broad statutory language to effectuate prescriptive
rules rather than performance-based standards. Most strikingly,
facing the ubiquitous statutory command that information must
be disclosed in a manner that is "clear and conspicuous," courts
have elevated a desire for clarity in the law for their own benefit
and for the benefit of firms over clarity and conspicuousness in
the disclosed information for the benefit of consumers. At times,
courts treat the clarity requirement as surplusage, requiring
that the disclosure merely be visible-a requirement that the
conspicuousness demand already includes. 137 The conspicuous-
ness requirement is often read as shorthand for prescriptive
rules-such as the requirement that rules be written in a par-
ticular size and color font, set forth in a separate paragraph, or
written using all caps-without any evidence that these devices
lead to increased readership.138 The all-caps requirement is
particularly perverse; passages in all caps are more difficult to
read and less likely to be read than regular font.139
More broadly, courts currently use an "objective" standard
to evaluate compliance with many consumer laws, including
UDAAP prohibitions. Sometimes courts use a "vulnerable
135 29 CFR § 2550.404a-5(a).
136 See 29 CFR § 2550.404a-5(b)-(c).
137 See, for example, Channel v Citicorp National Services, Inc, 89 F3d 379, 382 (7th
Cir 1996) (interpreting "clear and conspicuous" as meaning "visible" and citing for sup-
port the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of "conspicuous" standing alone).
138 See, for example, Corbett v Firstline Security, Inc, 687 F Supp 2d 124, 132
(EDNY 2009) (holding that contract terms gave consumers sufficient notice because,
among other things, the terms were written in capital letters, a legible font size, and
"primarily" in language understandable to a layperson); 13 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1201
(2003) ("A printed heading in capitals (as: NONNEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is
conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is conspicuous if it is in larger or other con-
trasting type or color.").
139 See Linda L. Lohr, Creating Graphics for Learning and Performance: Lessons in
Visual Literacy 100 (Prentice Hall 2003); Miles A. Tinker, Legibility of Print 57 (Iowa
State 1963).
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consumer" standard and, more frequently, a "reasonable con-
sumer" test, but both are often assessed without reference to ac-
tual consumers. 140 For example, a judge reviewing a document
after the fact and knowing what she is looking for may decide
whether a consumer ought to have noticed the disclosure and
ought to have understood it, rather than deciding whether real
consumers did notice and understand it.141 This makes litigation
cheaper because it renders consumer surveys and expert battles
unnecessary. 142 It also makes the application of the legal rule
more predictable; once a court announces that a particular for-
mulation is clear or that a particular presentation format is con-
spicuous, firms can rely on those findings as a judicially created
safe harbor of sorts.
Consumer testing introduces uncertainty because what is
clear or conspicuous to actual consumers may vary with the
firm's customer base and may change over time, due to both the
actions of firms (in some cases, actions calculated to undermine
the disclosure) and changes in society. Yet this variation over
time in consumer comprehension, whether instigated by firms or
not, is one of the very reasons why performance standards are
more likely to meet consumer law's goals than prescriptive rules
alone. The FTC's recent online advertising guide for businesses
articulates this well: "The ultimate test is not the size of the font
or the location of the disclosure, although they are important
considerations; the ultimate test is whether the information in-
tended to be disclosed is actually conveyed to consumers."143
Without performance-based comprehension standards, the law
has little ability to perform this ultimate test.
140 Recall also that in interpreting the Consumer Leasing Act discussed above, Alito
used an "expert" test, interpreting "clear" as meaning intelligible to an expert, not to a
consumer. See note 106 and accompanying text.
141 See, for example, UCC § 1-201(10) (defining conspicuous as "so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it") (emphasis
added); 13 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1201 ("Whether a term or clause is conspicuous or not is
for decision by the court.").
142 Replacing judge-made constructs of the reasonable consumer with testing of real
consumers is likely to increase litigation costs in situations in which enforcement agen-
cies and consumers are currently permitted to prove deception without reference to em-
pirical evidence. But survey evidence is becoming less expensive to produce, and the in-
creased accuracy that such evidence provides is likely worth the cost.
143 FTC, .Com Disclosures at *1 (cited in note 65).
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2. Comprehension or suitability?
Quite a bit of legal authority already exists for comprehen-
sion standards, and philosophically, comprehension standards
are close to well-accepted disclosure and antideception princi-
ples. A comprehension-based system is appropriate when con-
sumer decisional autonomy is our paramount goal, either be-
cause that autonomy is intrinsically valuable or because it is a
cost-effective way to assure consumer welfare. Further, suitabil-
ity standards are not an option when suitable uses cannot be
well defined and measured, whether due to technical constraints
or to a lack of societal consensus on suitable use. Personal-data
privacy might fall into the latter category.
But there are at least three situations in which suitability
standards ought to be favored over comprehension standards.
The first is when comprehension is insufficient to assure con-
sumer welfare. Comprehension is no panacea. If desperation
drives consumers to use a product unsuitably, comprehension
will not help. Even knowledgeable consumers sometimes make
serious mistakes due to, for example, emotion, social pres-
sures, cognitive distortions, or inattention. The story of the
New York Times financial reporter who bought a house that he
could not afford with a "no-doc mortgage"'' 4 is a recent, notori-
ous example. 145
The second situation is when the costs of a comprehension
regime exceed the costs of a suitability regime and decisional
autonomy has little intrinsic value. The costs to firms of com-
prehension testing and meeting comprehension standards,
whether through educating their customers or altering their
products to make them easier for consumers to comprehend, will
vary with the context. For example, assuring that a consumer
understands diversification well enough to apply it to her port-
folio is probably more expensive than offering her a menu and
144 No-doc mortgages are a type of mortgage that does not require any documenta-
tion of income. See Stephane Fitch, No-Doc Mortgages are Back?! (Forbes, July 2, 2010),
archived at http://perma.cc[NB6A-3Q5R.
145 Edmund L. Andrews, My Personal Credit Crisis (NY Times, May 14, 2009), ar-
chived at http://perma.cd2LTC-P8PF. See also James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte
C. Madrian, Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual
Funds, 23 Rev Fin Stud 1405, 1422-25 (2010) (demonstrating experimentally that even
MBA students who know that they should ignore returns and focus on cost in choosing
investments were unable to do so).
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accompanying marketing that will tend to lead her to a diversi-
fied portfolio.146 Testing for whether a consumer understands di-
versification well enough to diversify her investment portfolio is
also probably more costly to do accurately than testing for
whether her portfolio is well diversified, and it is unlikely that
consumers value autonomy in diversification decisions.
The story of one corrective advertising order hints that
meeting comprehension standards could be costly, particularly
when firms have previously misled consumers. After years of
marketing suggesting that Hawaiian Punch was made up of
mostly fruit juice, the manufacturer and its advertising agency
were charged with deception by the FTC. The parties settled
with a consent order that obligated the defendants to engage in
consumer-education efforts until one of the three following
benchmarks was met regarding the proportion of consumers who
knew that the drink contained less than 20 percent juice: 67
percent of all fruit-drink consumers, 80 percent of prospective
Hawaiian Punch customers, or 95 percent of customers who pur-
chased Hawaiian Punch in the last month. 147 After the order was
issued, Hawaiian Punch began stating on its packaging that it
contained "not less than 11% natural fruit juices.148 Ten years
later, the first benchmark-and only the first benchmark-was
met: even among recent purchasers, only about 70 percent real-
ized that Hawaiian Punch contained so little juice. 149
However, this example might not hold lessons for perfor-
mance regulation, because the defendants had little incentive to
meet the benchmarks more quickly. In addition, performance-
based regulation would give firms more flexibility in reaching
the benchmarks. For example, a firm might choose to change the
amount of fruit juice in its drink to match consumer expecta-
tions, sponsor a guess-our-fruit-juice-content contest to encour-
age consumers to learn the true amount, or compose a catchy
advertising jingle to teach consumers its fruit juice content.
146 See Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 Am Econ Rev Papers
& Proceedings 429, 429-31 (2011) (finding that consumers are remarkably impervious to
financial education).
147 See In the Matter of RJR Foods, Inc, 83 FTC 7, 16, 20-21 (1973).
148 William L. Wilkie, Dennis L. McNeill, and Michael B. Mazis, Marketing's "Scar-
let Letter" The Theory and Practice of Corrective Advertising, 48 J Mktg 11, 24 (1984).
149 See id.
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Certainly firms could do better than merely adding dry text to
packaging.
Evidence that consumers know more than one might expect
can be found in a recent survey of Facebook users. The survey
found that while over three-quarters of users admitted that they
had never read the terms of service, a majority understood twenty-
one of twenty-five terms that implicated privacy concerns. 150 For
example, most consumers knew that Facebook shares infor-
mation about individual users to enable third-party targeted
marketing and that Facebook could use their name and photo in
an advertisement directed to their friends for a product the us-
ers had "liked" on their Facebook pages.15 '
Moreover, small, inexpensive changes in marketing copy can
make big differences in consumer comprehension. In one recent
experiment, subjects who were exposed to realistic advertise-
ments containing "up to" claims (for example, "PROVEN TO
SAVE UP TO 47% ON YOUR HEATING BILLS!") interpreted
these advertisements no differently than subjects exposed to di-
rect claims ("PROVEN TO SAVE 47% ON YOUR HEATING
BILLS!").152 About half of each group believed that half or more
buyers could expect to save "about 47%," and over a quarter of
both subject groups believed that all or almost all buyers could
expect to save "about 47%."153 Adding a small-font disclaimer ac-
knowledging that consumers saved only 25 percent on average
did not change the misimpression created by the larger-font "up
to" claim. 154 Under a comprehension-testing scheme, firms would
have to refrain from "up to" claims. This change would not cost
firms anything other than lost revenue from formerly duped
consumers, which is precisely the aim of comprehension perfor-
mance regulation.
Not all comprehension improvements can be achieved so
easily, but crucially, the cost of comprehension ought to be some-
thing that policymaking takes into consideration, and it dramat-
ically fails to do so now. Although firms that have aided and
150 Ayres and Schwartz, 66 Stan L Rev at 600 (cited in note 8).
151 Id at 598.
152 See Manoj Hastak and Dennis Murphy, Effects of a Bristol Windows Advertise-
ment with an "Up To" Savings Claim on Consumer Take-Away and Beliefs *4 (May
2012), archived at http:/Iperma.cc/784P-EJQX (emphasis omitted).
153 Id at *11.
154 Id.
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abetted misunderstanding ought not to be rewarded in the cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) process with lower benchmarks, regula-
tors should ask whether the cost of comprehension is worth its
benefits. While it is not possible to put a dollar price on the de-
ontological value of decisional autonomy that comprehension
enables, in the context of most consumer decisions, it is not
priceless. 15
The third situation in which suitability standards should be
used is when consumers would prefer a suitability regime. For
consumers, the costs of comprehension are the costs of becoming
informed and, sometimes, the costs of being informed. The costs
of becoming informed include time and effort, both of which may
be diverted from more productive uses-including becoming in-
formed about other transactions in which one is engaged.156 The
costs of being informed include the loss of sometimes-blissful ig-
norance. These costs would exist in a disclosure system as well,
if the system were effective. They are necessary costs of consum-
er decisional autonomy.157 When these costs are sufficiently high
and the benefits of this autonomy are sufficiently low, suitability
or design regulation placing the decision squarely in the demo-
cratic regulatory process would be preferable. Consumers do not
want to understand all aspects of the transactions in which they
engage and would often prefer to be able to engage in suitable
transactions without spending the time and energy necessary to
comprehend much about these transactions.158 In these contexts,
155 This is in contrast to political decisions (for example, voting) and personal-
relationship decisions (for example, getting married), in which our constitutional and
cultural commitments may make decisional autonomy priceless.
156 See Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis in Financial Disclosure Regulation, 43 J Legal Stud 253, 264 (2014) (describing the
crowd-out effect that disclosures have, vis-A-vis other disclosures, on a consumer's
attention).
157 Professors Ayres and Schwartz suggest that the cost to consumers of becoming
informed ought to be reduced by: (a) allowing consumers to opt out of the comprehension
regulation system, or (b) exempting firms from demonstrating comprehension of terms
for which firms can show that a majority of consumers do not want to be informed about.
Both are problematic loopholes. The first is problematic because confusing consumers
into opting out would probably be quite easy for firms to do. See Willis, 80 U Chi L Rev
at 1185-1200 (cited in note 22). The second is problematic because it is at odds with the
very consumer-autonomy reason for having comprehension standards in the first place,
particularly in cases in which a minority of consumers have strong preferences that are
contrary to the majority's preferences.
158 See note 3 and accompanying text.
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respecting consumer meta-autonomy requires a reduction in
consumer decisional autonomy.
3. Standards, benchmarks, and testing.
a) Standards. Determining the content of performance
standards is a very fact-specific enterprise. But a few general
approaches to comprehension and suitability standards are de-
scribed here in turn.
Comprehension standard setting requires choices about fac-
tual content and depth of understanding. Identifying what must
be comprehended about any particular transaction is not easy.
Every transaction has an infinite number of dimensions, and the
costs and risks of many transactions are not precisely known.
Take, for example, a firm's collection and use of consumers' per-
sonal information. Must a consumer comprehend what data are
being collected, which parties will have access to the data, to
which uses the data will be put, in which ways the data will be
combined with other data about the consumer, how long the da-
ta will be retained, what methods will be used to protect the da-
ta, what record of security has been achieved in the past by
these methods, or some other type of information? Further, each
fact can be understood with varying degrees of specificity. For
example, a comprehension standard might require consumers to
understand merely that "third parties" will have access to their
data or to know the identities of those parties. 159
Choices must also be made about the depth of understand-
ing demanded. Comprehension itself can range from superficial
knowledge to profound appreciation. Standards aimed directly
at the latter would require each firm to demonstrate that its
159 At first blush, comprehension standards might seem to pose a public-goods prob-
lem in that consumers could, in theory, use the education provided by one firm to shop at
a firm that has not spent resources on education and thus has lower costs and can offer
the product at a lower price. But the same theoretical case can be made about all adver-
tising-an ad for one brand of cigarette likely increases sales of all cigarette brands, for
instance. Yet this public-goods effect (or "public-bads" effect, depending on one's view of
the product) has not been a death knell for advertising. So long as the information that
consumers must understand to meet a comprehension standard is sufficiently specific,
any public-goods effect should be no greater than for advertising. Sufficiently specific
information might entail, for example, the particular uses to which a consumer's infor-
mation will be put, rather than the general fact that the information will be used to
"'enhance' or 'improve' users' shopping experiences." Federal Trade Commission, What's
the Deal? An FTC Study on Mobile Shopping Apps *21 (Aug 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/U2LC-B4DD.
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customers understand what they need to know in order to make
autonomous, welfare-enhancing decisions about the transac-
tions they engage in with the firm at the time they engage in
them. Firms would also have to demonstrate that their cus-
tomers can apply this knowledge to their decisions. This re-
quires an understanding of not only product costs and risks
but also how those costs and risks are likely to play out for the
consumer over time160 and how the transaction compares to
available alternatives.161
Such a deep and wide standard would be demanding for
firms to meet, but less so than it might first appear. Only those
aspects of transactions that are neither well advertised nor of
the sort that consumers will themselves discover and account for
in repeat purchasing need be part of the standard.162 Also, con-
sumers need to know only the effect of product features, not the
under-the-hood mechanics. Consumers who know that using a
particular cell phone app enables retailers to tailor their prices
to the consumers' financial resources do not need to also under-
stand how the technology that facilitates this tailoring works.
Furthermore, consumers need to understand only what their
own experiences with the product will be. A credit card revolver
who is likely to make domestic purchases would thus need to
understand only the interest rate applicable to purchases, not
the cost associated with foreign transactions; a jet-setting trans-
actor would need to know about foreign-transaction fees, but not
the interest rate for revolving debt. Finally, while such rigorous
standards could require firms to teach consumers both infor-
mation and skills, the way in which information is conveyed
dramatically affects the skills needed to use that information.
Consumers need minimal skills to use a well-constructed energy-
star rating; consumers need many skills to use a set of technical
160 See Emir Kamenica, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Richard Thaler, Helping Con-
sumers Know Themselves, 101 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 417, 417-18 (2011).
161 See John G. Lynch Jr and Wendy Wood, Special Issue Editors' Statement: Help-
ing Consumers Help Themselves, 25 J Pub Pol & Mktg 1, 3 (2006) (describing the tre-
mendous importance of choice sets in influencing consumers' ultimate decisions).
162 As a practical matter, we could leave out the benefits of the transaction at issue
from performance testing. Firms have market incentives to ensure that consumers un-
derstand a product's benefits. See Ayres and Schwartz, 66 Stan L Rev at 574-75 (cited in
note 8) (suggesting that the terms that the law must ensure consumers are made aware
of are only those that "sellers do not emphasize," that "generate low or negative utility
for the typical consumer," and that would affect consumer purchasing decisions if con-
sumers knew about the terms).
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energy-use specifications. Comprehension standards hold firms
responsible for reaching consumers where they find them, which
is where firms sell to them.
At the other end of the spectrum is a shallow, narrow
standard requiring bare consumer knowledge of a small number
of important product dimensions that consumers tend to un-
derappreciate. The content of such a standard might shift from
year to year as consumers learn about some dimensions and for-
get about others or as product changes render some dimensions
less important.163 Even superficial comprehension might in-
crease decisional autonomy as compared to the level of compre-
hension produced today by largely unread mandated disclosures.
Moreover, superficial understanding that is cheaply demon-
strated among a large proportion of a firm's customers could be
correlated with deep understanding by a few customers who
might drive the market toward welfare-increasing transactions
for all.
Decisions about the content and depth of comprehension to
test for with respect to any particular type of transaction will
require choices in the face of empirical uncertainty and norma-
tive dissensus. Yet disclosure regulation requires the same
choices as to which dimensions of a product to disclose and how
t6 disclose that information. In a world of limited bandwidth,
choosing which information should be understood and how well
depends on judgment, and that judgment must be exercised no
matter whether the regulatory scheme employs disclosure rules
or comprehension standards. As a first cut, comprehension
standards might simply import the content of existing disclosure
mandates.
For suitability, three approaches to standard setting are
discussed here. The first is a standard that defines the condi-
tions under which particular product features are suitable or
unsuitable for a consumer. This parallels the OTC-drug actual-
use testing, which examines whether the drug is indicated or
contraindicated for the consumers who selected it. 16 A variation
163 See id at 582-85 (suggesting that mandated disclosures ought to cover transac-
tion features of which consumers are unaware and thus ought to change over time to re-
flect changing consumer knowledge).
164 Sometimes this is described as a separate self-selection study, but at other times
it is collapsed into the actual-use study. See Leonard-Segal, et al, 49 J Am Pharmacists
Assoc at 671-72 (cited in note 5).
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is to allow firms to publicly define suitable uses, with some regu-
latory oversight. Firms might have better access to information
that would demonstrate which conditions make a product wel-
fare enhancing for consumers, and publicity might be sufficient
to ensure that firms account for consumer welfare.
Ultimately, this approach requires regulator judgment
about which products or attributes are appropriate for which
consumer situations. Sometimes we will lack the societal norma-
tive consensus necessary for such judgments. Is using a payday
loan to cover an arguably discretionary expense-a honeymoon,
for example-a suitable use? The law ought not to engage in
such judgments. But even the payday-lending trade associations
agree that high-cost short-term lending is appropriate only for
individuals who have an infrequent need for cash rather than a
chronic shortfall.165
Winnowing infrequent from chronic cash needs is both em-
pirically and normatively challenging, but design regulation
must meet the same challenges. For example, the Dodd-Frank
Act's requirement that a lender originate home mortgages only
to borrowers who the lender reasonably and in good faith ascer-
tains have the ability to repay the loan 166 reflects an implicit de-
termination that homeowners should not use mortgages on their
principal dwellings to speculate on real-estate prices. Most
states that permit payday lending limit loans to $500, an im-
plicit determination that payday borrowing is suitable only for
small financial needs.167 Suitability standards would make ex-
plicit the judgment calls that design regulation often leaves
implicit.
A second approach would, in effect, apply systems now used
ex ante as decision aids to assess suitability ex post. These deci-
sion aids range from simple infomediaries like kayak.com,16 to
choice engines used to help consumers make complex decisions
(like choosing an optimal health insurance plan169), to those that
165 See note 106 and accompanying text.
166 See 15 USC § 1639c.
167 See Payday Loans and Deposit Advance Products *9 (CFPB, Apr 24, 2013), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/RAA9-XRBQ.
168 See Thaler and Tucker, 91 Harv Bus Rev at 50-52 (cited in note 113).
169 See Predictive Analytics for Personalized Health Insurance Decision-Making
(Picwell, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9B6R-7TT8. For an explanation of how such a
decision aid could be used alongside state health-insurance exchanges to save consumers
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help consumers engage in affective forecasting and resolve value
conflicts so as to make medical-treatment decisions.170 They can
operate in an individualized manner, eliciting consumer prefer-
ences and subjective weightings of those preferences.171 In the
context of suitability testing, these decision-aid systems would
be used diagnostically to determine whether consumers had se-
lected an appropriate transaction, rather than to help consumers
select an appropriate transaction. This approach would allow for
more heterogeneous preferences and relieves the regulator from
ascribing preferences to consumers. However, validating such
systems is tricky.172
A third possibility is to measure suitability using ex post
outcome measures that correspond well with ex ante suitability.
A model would be the Gainful Employment Rule, referenced
above.173 The Rule conditioned a for-profit school's eligibility for
federal student-loan funds on its former students' ability to meet
specified loan-repayment rates and debt-to-income ratios. With-
out such a performance requirement, these schools and their
student customers had severely misaligned incentives. Students
were unable to ex ante determine for themselves whether the
education offered was suitable. Schools had profit motives to en-
roll as many students as possible without necessarily providing
students a suitable education. A court invalidated one portion of
the Rule but rejected a general challenge to the use of perfor-
mance standards to assess whether a school was "prepar[ing] its
students for gainful employment" as required by the statute.17 4
The court explained that "the adequacy of a program's prepara-
tion is difficult to measure-and it is reasonable to consider stu-
dents' success in the job market as an indication of whether
those students were, in fact, adequately prepared."'17
billions of dollars a year, see Eric J. Johnson, et al, Can Consumers Make Affordable
Care Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 5 (2013).
170 See generally An Introduction to Patient Decision Aids, 347 Brit Med J 27 (2013).
171 See Peter Ubel, Beyond Comprehension: Figuring Out Whether Decision Aids
Improve People's Decisions, in Eldar Shafir, ed, The Behavioral Foundations of Public
Policy 351, 354 (Princeton 2012).
172 See Glyn Elwyn, et al, Developing a Quality Criteria Framework for Patient Decision
Aids: Online International Delphi Consensus Process, 333 Brit Med J 417, 418-19 (2006).
173 See note 109 and accompanying text.
174 Association of Private Colleges and Universities, 870 F Supp 2d at 149-55. See
also 20 USC § 108(b)(1)(A)(i).
175 Association of Private Colleges and Universities, 870 F Supp 2d at 147.
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Outcome measures might be particularly cost effective when
the firm has an ongoing relationship with the consumer and can
alter the outcome directly. For example, payday lenders might
meet a suitability standard that limits sustained reborrowing by
doing workouts with consumers whose borrowing would other-
wise not meet the standard. 176 The unattractiveness of such
workouts would then compel the lenders to ex ante select bor-
rowers who are more likely to be able to repay the loan promptly
or restructure the loan-repayment schedule to increase the like-
lihood of on-time repayment.
b) Benchmarks. In most cases, firm performance will be
measured through testing samples of the firm's customers,
which in turn will require benchmarks against which to assess
compliance. 177 Complete decisional autonomy would require 100
percent comprehension of the costs, benefits, and risks by 100
percent of consumers. Completely welfare-enhancing transac-
tions would require that 100 percent of transactions be suitable.
Lower benchmarks would permit tradeoffs between consumer
law's goals and regulatory cost minimization.
Ideally, one would determine the costs and benefits of
making the marginal transaction meet the performance stand-
ard and set the benchmark where benefits just outweigh costs,178
but reasonable forecasts of these costs and benefits will initially
be difficult to come by. For costs, the regulator would need to
play out each possible firm response-changes in marketing,
sales processes, product terms, or consumer choice architec-
ture-as the true cost is only the least expensive of these. Meas-
urement challenges would plague estimates of benefits as well,
including not only the benefits of increased consumer autonomy
and welfare but also tertiary benefits such as more informed cit-
izens; reduced demands placed on consumers' attention, time,
176 The payday-lenders trade associations recommend such workouts as best prac-
tices. See What Is an Extended Payment Plan? (Community Financial Services Associa-
tion of America), archived at http://perma.cc/3BSQ-9UR8; FiSCA Best Practices (Finan-
cial Service Centers of America), archived at http://perma.cc/T5EX-J44L.
177 As explained below, in a few cases, it might be appropriate to test all of a firm's
customers, but usually sampling would be used. See notes 190-92 and accompanying
text.
178 Not all regulators that would be involved in setting consumer law performance
standards are executive agencies subject to the Office of Management and Budget's for-
mal CBA requirements, but most are charged with considering at least some costs and
benefits in the rulemaking process. See, for example, 12 USC § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i) (charging
the CFPB with considering "the potential benefits and costs to consumers and [firms]").
1360 [82:1309
Performance-Based Consumer Law
and effort in selecting products; increased confidence in the
marketplace; and a reduction in regressive cross subsidies from
lower- to higher-wealth consumers. 179 The cost to firms of testing
and the cost to regulators of administering the regulation might
be quantifiable, but weighing them against the likely benefits
would require tradeoffs among incommensurate values.
Three alternatives to CBA-based benchmarks are market
structure-based benchmarks, relative-performance-based
benchmarks, and lab-based benchmarks.
A market structure-based approach, applicable only to
comprehension standards, would ask what proportion of con-
sumers (or segments of consumers) must understand each cost,
benefit, and risk so as to tame the market.10 Is this a market in
which comprehension by 10 percent of consumers can drive all
firms to provide all consumers with good products? The answer
depends on whether the savvy shoppers have the same needs,
preferences, and use patterns as the rest; whether the products
are commodities or made to order; and whether firms can distin-
guish among consumers of varying comprehension levels in a
cost-effective manner.' 8 ' As firms engage in greater segmenta-
tion more inexpensively, the proportion of consumers that must
comprehend the transaction increases. If it is a market in which
it is cost effective for the firm to segment consumers and exploit
uninformed market segments until 90 percent of consumers meet
comprehension standards, a standard that requires 90 percent of
a firm's customers to understand the product makes sense.
Another potential benchmarking system is a comparative
one. As compared to customers of other firms selling the same
product, is the comprehension level of a given firm's customers
and the suitability level of the firm's transactions above or below
the median for firms in this market? A market-median bench-
mark would tend to ratchet up over time, at least to the point at
which the costs to firms of meeting the standard exceed the costs
179 For a discussion of how we might correct CBA to account for distributional con-
cerns, see Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit
Analysis 108-11 (Oxford 2012).
180 Ayres and Schwartz suggest a population benchmark of 50 percent of consumers
accurately understanding each attribute tested. Ayres and Schwartz, 66 Stan L Rev at
576 n 80 (cited in note 8). While appealing as a democratic sort of standard, the 50
percent number lacks any justification based in autonomy, welfare, or intraconsumer
fairness.
181 See Cruz and Hinck, 47 Hastings L J at 672-75 (cited in note 15).
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of not meeting the standard. However, entire markets could be
performing so poorly-for example, perhaps only 5 percent of
consumers know that they will incur an overdraft fee when they
are deciding whether to engage in the transaction that will trig-
ger the fee-and ratcheting up might happen so slowly that rel-
ative performance benchmarks will not advance consumer law's
goals by much.
A third way to answer the benchmarking question is to de-
mand, at a minimum, something close to what regulators can
achieve in the lab. For comprehension, the theory behind such a
benchmark would be that otherwise firms have incentives to
impair consumer comprehension, rather than enhance it. For
example, the CFPB's new mortgage disclosures might be sup-
plemented or replaced with comprehension standards that
measure comprehension of the same key mortgage features that
the CFPB measured in its consumer testing. Success might be
defined as meeting a distribution of comprehension levels in the
field comparable to those obtained in the lab. This would be
technology forcing because the real world is more distracting
than the lab. But given that some of the comprehension levels
obtained in the lab are low,182 once again these benchmarks
might be quite low.
For suitability, the benchmark might be the results that
regulators can obtain when they give consumers decision aids ex
ante. This approach is analogous to the way in which emissions
standards are often selected in practice: regulators determine
the emissions levels achievable using the best widely available
technology and then set performance standards to reflect those
levels.183 Here, regulators would determine what the best deci-
sion aids can accomplish and would require firms to meet the
same level of decision quality. Firms might then employ these or
other decision aids in the field, or use other methods-such as
choice architecture, targeted marketing, product packaging, or
salespeople-to match consumers to the right transactions.
182 See, for example, Loretta Garrison, et al, Designing Evidence-Based Disclosures:
A Case Study of Financial Privacy Notices, 46 J Consumer Aff 204, 221-22 (2012) (find-
ing that, in a test of new privacy disclosures developed by regulators as a safe harbor,
just over 40 percent of subjects were able to compare information-sharing practices of
financial institutions, choose the lower-sharing bank, and give a reason that was an ac-
curate statement about which bank shared less).
183 See Freeman and Farber, 54 Duke L J at 819 (cited in note 70).
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In the end, when marginal costs and benefits cannot be
measured well, selecting the right benchmark will not be a pre-
cise scientific enterprise. But regulators and courts routinely
engage in analogous benchmark setting. In the OTC context, the
FDA has rejected OTC applications for drugs with a 24 percent
incorrect self-selection rate and accepted applications for drugs
with a 5 percent incorrect self-selection rate in actual-use test-
ing, although the agency has provided no rationale for these
numbers.s4 In Lanham Act cases, courts typically require that
some amount more than 7.5 percent, but still as low as 15 per-
cent, of surveyed consumers be deceived to prove a false-
advertising claim.185
Regulators who employ disclosure and design regulations do
not avoid deciding what proportion of the consumer population
will comprehend products or use them suitably, although they
sometimes avoid explicit examination of these questions. When
regulators do attempt to estimate these numbers, their ex ante
projections are likely to be poor. Retrospective CBA more often
than not demonstrates that earlier cost-benefit projections
were far off the mark.186 Good projections of costs and benefits
are impossible without randomized trial deployment of regula-
tion, and even these studies are valid only to the extent that
conditions during the trial are the same as they will be upon
market-wide deployment of the regulation. This is unlikely in
184 See R. William Soller, Philip V. Chan, and Christopher Shaheen, OTC Consider-
ations for Expanding Access to Nonprescription Medicines: A Critical Synthesis of Ques-
tions from the Food and Drug Administration to Its Advisory Committees on Rx-to-OTC
Switch, 2 SelfCare 117, 126-27 (2011). Given that the costs and risks presented by un-
suitable use will vary, benchmarks ought to vary correspondingly. See id at 138 (explain-
ing that in OTC-drug preapproval testing the FDA demands greater consumer compre-
hension of dose limits and contraindications that present more risk).
185 See, for example, Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals, 19 F3d
at 134 (using a 7.5 percent benchmark); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc v Johnson &
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co, 290 F3d 578, 594 (3d Cir 2002) (using a
15 percent benchmark).
186 See, for example, James K. Hammit, Are the Costs of Proposed Environmental
Regulations Overestimated? Evidence from the CFC Phaseout, 16 Envir Resource Econ
281, 288-93 (2000) (finding that actual costs of banning CFCs were much lower than
projected); Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson, On the Ac-
curacy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 297, 306-07 (2000) (ret-
rospectively reviewing the costs of twenty-one Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration and Environmental Protection Agency rules and finding that prospective
CBA significantly overestimated and underestimated costs in seven and nine cases,
respectively).
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the consumer space, because firms will respond differently to a
market-wide requirement than they will to a trial. For example,
firms systematically alter their advertising of medications to
omit warnings after they have OTC-sales approval.187
Performance standards paired with a requirement that the
agency engage in adaptive management by continually monitor-
ing performance-testing results and adjusting performance
standards in response is more defensible than traditional disclo-
sure or design regulation on this score. Evidence-based evolution
of performance benchmarks means they can be made less arbi-
trary as new information informs regulators about actual costs
and benefits, as these change over time.188
c) Testing. Who should conduct performance testing,
when should they conduct it, how should they conduct it, and
whom should they test? This Section addresses each of these
questions in turn.
To ensure integrity and accuracy, performance testing
should generally be conducted by third-party, accredited audi-
tors paid for by firms but assigned randomly. Random assign-
ment is necessary to avoid the problems with ratings agencies
that surfaced during the mortgage crisis, in which the testing
firm is beholden to, and thus biased toward, the firm hiring it.
Such randomized auditor assignments are not unprecedented.
For example, before 1994, the Federal Housing Authority used
a "fee panel" system that assigned appraisers on a rotational
basis, ensuring home appraisals free of lender bias.189 Beyond
ensuring integrity and accuracy, third-party testing and gov-
ernment oversight would protect consumer privacy and prevent
firms from using testing data to prey on consumers. Consum-
ers who test poorly might otherwise be targets for higher pric-
es, as consumers who give indicia of being poor price shoppers
are today.
187 See notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
188 This suggests that judicial review ought to occur after the deployment of perfor-
mance-based regulation, when costs and benefits can be better measured. See Jerry L.
Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 245 (Harvard 1990) (making
a similar suggestion for judicial enforcement review of auto-safety regulations).
189 See J. Kevin Murray, Issues in Appraisal Regulation: The Cracks in the Founda-
tion of the Mortgage Lending Process, 43 Loyola LA L Rev 1301, 1319-20 (2010).
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As for timing and frequency, recall that performance-based
consumer law seeks to avoid the bias inherent in complaint-
driven enforcement. Therefore, testing should be conducted:
" on a regular, periodic basis (parallel to child product
safety testing);
" on a periodic basis that varies with the results of
previous performance testing (akin to nuclear power
plant safety performance testing); or
* episodically, triggered by objective indicators of poor-
ly understood features or unsuitable transactions
(similar to much US food-safety testing).
The particular methodology used for testing can be worked
out only contextually, depending on the content of the standard
and the practical limits imposed by costs and by the necessity of
formulating a valid test. For comprehension, testing will depend
on the depth of understanding tested. Facial knowledge might
be assayed using a simple true/false or multiple-choice test. Ap-
plied understanding might be assessed by analyzing whether ob-
jective reasons given by a consumer for a product choice re-
flect an accurate or inaccurate understanding of the product.
Suitability-testing methodology will reflect the performance
standard selected. If the standard establishes a set of indica-
tions and contraindications for particular transaction features,
compliance can be measured using self-reported or third-party
data (such as credit reports). For a subjective-utility standard,
conjoint analysis or other preference-elicitation techniques
would be appropriate. When the standard is based on the per-
formance of a particular product type or feature over time, audi-
tors might examine data that the firm collects for business pur-
poses in its interactions with its customers, such as data on
customer repayment history.
In selecting among performance standards and testing
methodologies, objectivity, reliability, accuracy, and cost are all
important considerations. Overly subjective interpretations by
auditors of open-ended customer responses could introduce in-
consistencies in treatment both among consumers and among
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firms. 190 But the use of in-depth consumer-testing methods in
the OTC-drug actual-use studies demonstrates that this can be
done.
Consumer testing and auditing of firm records for transac-
tion suitability are becoming cheaper and more accurate for
many of the same technological reasons that firms are becoming
better at sabotaging disclosures and evading design rules. Com-
puter processing and storage costs are going down and the ubiq-
uity of sensors, data collection, and intermediating devices that
could be used for consumer testing is increasing. Nonetheless,
the deeper the comprehension standard, the more burdensome it
is for firms to test and for consumers to be tested. Suitability
testing could require expensive, time-consuming, in-depth con-
sumer interviews.
But inexpensive, painless, objective testing of consumer fac-
tual knowledge could be surprisingly powerful. During the
mortgage bubble, for example, a major problem was that con-
sumers buying mortgages with adjustable monthly payments ei-
ther did not know the payments would change or did not know
how much they would change.191 Comprehension testing for
these two facts would not have been difficult, yet it might have
helped consumers steer clear of unaffordable mortgages-and it
almost certainly would have been more efficacious than the new
mortgage disclosure forms the CFPB has developed.192
Further, sufficient information to make valid inferences
will often be possible with small random or stratified (to cap-
ture subpopulations 193) samples of consumers. An alternative
would be to test only the most-vulnerable customers; if they
190 See Ho, 122 Yale L J at 638-42 (cited in note 88) (attributing inconsistent res-
taurant sanitation grades in New York City to, for example, inspector variation in the
application of subjective standards).
191 See Lauren E. Willis, Will the Mortgage Market Correct? How Households and
Communities Would Fare If Risk Were Priced Well, 41 Conn L Rev 1177, 1241-45 (2009).
192 As previously explained, these disclosures have a small salutary effect in the
lab-an effect that is likely to disappear once the stressors and distractors of real life are
added. See note 97 and accompanying text.
193 See, for example, Leonard-Segal, et al, 49 J Am Pharmacists Assoc at 671 (cited
in note 5) (suggesting that actual-use OTC-drug-sales tests should include "a low literacy
cohort as determined by a validated literacy testing instrument such as the REALM
(Rapid Estimate of Adult Literacy in Medicine) test").
1366 [82:1309
Performance-Based Consumer Law
comprehend a product and use it suitably, less-vulnerable popu-
lations likely will as well.194
Testing is likely to annoy consumers. However, the fact that
consumers accept having to click through computer software
warning screens and terms of service on websites before getting
on with their lives is some evidence that over time consumers
will accept testing as incidental to a well-regulated marketplace.
When samples or subpopulations are tested, firms might finan-
cially compensate them for their efforts, thus distributing the
cost more evenly across the firm's customer pool. Firms will also
pass their own testing costs on to consumers in the form of high-
er prices. However, recall that one of the underlying problems
that performance-based consumer law seeks to address is re-
gressive cross subsidization. Performance-based regulation
ought to redistribute from, for example, consumers who receive
free checking to those who currently pay overdraft fees, even if
the result is an increase in across-the-board monthly account
fees. Thus, any consideration of costs must be tempered by the
welfare benefits of redistribution from higher- to lower-wealth
consumers. 19
The costs to regulators of enforcing performance-based con-
sumer law and actively engaging in adaptive management to
improve that law's performance would be high.96 Firms would
pay for performance testing of consumers and transactions in
most cases, and so the lab-based disclosure testing that regula-
tors currently perform could be jettisoned (except when lab test-
ing is used to set benchmarks). But performance-based consum-
er law would require regulators to continuously monitor the
performance of the testing-perhaps by means of random au-
dits of firm records and in-depth interviews of consumers-to
ensure that third-party audits of firms accurately reflect cus-
tomer comprehension and transaction suitability. The addi-
tional costs imposed on regulators by performance-based con-
sumer law, including monitoring third-party auditors and
engaging in enforcement actions, are likely higher than the
194 This alternative echoes the unsophisticated-consumer test used in some areas of
consumer law. See note 14.
195 See Adler, Well Being and Fair Distribution at 114-19 (cited in note 179).
196 See Holly Doremus, et al, Making Good Use of Adaptive Management *5-6 (Cen-
ter for Progressive Reform, Apr 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/C5LV-AFSV (discuss-
ing the cost of adaptive environmental regulation).
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costs of developing and enforcing disclosure or design rules. The
premise of this Article is that the benefits of more-efficacious
regulation would likely outweigh these costs in many instances.
4. Enforcement levers.
Various levers could be used to enforce performance-based
consumer law. The mildest would be to institutionalize periodic,
field-based performance testing as a regulatory tool for deter-
mining which firms, products, and product features to investi-
gate for UDAAP violations. Consumer law regulators use per-
formance measures to focus their examination and enforcement
resources today, although the measures used vary in how sys-
tematically they capture performance. For example, regulators
use bank Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, examining appli-
cation and denial rates and the sales rates of higher-priced
mortgages by race, sex, and census tract, to single out relatively
weak performers for further Equal Credit Opportunity Act and
Fair Housing Act scrutiny.197 The FTC and the CFPB both have
complaints databases that the agencies use to identify patterns
among products or firms that suggest UDAAP violations. 198 The
results of comprehension and suitability performance testing
could provide an indicator that is both more reliable and fairer
than consumer complaints, which, as noted, are biased toward
the problems of higher-socioeconomic-status consumers. Know-
ing that this testing would be used this way would give firms an
incentive to achieve high performance levels.
In contrast, the most demanding enforcement mechanism
would be transaction-related consequences. For comprehension
performance standards, meeting the standard could be a pre-
condition for enforcing a tested contract term, collecting a tested
fee, or retaining a tested type of personal data. When compre-
hension testing of all relevant customers is feasible, an elegant
enforcement mechanism would be for the enforceability of each
197 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, et al, Interagency Fair Lending
Examination Procedures (Aug 2009), in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB
Supervision and Examination Manual *237, 250-53, 268-69, 271 (Oct 1, 2012), archived
at http://perma.cc/YD7Y-WNNY.
198 For an overview of the FTC's complaint database, see The FTC's Consumer Sen-
tinel Network (FTC), archived at http://perma.c/993P-8ANF. For an explanation of how
complaint data are used by the CFPB, see How We Use Complaint Data (CFPB), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/D4HW-TFEW.
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term to hinge on how the individual consumer comprehends that
term. So, for example, a firm could be required to demonstrate
that a consumer comprehended a back-end fee, a forum-selection
clause, or a personal-data collection practice at the time of con-
tracting as a precondition for imposing that fee, demanding the
use of that forum, or collecting those data.
Testing a sample of a firm's customer population permits a
coarser enforcement system. An exclusionary rule of sorts could
prevent firms from benefiting from a term contained in any
transaction consummated prior to the date on which the firm
demonstrates that the benchmark proportion of its customers
comprehend the term. Firms would then be required to periodi-
cally reaffirm consumer comprehension of a term, perhaps an-
nually for those terms that barely meet the benchmark and less
frequently for terms that beat the benchmark. 199
A similar enforcement mechanism for a suitability standard
would be to prohibit a firm from taking payments from a con-
sumer until the firm demonstrates that the transaction is suita-
ble for the consumer, akin to a contingency fee. Such a pay-for-
performance rule would be useful when firms are better
equipped than consumers to determine ex ante whether the
transaction is likely to provide benefits to the consumer. For ex-
ample, firms selling debt-settlement services have far better in-
formation than consumers about the value (if any200) of what
they are selling. A suitability requirement might require debt-
settlement firms to demonstrate that a consumer has improved
her financial position-net of the firm's fees and taxes related to
the settlements-with respect to the debt she started with, be-
fore collecting any fee.
A third potential enforcement scheme would be a freestand-
ing obligation for firms to demonstrate through testing samples
of their customers either that their customer population meets
199 See Reactor Oversight Process *6 (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dec
2006), archived at http://perma.ccIK65U-CXYR (explaining that all but the most severe
nuclear power plant safety-performance-standard violations are enforced this way,
and that the extent to which a plant meets performance standards determines the
frequency with which it will face reinspections in the eighteen months following the
initial inspection).
200 The industry is rife with programs that do not appear to benefit consumers. See
Rachel Abrams and Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Companies That Offer Help with Student
Loans Are Often Predatory, Officials Say (NY Times, July 13, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/7BDL-6SC7.
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the comprehension performance benchmark or that their trans-
actions with those customers meet the suitability performance
benchmark. Failure to meet one of the benchmarks could consti-
tute prima facie or even conclusive evidence of a UDAAP viola-
tion. The virtue of such strong sanctions would be that the en-
forcement apparatuses for UDAAP violations already exist.
However, this system would give firms no incentive to outper-
form the benchmark.201 It would be better to incrementally tax
firms for failing to meet the benchmarks and incrementally re-
ward firms for exceeding the benchmarks.202 Taxes might take
the form of fines; rewards might include lengthening the inter-
val before the firm's next performance test.203
5. Exemptions.
Compliance with performance-based consumer law could be
costly for firms. While firms can effectively lower their own per-
formance bar by redesigning their products to make them easier
to understand and more likely to be selected and used suitably,
the burden on small- and even medium-sized firms might in
some cases outweigh the benefits of performance-based regula-
tion.204 Firms with fewer transactions will need to have a larger
proportion of their customers tested to ensure representative
sampling. In these situations, the regulator ought to pay for the
testing or exempt smaller businesses from performance stand-
ards, just as small-scale polluters are sometimes exempted from
emissions standards.205 As discussed further below, information
201 See Freeman and Farber, 54 Duke L J at 815 (cited in note 70) (discussing how
cap and trade aims to solve this issue in the emissions context).
202 In practice, this appears to be what occurs in the pollution context. See 42 USC
§ 7524(b), (c)(2) (mandating that civil liability and penalties for the vehicle and engine
requirements of Title II of the Clean Air Act take into account the gravity of the viola-
tion); Clean Air Act Mobile Source Civil Penalty Policy-Title II of the Clean Air Act, Ve-
hicle and Engine Emissions Certification Requirements *11-12 (EPA, Jan 2009), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/PSJ2-CD9X (defining "gravity" to include the amount of excess
emissions).
203 If the taxes and rewards are set correctly, this scheme would carry efficiency
benefits as well. See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective
Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 Am L & Econ Rev 1, 6 (2002).
204 See Ayres and Schwartz, 66 Stan L Rev at 581-82 (cited in note 8) (limiting their
proposal for requiring firms to test consumer comprehension to "mass-market" sellers,
which they define as having more than five hundred employees or more than $20 million
in annual retail sales).
205 See, for example, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3704.03(T)(4) (exempting smaller emis-
sion sources-those producing fewer than ten tons per year of emissions-from "best
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gleaned from the performance testing of other firms offering
similar products can nonetheless inform the adjustments that
the regulator makes to other regulations, such as disclosure and
product-design rules. Large firms could thus serve as experi-
mental labs to improve the regulation of all firms.
6. Experimentation.
As a precursor to wholesale adoption of performance-based
consumer law, comprehension or suitability requirements could
be used remedially in settlement contracts or court orders. Re-
medial injunctions and consent decrees often contain analogous
performance benchmarks.206 A series of remedial orders would
build on the experience of the Hawaiian Punch case to help reg-
ulators determine how best to make the performance-based con-
sumer law paradigm work.
Meeting a comprehension performance target is a particu-
larly apt remedy for deception and meeting a suitability target is
an equally apt remedy for unfair or abusive practices. For ex-
ample, the FTC recently found that a national retailer had de-
ceived consumers when it loaded tracking software on consum-
ers' computers and hid the depth to which the tracking would go
on the seventy-fifth line of a scroll-down disclosure.207 The case
was resolved by means of a consent decree containing precise
time and manner rules for how the retailer must disclose the
information in the future.208 A more effective decree would
have required the retailer to demonstrate, through third-party
random-sample testing of its users, that users generally
available technology" emission-reduction requirements under the Ohio State Implemen-
tation Plan of the federal Clean Air Act).
206 See, for example, Swann v Charlotte-Mecklen burg Board of Education, 402 US 1,
22-31 (1971) (upholding specified racial-integration benchmarks ordered by the district
court in the form of an equitable remedy); Brown v Plata, 131 S Ct 1910, 1944-45 (2011)
(upholding a district court order giving California two years to meet a performance
benchmark for its inmate population density of 137.5 percent of prison design capacity);
Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal, United States V Westchester County,
New York, Civil Action No 06-2860, *6 (SDNY filed Aug 10, 2009) (ordering the defend-
ant county to "within seven (7) years of the entry of this Stipulation and Order, ensure
the development of at least seven hundred fifty (750) new affordable housing units").
207 Complaint, In the Matter of Sears Holdings Management Corp, FTC Docket No
C-4264, *2-4 (FTC filed Aug 31, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 2979770).
208 Decision and Order, In the Matter of Sears Holdings Management Corp, FTC
Docket No C-4264, *3-5 (FTC filed Aug 31, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL
2979770).
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understood what the retailer was collecting from them and how
the retailer could use that information. The retailer would then
have been both required and empowered to determine the best
way to inform its customers-perhaps by showing them a short
video clip or animation, by requiring them to pass a quiz as a
condition of activating the software, or perhaps by using differ-
ent methods to reach different types of consumers. Such a per-
formance standard would have given the retailer an interest in
ensuring that its consumers were well informed, rather than an
interest in foiling the consumer comprehension to which the
FTC's disclosure time and manner requirements aspire.
Another example comes from the CFPB, which resolved
charges of unfairness, deception, and abuse with a decree requir-
ing a payday lender to stop pressuring consumers to reborrow
rather than pay off their loans.209 A surer cure would have been
to require the lender to demonstrate, through third-party exam-
ination of its records, that consumers were not reborrowing at a
high rate. The lender could then have met the benchmark by, for
example, engaging in workouts with borrowers who were having
difficulty with repayment, restricting its lending to borrowers
who presented evidence that they would be able to repay the
loans when they came due, or requiring repayment according to
an installment schedule that closely tracked what the borrower
would likely be able to repay.210
As with any new regulatory method, there are bound to be
snags in operation. Studying the implementation of performance-
based consent decrees would help regulators foresee and thus
forestall such snags.
D. Applications
This Section fleshes out more specifically how performance-
based regulation might work in a few exemplar contexts. The
209 Consent Order, In the Matter of ACE Cash Express, Inc, File No 2014-CFPB-
0008, *11-15 (CFPB filed July 10, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 4472891).
210 Analysis of borrower surveys and data from loan performance in Colorado, which
requires lenders to allow borrowers to repay small-dollar loans with small, affordable
payments on a fully amortizing installment schedule, demonstrates that "monthly loan
payments exceeding 5 percent of a borrower's individual gross monthly income are unaf-
fordable." Payday Lending in America: Policy Solutions *4 (The Pew Charitable Trusts,
Oct 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/QM4L-F8U9. See also generally Trial, Error, and
Success in Colorado's Payday Lending Reforms (The Pew Charitable Trusts, Dec 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/TE4Y-YDYE.
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descriptions below are not intended to be blueprints but rather
starting points to begin the discussion about how to apply per-
formance-based regulation to consumer transactions.
1. Personal-data collection and use.
The marketplace currently does not ensure that the inter-
ests of consumers and firms are well aligned when it comes to
firms' collection and use of personally identifiable consumer in-
formation. Firms successfully shroud data collection to keep it
nonsalient, if not invisible.211 Privacy competition is limited, both
because consumers cannot winnow false from accurate claims
about privacy protection 12 and because telling consumers that
their privacy is being protected heightens their privacy con-
cerns 21a--a state of mind rarely conducive to business. Decisional
autonomy is absent here; apart from a few high-profile types of
collection and use,214 consumers are largely clueless about what
information is collected about them, by whom, and how it is
used.215 Privacy-control interfaces are so difficult to use that
even consumers who try to control what information is shared
about them usually fail.216 Consumer law's goal of maximizing
211 See, for example, Jeremy Singer-Vine, How Dataium Watches You (Wall St J,
Dec 7, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/JP3Q-QKVU (describing the remarkable
lengths to which one firm goes to conceal its tracking code, which logs which pages of
websites a consumer views, "what parts of the page were clicked, which dropdown op-
tions were selected, and what information (such as name, email address, and phone
number) [was] entered in [ ] forms").
212 See Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 Berkeley Tech L J 61,
128-29 (2014); Joseph Bonneau and Sbren Preibusch, The Privacy Jungle: On the Market
for Data Protection in Social Networks *29-33 (Workshop on the Economics of Infor-
mation Security, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/6AH4-FZUH (surveying the privacy
practices and policies of forty-five social networking sites, finding a broken market for
privacy, and postulating that the optimal policy for social networking sites involves mak-
ing minimal references to privacy and even obfuscating the language in privacy policies
so that sites need not compete on privacy).
213 See Leslie K. John, Alessandro Acquisti, and George Loewenstein, Strangers on a
Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information, 37 J Consumer
Rsrch 858, 859-60 (2011).
214 See, for example, Ayres and Schwartz, 66 Stan L Rev at 600 (cited in note 8).
215 See Joseph Turow, et al, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Privacy
in the Coming Decade, 3 I/S: J L & Pol Info Socy 723, 732-33 (2007-2008) (summarizing
research showing that "[c]onsumers [m]isunderstand [o]nline [d]ata [c]ollection").
216 See generally Michelle Madejski, Maritza Johnson, and Steven M. Bellovin, A
Study of Privacy Setting Errors in an Online Social Network *5 (PERCOM Workshops,
Oct 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3RUX-C272 (reporting findings demonstrating
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consumer welfare is probably also not being met. It is possible
that what is good for Google is good for consumers, but without
market forces or regulation ensuring this alignment of interests,
there is no reason to believe that it exists.
Suitability standards may not make sense here, for two rea-
sons. First, privacy is an arena in which consumers may have
very heterogeneous preferences.217 Second, even if information
privacy preferences are not very heterogeneous,218 privacy re-
mains an arena without political consensus on what information
ought to be collected by whom and for what purposes. Thus, at
this moment in our society's understanding of privacy, compre-
hension standards should be used.219
a) Legal authority. The Privacy Bill of Rights, should it
become law, would be an excellent starting point for comprehen-
sion standards. This document declares that consumers have the
rights to: (a) "easily understandable and accessible information
about privacy.., practices," and (b) "control over what personal
data companies collect from them and how they use it."220 Firms
have correlative duties: (a) to explain what data they collect and
how they use it "[a]t times and in places that are most useful to
enabling consumers to gain a meaningful understanding of pri-
vacy risks and the ability to exercise [personal control],"and
(b) to "offer consumers clear and simple choices, presented at
times and in ways that enable consumers to make meaningful
that social media-website users who adjust privacy settings do not successfully limit in-
formation sharing in the manner that they intend).
217 See generally Ponnurangam Kumaraguru and Lorrie Faith Cranor, Privacy In-
dexes: A Survey of Westin's Studies (Carnegie Mellon Institute for Software Research In-
ternational, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/B3NW-R2AA (summarizing the work of
Alan Westin, who conducted over thirty surveys regarding privacy between 1978 and
2004 and found considerable variation in privacy preferences).
218 See, for example, Jeff Fox, 85% of Online Consumers Oppose Internet Ad Track-
ing, Consumer Reports Finds (Consumer Reports, May 27, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/DX5U-VSWX (finding that most consumers oppose having their online
activities tracked for advertising purposes); Turow, et al, 3 I/S: J L & Pol Info Socy at
729 (cited in note 215) (finding that "[c]onsumers [c]are [d]eeply about [p]rivacy").
219 On the other hand, if sufficient numbers of consumers share information, other
consumers may be forced to do so as well, regardless of their preferences. See Scott R.
Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure
Future, 105 Nw U L Rev 1153, 1157-58 (2011). These third-party effects might require
suitability or design regulation of practices regarding consumer-data collection and use.
220 Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Pri-
vacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy *47 (The White House,
Feb 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/CR88-X8VT (propounding a "Consumer Privacy
Bill of Rights" designed to guide legislative and agency action).
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decisions about personal data collection, use, and disclosure. '"221
Consumer comprehension is indispensable to making these
rights and duties a reality.
Although new authority would be optimal, existing UDAAP
law discussed above provides some support for comprehension
requirements.222 More-specific authority exists in two contexts.
First, regulations implemented under the Children's Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1998223 (COPPA) require that websites
used by children give parents a description of the website's data
collection and usage practices in a notice that is "clearly and un-
derstandably written" and "prominent"224 so that parents can ex-
ercise their rights to decide whether to permit the websites to
collect their children's data. To date, the FTC has sought to en-
sure that these standards are met through prescriptive rules
about the placement, typeface, and language of the notices.225
These disclosure design rules have been ineffectual; firms can
easily distract consumers from the disclosures even when they
are designed as directed.226
The FTC likely has authority to put comprehension perfor-
mance standards in place that would potentially be more effec-
tive at ensuring that parents understand their rights. COPPA
directs the FTC to promulgate regulations to ensure that web-
sites "provide notice" of what information they collect from chil-
dren and how they use it and "obtain verifiable parental con-
sent" for this collection and use.227 Comprehension testing could
assess whether parents have received notice and have consented
221 Id.
222 Most commercial collection of consumer data is governed primarily by UDAAP
law. See Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 Colum L Rev 583, 585-86 (2014).
223 Pub L No 105-277, 112 Stat 2681-728, codified at 15 USC § 6501 et seq.
224 16 CFR § 312.4.
225 See The Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan
for Your Business *3 (FTC, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/77F8-2BP5 ("Make those
links clear and prominent. Consider using a larger font or a different color type on a con-
trasting background."); id ("To comply with COPPA, your privacy policy should be clear
and easy to read. Don't add any unrelated or confusing information.").
226 See Joseph Turow, Privacy Policies on Children's Websites: Do They Play by the
Rules? *12 (Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/7DM
E-DDFV (showing how children's websites follow the regulations about the placement of
privacy-policy links yet are able to surround the links with distracters or otherwise re-
duce the links' visibility).
227 15 USC § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
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to the information collection and use to which they think they
have consented.
Second, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act28 (GLBA) requires fi-
nancial institutions to provide consumers with "clear and con-
spicuous" disclosures about data collection and use, as further
specified by regulation.229 The GLBA requires the federal bank-
ing regulators to develop a safe harbor model form that "(A) [is]
comprehensible to consumers ... ; (B) provide[s] for clear and
conspicuous disclosures; [and] (C) enable[s] consumers easily to
identify the sharing practices of a financial institution and to
compare privacy practices among financial institutions.230 How-
ever, the model form that the regulators have developed per-
forms poorly: even in the lab, only 40 percent of consumers un-
derstand these disclosures at even a basic level.231 Given that
regulators have been unable to develop a form that meets the
requirements of the statute, regulators ought to promulgate and
enforce comprehension performance standards instead.
b) Comprehension standards. To make informed, auton-
omous choices about transactions in which their (or their chil-
dren's) personal data are obtained by firms, consumers need to
know what information is being collected and how firms will use
it. This knowledge must be fairly concrete-a consumer cannot
make an informed decision about sharing based on a vague ad-
monition that a firm may collect information about consumers to
improve its services.22 Testing for every possible use, however,
might prove unwieldy, and some uses might be so universally
desired that comprehension is unnecessary. For example, con-
sumers probably do not need to know that their information is
used to complete their online transactions. However, consumers
are likely to have varying preferences about the use of their
228 Pub L No 106-102, 113 Stat 1338 (1999), codified in various sections of Titles
12 and 15.
229 15 USC § 6803(e)(2)(B).
230 15 USC § 6803(e)(2)(A)-(C).
231 See Garrison, et al, 46 J Consumer Aff at 221-22 (cited in note 182) (finding that
only about 40 percent of consumer subjects tested were able to accurately compare dif-
ferent information-sharing practices of two institutions using the model forms).
232 See Dieter Bohn, UK and Germany Join France in Demanding Google Rewrite Its
Privacy Policy (The Verge, July 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/YZ5T-H9KG (re-
porting that EU countries have found Google's privacy policy "too vague" for users to un-
derstand how their data will be used).
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personal information for targeted advertising or "price optimiza-
tion"233 (that is, price discrimination) purposes.
Knowing what data firms collect and how they use it is not
enough for fully informed decisions. Consumers must also un-
derstand attendant costs, risks, and benefits.234 But these are
contested and experienced differently by different consumers. 235
Testing for comprehension of these personalized costs and risks
could require psychological inquiries not amenable to objective,
affordable, noninvasive testing mechanisms. Thus, the inquiry
should be limited to bare, objective facts about collection and
use. This approach accords with current disclosure require-
ments. For example, California law requires websites and online
services to disclose only: (1) "the categories of personally identi-
fiable information that the operator collects.., about individual
consumers," (2) "the categories of third-party persons or entities
with whom the operator may share that personally identifiable
information," and (3) "whether other parties may collect person-
ally identifiable information about an individual consumer's
online activities over time and across different Web sites when a
consumer uses the operator's Web site or service."23
Firms could meet a performance standard for personal-data
collection and use in creative ways that extend well beyond the
dry, textual disclosures currently mandated by California law.
Cartoons, infographics, personalized messages, and the like are
bound to educate more consumers more effectively.
c) Testing and enforcement. Given that only factual
knowledge would be tested, online machine-graded tests could
be used. To ensure impartiality, testing should be performed by
the government or independent third parties. Prior to collecting
personal data, a firm would need to disclose to the testing entity
what data it collects and how it will use that data. The firm
233 See text accompanying note 25.
234 Knowledge also is not enough, because decisionmaking biases are endemic to the
privacy arena. See Willis, 29 Berkeley Tech L J at 74-77 (cited in note 212) (surveying
biases that commonly influence privacy decisions).
235 For examples of how consumers experience the effects of data collection different-
ly, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv L Rev
2010, 2021-22 (2013).
236 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 22575(b)(1), (b)(6). California law requires websites to
"conspicuously post" these disclosures; posts that use large fonts, capital letters, or con-
trasting colors and posts that include a link to the privacy policy on the homepage are
both examples of ways that companies can satisfy this requirement. See Cal Bus & Prof
Code § 22577(a)-(b).
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would then need to give the testing entity access to consumers
before collecting the data.
Firms could motivate consumers to perform well on the test
by preventing uninformed consumers from engaging in certain
transactions with the firm or from obtaining access to web con-
tent, "free" apps, or other benefits for which the consumer would
otherwise pay with personal data. Alternatively, firms could
charge noncomprehending consumers a monetary fee for this ac-
cess. Such actions by firms would prevent savvy consumers from
feigning ignorance so as to avoid data collection while continu-
ing to obtain (now truly) free benefits that other consumers
would be paying for with their personal data.
Other aspects of testing depend on the desired enforcement
mechanism. To limit firms to collecting from each consumer only
the data that the consumer demonstrably understands is being
collected and only for the purposes that the consumer demon-
strably understands, testing for knowledge of every type of data
collected and every use would have to be conducted on every
consumer (or parent).237 This would be costly, particularly for
consumers. Firms often collect a large number of types of infor-
mation for a large number of uses. Thus, a lengthy test would be
needed unless the testing requirement deterred firms from col-
lecting many data types or engaging in many types of uses.
If samples of consumers were tested, each might be asked
three or four questions randomly drawn from the complete list of
questions about the firm's data collection and use. Sampling
would dramatically reduce testing costs but would foreclose a
tailored enforcement mechanism. Instead, a cruder penalty
would need to be imposed, such as not allowing firms to collect
information until a specified proportion of consumers accurately
answered questions about the firm's collection and use of that
specific information. Firms might be required to periodically re-
validate consumer comprehension.
It is not obvious what proportion of sampled consumers ought
to understand a firm's data collection and use practices to vali-
date these practices. Using CBA to set the benchmark is prob-
lematic because the direct benefit of consumer comprehension is
237 The only exception would be for personally identifiable data that are used to
identify each consumer's testing results and guide the firm's subsequent treatment of the
consumer's data.
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an increase in decisional autonomy, which is not quantifiable.
Consumer knowledge here would facilitate privacy-based con-
sumer choices about doing business with firms, but the value of
facilitating these choices is not measurable. The cost of testing-
both the cost to firms paying third parties to test and the cost to
consumers in time spent answering questions-can probably be
estimated well, but the cost to firms of educating consumers to
the point at which they can pass the test probably cannot be
estimated.238
d) Dynamic effects. The secondary, dynamic effects of
consumer privacy-comprehension standards are likely to be sev-
eral. First, consumer comprehension might solve part of the
market-failure problem: firms would stop collecting personally
identifiable data and eliminate uses of that data when consum-
ers do not receive sufficient value in exchange.239 Consumer
comprehension would facilitate firm competition over privacy
practices (rather than privacy image).
Second, firms might limit the number of types of infor-
mation and uses in which they engage-in effect, simplifying the
consumer's decision problem-so as to increase the likelihood
that consumers would pass the test. Lower collection levels
would have positive effects on data security and identity theft.
Third, consumer comprehension testing would force firms
to decide how they will use their customers' information prior to
collecting it. Tying firms' hands could prevent innovative uses-
although if the new uses truly enhance consumer welfare, then
firms might educate old customers about these new uses.
Finally, educating consumers about what is happening
with their data might spark deeper thinking about the substan-
tive privacy rules that consumers would like to govern their data
and perhaps motivate and empower them to address the issue in
the democratic process. Performance-based regulation might
thus be a bridge to thoughtful substantive regulation.
238 To the extent that ignorance is bliss and knowing that one's data are being col-
lected and used creates a negative feeling of being subjected to the Panopticon, increased
knowledge itself might be a cost borne by consumers. But the cost of knowledge is one
inherent in consumer decisional autonomy. See notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
239 See Mary Graham, Regulation by Shaming, The Atlantic Monthly 36, 38 (Apr
2000) (explaining how the Toxic Release Inventory shamed companies into reducing
their toxic releases); Craswell, 88 Wash L Rev at 334 (cited in note 88) (calling disclo-
sures that produce such responses from firms "dynamic" disclosures).
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2. Consumer credit products: overdraft.
The sale of consumer credit products is another area in
which the interests of firms and consumers are poorly aligned.
Financial products can be designed in such a multitude of com-
plex and shifting ways that it. is easy for firms to shroud costs.
At times, the price of the product is clear but the relative prices
of alternatives are not. Some fees are avoidable in theory but are
structured to be undetected at the moment they are incurred.
Other price components depend on risks that are easier for firms
than for consumers to predict. Simple illiteracy and innumeracy
limit many consumers' abilities to assess the costs or benefits of
financial products well. Finally, financial desperation and con-
comitant limited cognitive-willpower bandwidth can prevent
well-considered decisionmaking.
One product that has drawn particular concern is debit card
overdraft. An overdraft is, in effect, a high-cost, small-dollar,
short-term loan. It occurs when a checking account holder with-
draws more from her checking account than is available and the
bank, for a fee, covers the withdrawal with its own funds. Some
prepaid debit cards also permit consumers to overdraft, for a
fee.240 In a large data set analyzed by the CFPB, the median
amount that led to an overdraft charge and the typical length of
time before the account holder came current for overdrafts occa-
sioned by debit card use were $24 and three days, respectively;241
during the same period, the median fee was $34.242 These num-
bers imply an APR of over 17,000 percent.243 The law treats
overdraft as a discretionary service rather than as a loan, and so
banks are not required to disclose the APR (nor would it be easy
for them to do so, given the complexity of their fee structures
and the variability in the timing of repayment).244 Checking
240 See Consumers Continue at *9-10 (cited in note 62). On prepaid debit cards,
overdraft is called "shortage." See Analysis of Reloadable Prepaid Cards in an Environ-
ment of Rising Consumer Banking Fees *16-17 (Bretton Woods, Mar 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/29D4-FTR3.
241 See Data Point: Checking Account Overdraft *5 (CFPB, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/5A3Y-MKYR.
242 See CFPB Study of Overdraft Programs: A White Paper of Initial Data Findings
*52 & n mmm (CFPB, June 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/ZNJ7-TV2E.
243 This figure was derived using an APR calculator. For an APR calculator, see
Overdraft APR Calculator (CSGNetwork.com), archived at http://perma.cc/KN54-NWDF.
244 See Willis, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1176, 1182 (cited in note 22).
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account overdraft fees amounted to $32 billion in 2012, or 61
percent of checking account-fee revenues. 245
The current law on checking account overdraft consists of an
ineffective nudge paired with a disclosure. Banks cannot charge
account holders overdraft fees on automated teller machines
(ATMs) or nonrecurring debit transactions unless the account
holder affirmatively opts out of the default and opts in to the
overdraft service.246 Consumers need to opt out only once; after
that, the overdraft product becomes a part of the account. No
law targets prepaid-debit card overdrafts; these must be dis-
closed as any other fee in the fine print that is incident to the
card.247
Empirical evidence about overdraft transactions indicates
that none of the goals of consumer law-decisional autonomy,
consumer welfare, and distributional fairness-is being met.
Overdraft fees are disproportionately paid by poorer account
holders and subsidize free checking for wealthier account hold-
ers. 248 Over half of all consumers incurring overdraft fees do not
believe that they opted out of the default and into the service.249
Most consumers overdraw their accounts unintentionally and
many do not realize it until they receive their account state-
ments. 250 Those consumers who believe they have opted into the
service hold serious misconceptions; most consumers erroneous-
ly believe that the service prevents them from bouncing checks
and that without it, they could incur declined-debit card fees.251
Finally, a majority of overdrafts appear to be incurred by con-
sumers who, at the time of the overdraft-incurring transaction,
either have cash sitting in another liquid account or could have
tapped a credit card cash advance several orders of magnitude
245 See Carter Dougherty, Consumers Using Overdraft Coverage Risk Fees, U.S.
Says (Bloomberg, June 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/73LR-LKRJ.
246 The opt-in and disclosure requirements do not apply to prepaid debit card
overdraft.
247 See Analysis of Reloadable Prepaid Cards at *17 (cited in note 240) ("A majority
of [prepaid debit card issuers] do not disclose shortage fees, except to refer to 'applicable
fees."').
248 See Willis, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1178, 1184-85 (cited in note 22).
249 See Overdrawn: Persistent Confusion and Concern about Bank Overdraft Practices
*5 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, June 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/AL2Q-ACBB.
250 See id at *9 (finding that reading an account statement was the most common
way that consumers discovered that they had overdrawn their accounts, with about one-
third learning of the overdraft this way).
251 See Willis, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1188-89 (cited in note 22).
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cheaper than overdraft.252 Even for those consumers who do not
have a cheaper means of payment readily available, overdrafts
are frequently charged on discretionary purchases. It is incon-
ceivable that many consumers, particularly low-income consum-
ers, would knowingly and routinely choose to pay a $34 fee on a
$24 purchase instead of waiting three days.253 A majority of con-
sumers who have had transactions declined, a majority of those
who have been charged overdrafts, and even a majority who
knowingly opted into the overdraft service say that they would
prefer that their debit card transactions be declined rather than
incur an overdraft fee.254
a) Legal authority.255 The Dodd-Frank Act gives the
CFPB authority to establish comprehension and suitability
standards for consumer financial products, including over-
draft. The CFPB's statutory objectives include ensuring that:
(1) "consumers are provided with timely and understandable
information to make responsible decisions about financial
transactions"; (2) "consumers are protected from unfair, decep-
tive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination";
and (3) "markets for consumer financial products and services
operate transparently and efficiently to facilitate access and
innovation."256
Performance-based regulation could go a long way toward
achieving these objectives. The CFPB has rulemaking,257 exami-
nation,258 and enforcement29 authority to achieve them. The
252 See Victor Stango and Jonathan Zinman, What Do Consumers Really Pay on
Their Checking and Credit Card Accounts? Explicit, Implicit, and Avoidable Costs, 99
Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 424, 424-25 (2009). However, it is important to note
that the population studied was slightly wealthier than the US population. See id at 424.
While there may be reasons that consumers would choose to use overdraft despite these
circumstances, if consumers do not know they are incurring overdraft charges, one can
hardly argue that they are intentionally choosing to use it.
253 See, for example, Eugene Jones, Wen S. Chern, and Barry K Mustiful, Are Lower-
Income Shoppers as Price Sensitive as Higher-Income Ones? A Look at Breakfast Cereals,
J Food Distribution Rsrch 82, 88 (Feb 1994) (finding that low-income consumers are
more sensitive to cereal prices than high-income consumers).
254 See Overdrawn at *12 (cited in note 249).
255 In related work, I explain in more detail the CFPB's authority to deploy performance-
based standards. See generally Lauren E. Willis, The Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau and the Quest for Consumer Comprehension (Loyola-LA, May 14, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/EM3C-ZA6X.
256 12 USC § 5511(b).
257 See 12 USC §§ 5512, 5531(b).
258 See 12 USC §§ 5514-15.
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statute contains additional language further authorizing com-
prehension standards. It tasks the CFPB with promulgating and
enforcing
rules to ensure that the features of any consumer financial
product or service, both initially and over the term of the
product or service, are fully, accurately, and effectively dis-
closed to consumers in a manner that permits consumers to
understand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the
product or service, in light of the facts and circumstances.260
In practice, performance-based regulation would likely be scaled
down from these sweeping goals, perhaps focusing on the key at-
tributes that can make some financial products unfair, decep-
tive, and abusive.
b) Standards, testing, and enforcement. Overdraft is
opaque to consumers in part because price structures and billing
practices are not intuitive. Nearly half of the banks in a recent
survey were found to engage in transaction reordering (ordering
daily transactions from largest to smallest instead of sequentially),
which baffles consumers 261 but maximizes the number of over-
draft fees consumers incur.262 Fee structures vary widely: some
banks charge a flat fee per overdraft, others charge tiered fees
depending on the number of overdrafts, some charge a fee for
each day the account remains overdrawn or after some specified
period has passed and the account has not been brought current,
others do not charge for small overdrafts, and so forth.263 Over-
draft fees on prepaid debit cards are especially opaque, in part
because many consumers understand prepaid cards as being a
way to live within one's means and avoid checking account-
overdraft and credit card-over-the-limit fees.264
To deal with this opacity, comprehension standards might
require banks and card issuers that extend overdraft loans to
259 See 12 USC §§ 5563-64.
260 12 USC § 5532(a).
261 See Gutierrez v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 730 F Supp 2d 1080, 1123 (ND Cal 2010)
(finding that checking account holders "could not reasonably have expected that [their]
bank would transform what would ordinarily be one overdraft into as many as ten").
262 See Checks and Balances: 2014 Update *3 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, Apr
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S8SV-AVFP.
263 See Data Point at *52-54 (cited in note 241).
264 See Why Americans Use Prepaid Cards: A Survey of Cardholders' Motivations
and Views *13-14 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, Feb 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/R7JD-NDLB.
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demonstrate that their account holders understand how those
fees are structured and billed. This would drive banks and issu-
ers to educate consumers or to make their pricing structures
more intuitive. If firms discover that industry-wide standardiza-
tion is needed for consumers to comprehend overdraft pricing,
they could ask regulators to impose such standardization
through design prescriptions.
Another contributor to the inability of consumers to make
good, autonomous decisions about overdraft is its invisibility at
the moment it is incurred. Consumers are not informed in real
time that they are about to incur an overdraft and therefore are
not given the choice at that moment to decline the product. Con-
sumers may not know the account balance their bank will assign
them at any moment because deposits take varying amounts of
time to clear, holds can be placed on account funds without the
consumer's knowledge, banks reorder transactions within a sin-
gle day, and account balance statements can be inaccurate.265 In
addition, particularly for poorer consumers under the stress of
financial scarcity, overdraft fees might be out of mind at the
moment when they are incurred due to insufficient cognitive-
willpower bandwidth and a hyperfocus on immediate financial
demands.266
While the law might respond with a disclosure rule to ad-
dress this, banks are particularly adept at preventing disclosure
rules from informing consumers. 267 A requirement that banks
demonstrate that consumers know that they are about to incur
an overdraft fee (and know the size of the fee) before incurring it
would stimulate banks to instead use their creativity to develop
the best methods for informing consumers, whether it be
through text messages, cell phone calls, ATM-screen warning
messages, or warning messages on the card readers at checkout
265 See Bank Fees: Federal Banking Regulators Could Better Ensure That Consum-
ers Have Required Disclosure Documents prior to Opening Checking or Savings Accounts
*21 (US Government Accountability Office, Jan 2008), archived at
http://perma.cc/5RGW-K74K (explaining that transaction clearing time varies). See also
id at *62 ("Debit card industry representatives explained that the account balance that is
used to authorize a debit card transaction-and which would be displayed to the con-
sumer-may not necessarily reflect the true balance in the consumer's checking account
at the time of the transaction.").
266 See Mullainathan and Shafir, Scarcity at 64-66 (cited in note 21).
267 See Willis, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1224-25 (cited in note 22).
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counters. Third parties could test consumers for comprehension
with just two questions:
* "Which, if any, of the following recent transactions
overdrew your account? [listing transactions]" and
* "How much were you charged in fees as a result of
this transaction?"
If every customer who had recently overdrawn her account
were tested every time she overdrew it, correct answers could be
a prerequisite to retaining overdraft fees. If samples of custom-
ers were tested, failures to perform to benchmark could result in
refunds of fees over a look-back period. Because overdraft is a
particular problem for the poor, the performance standard might
apply only to consumers with average daily account balances be-
low a specified amount, and thus only these consumers would be
tested.
c) Dynamic Effects. A substantive effect of overdraft-
comprehension testing would be to require banks to predeter-
mine the fee they will charge a consumer before she incurs it.
This would effectively prevent banks from reordering transac-
tions and using other complex fee structures. For consumers to
exercise decisional autonomy, banks must make overdraft fees
simple at the dashboard.
Overdraft comprehension regulation might also drive over-
draft out of the market. One industry consultant has opined that
if consumers were warned of the fee each time they attempted to
overdraw their accounts, so few consumers would overdraw that
it would "effectively kill overdraft services."268 While regulators
have been studying overdraft transactions since at least 2007,
comprehension performance standards would empower consum-
ers to vote with their feet.269
268 Ron Lieber and Andrew Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards Is Painful, but Not
for Banks, NY Times Al, A20 (Sept 9, 2009) (reporting the opinion of Michael Moebs, an
economist who advises banks and credit unions).
269 Performance standards also might send small banks that are currently depend-
ent on overdraft revenue out of business. See Carter Dougherty, Banks Face Hit from
CFPB on $30 Billion in Overdraft Fees (Bloomberg, Aug 1, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/3QQB-4K7U (noting that some small banks depend on overdraft fees for
as much as 15 percent of their total revenue). If that result would harm consumers, regu-
lators ought to find another way to keep small banks in business rather than through
the use of hidden overdraft fees.
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3. OTC drugs in the postapproval period.
Firm and consumer interests are better aligned in the OTC-
drug market than in the privacy and consumer-credit contexts.
Firms have reasons beyond potential tort liability2o to ensure
that customers do not suffer unpleasant side effects or injuries
directly attributable to their drugs. Reports of such problems
spread quickly and consumers will avoid these drugs. But many
dangers of OTC drugs are incremental increases in risk that
manifest only rarely, such as when the patient is using multiple
medications or has other risk factors. When damages are rare or
injury causation is complex, reputational effects might not take
hold. Incentives for firms to prevent excessive, ineffective, and
even contraindicated OTC-drug use are thus attenuated.
Drug misuse rates must be low to pass a preapproval OTC-
drug actual-use study.271 But when polled, consumers report
high rates of knowing and intentional misuse of OTC medica-
tions after the drugs have been approved for OTC use:
[A] third of Americans say they take more than the recom-
mended dose of a nonprescription medicine, believing that it
will increase the effectiveness of the product. Of these con-
sumers, two thirds (69 percent) say they take more than the
recommended amount at a single time; three fifths (63 per-
cent) report taking the next dose sooner than directed; and
two fifths (44 percent) say they take more than the recom-
mended number of doses in a day.272
These numbers likely understate misuse due to social desirabil-
ity bias. Moreover, they do not include unintentional OTC-drug
misuse, the prevalence of which is also quite high. One study
270 See Hutto v McNeil-PPC, Inc, 79 S3d 1199, 1209-10 (La App 2011) (finding that
a manufacturer could be liable for failing to adequately warn consumers of OTC-drug
dangers even when the manufacturer included all warnings required by the FDA). But
see Pliva, Inc v Mensing, 131 S Ct 2567, 2573-79 (2011) (holding that state law failure-
to-warn claims were preempted by FDA regulations that do not permit manufacturers of
generic drugs to alter their labels on their own initiative).
271 For example, in the actual-use study that led to OTC approval for ibuprofen, less
than 8 percent of consumers exceeded the correct daily-dose amount and less than 4 per-
cent exceeded the correct dosing duration. See Meeting Topic: NDAC Meeting on Risks of
NSAIDs (FDA), archived at http://perma.cc/68P4-P66N.
272 The Attitudes and Beliefs about Over-the-Counter Medicines: A National Opinion
Survey Conducted for the National Council on Patient Information and Education *3
(National Council on Patient Information and Education), archived at
http://perma.cc/3K4D-XXVC.
1386 [82:1309
Performance-Based Consumer Law
found that when subjects were presented with the labels of mul-
tiple OTC medications containing acetaminophen, nearly half
demonstrated that they would exceed the recommended dose by
simultaneously taking two products, posing a danger of liver
failure.273
Consumers also frequently state that they use OTC medica-
tions for durations that exceed the duration specified on the la-
bel.274 For example, OTC proton pump inhibitors are used by
many consumers for periods far exceeding the recommended
short-term therapy.275 Long-term use of proton pump inhibitors
is associated with an increased incidence of anemia, bone frac-
tures, and infections.276 But preapproval actual-use studies are
too brief to capture this kind of excessive use. For instance, none
of the actual-use studies supporting the OTC application for the
proton pump inhibitor omeprazole exceeded four weeks in dura-
tion.277
a) Legal authority. Current law specifically directs the
FDA to require postmarketing studies of prescription drugs in
some circumstances, but this law does not apply to OTC drugs.278
At times, the FDA obtains commitments from firms to engage in
273 Michael S. Wolf, et al, Risk of Unintentional Overdose with Non-prescription Ac.
etaminophen Products, 27 J General Internal Med 1587, 1587 (2012). See also Sujit S.
Sansgiry, Anagha Nadkarni, and Theresa Doan, Misuse of Over-the-Counter Medications
among Community-Dwelling Older Adults and Associated Adverse Drug Events, 1 J
Pharm Health Serv Rsrch 175, 175 (2010) (noting that 18 percent of respondents who
returned the survey gave responses indicating that they had recently misused OTC
drugs).
274 See Kennon Heard, Nonprescription Analgesics: Misunderstood and Abused, 41
Emergency Med 25, 26 (May 2009).
275 See Roni Caryn Rabin, Combating Acid Reflux May Bring Host of Ills (NY Times,
June 25, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/7RNC-5NKA; FDA Drug Safety Communica-
tion: Possible Increased Risk of Fractures of the Hip, Wrist, and Spine with the Use of
Proton Pump Inhibitors (FDA, Mar 23, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/K8LT-GHMY
("FDA acknowledges that consumers, either on their own, or based on a healthcare pro-
fessional's recommendation, may take these products for periods of time that exceed the
directions on the OTC label.").
276 See Rabin, Combating Acid Reflux (cited in note 275).
277 See Application for Omeprazole-Magnesium MUPS Tablets to be Marketed Over-
the-Counter *2 (FDA), archived at http://perma.cc/7GCC-66Z8 (displaying an overview of
the five actual-use studies conducted to support the OTC application for omeprazole).
See also Approval Package for Prilosec OTC (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
June 20, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/KJZ3-73JE (approving the drug for OTC
switch based on these five actual-use studies and additional labeling studies).
278 See 21 USC § 355(o).
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postapproval testing as a condition of receiving OTC approval,279
but more explicit regulatory authority from Congress would be
helpful here.
b) Standards, testing, and enforcement. Why does con-
sumer behavior with respect to OTC drugs postapproval differ
from consumer behavior during preapproval actual-use studies,
which take place while the drug is for the most part available
only by prescription? One factor may be changes in marketing.
After a drug is moved from prescription to OTC status, adver-
tisements for the drug contain more false statements, 280 promote
more benefits,281 and no longer explain specific risks of using the
drug.282 Another factor is that as the OTC drug becomes more
familiar, consumers are less careful about their use of it.283
While firms may not create the misimpression of safety that
contributes to overuse, they benefit from increased sales.
Adverse health effects of OTC drugs are sufficiently danger-
ous and societal consensus that consumers ought to follow OTC-
drug directions is sufficiently strong that the performance
standard in this context should be suitable use. Postapproval
suitability testing would capture the effects of marketing and
279 See Angelo DePalma, Post-marketing Surveillance: Better Late Than Never
(Pharmaceutical Commerce, May 20, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/9YA8-QRAM
("While safety has always been FDA's top priority, the agency is increasingly requesting
specific follow-up studies, even for over-the-counter products. Approximately three-
fourths of recent New Chemical Entity approvals include at least one post-marketing
commitment (PMC). Through PMCs, applicants agree to conduct post-approval studies
on safety, efficacy, or use."); Julie Aker, Getting Approval for an Rx-to-OTC Switch In-
volves Real-World Consumer Research (Applied Clinical Trials, May 1, 2002), archived at
http://perma.cc/KS95-JLFU ("[Researchers] may also design long-term studies to evalu-
ate [consumer] compliance over time after the new OTC product is on the market.").
280 See Adrienne E. Faerber and David H. Kreling, Content Analysis of False and
Misleading Claims in Television Advertising for Prescription and Nonprescription Drugs,
29 J General Internal Med 110, 110 (2013) (finding that 2 percent of televised prescrip-
tion drug advertisements contained false statements, whereas 7 percent of OTC-drug
advertisements did so).
281 See Adrienne E. Faerber and David H. Kreling, Content Analysis of Television
Advertising for Drugs That Switch from Prescription to Over-the-Counter: Balancing In-
formation and Appeals, 46 Drug Info J 226, 231 (2012).
282 See Adrienne E. Faerber and David H. Kreling, Now You See It. Now You Don't:
Fair Balance and Adequate Provision in Advertisements for Drugs before and after the
Switch from Prescription to Over-the-Counter, 27 Health Commun 66, 71-72 (2012).
283 See Amanda B. Bower, Stacy Landreth Grau, and Valerie A. Taylor, Over-the-
Counter vs. Prescription Medications: Are Consumer Perceptions of the Consequences of
Drug Instruction Non-compliance Different?, 37 Intl J Consumer Stud 228, 231 (2013)
(suggesting that consumers are less concerned about adherence to directions for familiar
OTC drugs).
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changes in consumer beliefs that might otherwise lead consum-
ers to purchase and use the drug excessively or even when con-
traindicated. Testing methods and benchmarks could be bor-
rowed from the preapproval actual-use testing. The consequence
of failing to ensure that an adequate proportion of consumers
were using the drug properly-a proportion that would vary de-
pending on the seriousness of the health consequences of im-
proper use-could include fines, limits on higher-dose OTC for-
mulations, or suspension of OTC status for the drug.284
4. Other applications.
Performance-based consumer law could be employed in a
host of other scenarios in which firm and consumer interests are
currently poorly aligned.
For example, comprehension standards could be explored for
civil justice waivers in standard-form consumer contracts, such
as arbitration clauses, class action and jury-right waivers,
clauses shortening limitations periods, damages waivers, and
indemnity provisions. Firms regularly use these waivers to
change the background procedural and substantive rules of the
civil justice system that apply to their interactions with consum-
prs. Few consumers understand that this is happening, or even
that it is legally possible.25 Although some jurisdictions invali-
date some waivers in the consumer law context, most allow the
waivers but require them to be clear, conspicuous, or the like.286
284 For a similar proposal, see generally H-G Eichler, et al, Adaptive Licensing: Tak-
ing the Next Step in the Evolution of Drug Approval, 91 Clinical Pharmacology & Thera-
peutics 426 (2012) (advocating an adaptive-management approach for the regulation of
the performance of prescription drugs).
285 See Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship among Citizen-
ship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 Conn L Rev 381, 422 (2008) (finding
that substantial proportions of employees did not believe that arbitration clauses in their
employment contracts were binding); Debra Pogrund Stark, Jessica M. Choplin, and
Eileen Linnabery, Dysfunctional Contracts and the Laws and Practices That Enable
Them: An Empirical Analysis, 46 Ind L Rev 797, 813-20 (2013) (finding that consumers
do not understand waivers of remedies in real-estate contracts); Jeff Sovern, et al,
"Whimsy Little Contracts" with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Con-
sumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements *50-53 (Feb 19, 2015), archived at
http://perma.c/VX9Z-RFHC (finding that many consumers do not believe arbitration
clauses are binding and that only 9 percent of consumer survey respondents, when given
a contract containing an arbitration clause, realized both that the contract had the
clause and that the clause would preclude them from suing the firm in court).
286 See Scientific Components Corp v Isis Surface Mounting, Inc, 539 F Supp 2d 653,
663 (EDNY 2008) (stating that the parties' intent to agree to a fee-shifting clause had to
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Testing could be done in a fairly superficial manner as suggested
for personal-data collection and use. For example, firms that
place damages caps in their contracts could be required to
demonstrate that their customers know that if the product is de-
fective and causes the consumer damages, a court can award her
no more than the cap in compensation. Benchmarks and en-
forcement could also mimic those used for privacy-
comprehension standards.
The inability of consumers to choose low-fee retirement in-
vestments 2 7 and diversify their portfolios well 288 after decades of
disclosure rules and investor education suggests that this is an-
other arena in which performance standards should be tried.
Concrete feedback on investment choices comes primarily at re-
tirement-far too late for consumers to use the feedback to
learn. Understanding fund costs and knowing that one ought to
pick investments based on cost rather than returns is not
enough to convince even MBA students to ignore returns, 2 9 but
if firms selling retail investments were required to demonstrate
be "unmistakably clear" from the language of the contract); Stelluti v Casapenn Enter-
prises, LLC, 1 A3d 678, 689-90 (NJ 2010) (stating that a damages waiver must "reflect
the unequivocal expression of the party giving up his or her legal rights that this deci-
sion was made voluntarily, intelligently and with the full knowledge of its legal conse-
quences"); BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc v Rosen, 80 A3d 345, 351 (Md 2013) (stating that a
waiver of damages for future negligence must be clear and specific); Corbett, 687 F Supp
2d at 132 (stating that a clause shortening a limitations period must "sufficiently alert"
consumers that the limitations period has been shortened); Fairfield Leasing Corp v
Techni-Graphics, Inc, 607 A2d 703, 705-06 (NJ Super 1992) (stating that waiver of a ju-
ry trial must be "conspicuous").
287 While many low-cost (under 0.5 percent expense ratio) funds with diverse risk
profiles exist, 66 percent of employees' 401(k) mutual-fund investments are in funds with
higher expenses. See 2014 Investment Company Fact Book: A Review of Trends and Ac-
tivities in the U.S. Investment Company Industry (Investment Company Institute, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/7A4M-HGGM. See also Jill E. Fisch and Tess Wilkinson-
Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund
Choice, 162 U Pa L Rev 605, 609 (2014) (finding that consumers have a limited ability to
identify low-cost options and lack the understanding that cost ought to be a considera-
tion when picking investments); 401(k) Participants' Awareness and Understanding of
Fees *6 (AARP, 2011), archived at http:/lperma.cc/8EDM-9UAM (finding that 71 percent
of surveyed plan participants did not know that they were paying fees).
288 Many consumers either do not diversify, or diversify naively (in other words, they
divide their retirement contributions evenly over the offered funds). See Julie Agnew,
Pierluigi Balduzzi, and Annika Sund6n, Portfolio Choice and Trading in a Large 401(k)
Plan, 93 Am Econ Rev 193, 193 (2003) (finding that most asset allocations in retirement
accounts are "either 100 percent or zero percent in equities"); Fisch and Wilkinson-Ryan,
162 U Pa L Rev at 609 (cited in note 287) (finding widespread naive diversification).
289 See Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 23 Rev Fin Stud at 1422-25 (cited in note 145).
Performance-Based Consumer Law
consumer comprehension of costs, they would be forced to de-
emphasize returns so as to draw attention to costs. Many would
also have to simplify their fee structures to facilitate consumer
comprehension. To help firms meet their comprehension obliga-
tions and to solve collective action problems, regulators might
promulgate a complementary investment fund "price tag" disclo-
sure that would assist firms in communicating fees in a simple,
standardized, easily comparable manner. 290
In contrast, comprehension of risk diversification is likely to
be so costly to achieve that a suitability performance standard
would be preferable. Because the risk suitability of any invest-
ment depends on the consumer's portfolio, a performance stand-
ard could be imposed only on firms that, in effect, sell consumers
a good chunk of their portfolios, such as defined contribution re-
tirement plan sponsors. A suitability standard might require
plan sponsors to demonstrate that plan participants in the lower
half of the income distribution, who are likely to have most of
their nonhousing investments in the plan, have in-plan invest-
ments that meet a diversification performance benchmark. Reg-
ulators would have to make judgment calls about how to meas-
ure diversification and then either decide what constitutes an
acceptably diversified portfolio or collect industry-wide data and
set benchmarks based on relative performance.
Requiring plan sponsors to demonstrate the diversification
suitability of plan participants' portfolios would require changes
in current law.291 But meeting the performance standards might
not prove to be all that difficult. About half of all plan sponsors
have already nudged their participants toward diversification by
removing employer stock as an investment choice, adding well-
diversified fund offerings, and automatically enrolling partici-
pants in those offerings.292 Performance-based regulation would
290 However, disclosure alone would be insufficient for all the reasons that disclo-
sure rules fail.
291 Plan sponsors are generally relieved of any fiduciary duties to participants with
respect to any loss or erstwhile breach of fiduciary duty that results from a participant's
exercise of control over the assets in her account. See 29 USC § 1104(c)(1)(A)(ii).
292 See Jeffrey R. Brown and Scott J. Weisbenner, Building Retirement Security
through Defined Contribution Plans *26, 57 (Dec 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/9GM7-AEFJ (documenting that, as automatic enrollment has spread, the
diversification of new hires' portfolios has improved dramatically, increasing invest-
ments in balanced funds and decreasing investments in employer stock). See also id at
*20 (noting that just under half of all 401(k) plans had an automatic- enrollment feature
as of 2011).
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give the firms that lag behind an incentive to engage in these
and other innovative practices. For example, sponsors might
design the choice architecture of the plan to accommodate na-
ive diversification, such as through offering a small number of
investments that would, in equal shares, create a well-
diversified portfolio. Alternatively, a sponsor might arrange a
larger menu of investments into risk groupings and advise par-
ticipants to invest in all the groupings. Experimentation would
guide sponsor strategies over time. Graduated penalties or re-
wards for meeting performance benchmarks would encourage
continued innovation.
Yet another example is payday lending. There is widespread
consensus that consumer law's goals are not being met for bor-
rowers who renew their borrowing repeatedly. As noted above,
even the payday-lender trade associations agree that "a payday
advance is inappropriate when used as a long-term credit solu-
tion for ongoing budget management."293 But the CFPB recently
found that nearly half of borrowers took out more than ten loans
in a year, 294 15 percent of loan sequences were ten or more loans
long,295 and loans to many borrowers persisted for an entire
year. 296 Suitable use rather than comprehension is key here.
Welfare-reducing choices are primarily driven by desperation
and associated cognitive-willpower bandwidth limitations. Over
one-third of borrowers report that they would have taken a loan
on any terms. 297 A performance standard might require lenders
to demonstrate that borrowers have the ability to pay the loan
without reborrowing before the end of the pay period in which
the loan becomes due. A pool-based suitability measure might
permit only a very limited proportion of a firm's customers to
engage in sustained use or might place the benchmark at the
median proportion of customers who engage in sustained use
throughout the industry.
Many other consumer transactions might benefit from per-
formance-based regulation. Each application of the performance-
293 Is a Payday Advance Appropriate for You? (cited in note 110).
294 See CFPB Data Point: Payday Lending *21 (CFPB, Mar 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/M9QN-QS96.
295 See id at *11.
296 See id at *14.
297 See How Borrowers Choose and Repay Payday Loans: Payday Lending in Ameri-
ca *19 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013), archived at http://perma.ccW37D.BZHH.
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law paradigm must be tailored to the particulars and practicali-
ties of the context, and valid testing techniques must be devel-
oped for each application. Moreover, each application must be
adjusted as data come in from consumer field-testing.
III. WHY PERFORMANCE-BASED TOOLS COULD FAIL, AND WHY
WE SHOULD ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT THEM ANYWAY
This Part anticipates potential stumbling blocks in success-
fully implementing performance-based consumer law. It then ar-
gues that comprehension and suitability standards offer second-
order benefits that make trying the approach worthwhile.
A. Performance-Based Consumer Law: Objections and Replies
Why is performance-based regulation so rare in consumer
law today? One reason could be a lack of imagination; the con-
ventional wisdom is that one can neither legislate comprehen-
sion nor save people from their own "stupidity.298 One aim of
this Article is to suggest that this reasoning is wrong. It is true
that developing performance-based standards and maintaining a
fair and accurate system for evaluating compliance are not easy
tasks, but the tools for doing so are getting better as data-
collection and data-analysis techniques improve.299 The following
Section describes the major challenges to performance-based
consumer law: evasion, discrimination, and stagnation. All of
these afflict disclosure and design regulation as well, but the
challenges they present are more transparent for performance-
based regulation.
1. Evasion.
Firms will look for strategies to pass performance tests
without necessarily meeting the comprehension and suitability
goals of the standards. Consumers could prove to be willing
298 See Thomas A. Durkin and Gregory Elliehausen, Disclosure as a Consumer Pro-
tection, in Thomas A. Durkin and Michael E. Staten, eds, The Impact of Public Policy on
Consumer Credit 109, 126 (KIuwer 2002) ("Simply stated, it is not possible to legislate
comprehension of anything."); Bob Secter, Gov. Ventura Still Twisting Heads: Insiders
Surprised by His Effectiveness (Chicago Tribune, May 19, 1999), archived at
http://perma.cc/ZP9K-HDSY (quoting then-Governor of Minnesota Jesse Ventura as say-
ing that government "can't legislate against stupidity").
299 See Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 Georgetown L J 1777,
1782-84 (2014) (describing some of these developments).
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coconspirators, to avoid expending time and effort on taking
tests. If firms condition transactions on their customers first
passing the test, consumers will have even more reasons to
cheat.
Two strategies seem likely for evading comprehension test-
ing. The first is for firms (or fellow consumers spontaneously) to
help consumers cheat by, for example, placing answers to all
possible questions online. But that would likely increase con-
sumer knowledge about the transaction, which is precisely the
goal of the performance standard. One step away from this
strategy might be a firm not only informing its customers that
their contract contains an arbitration clause, for example, but
also persuading them that arbitration is better for the consum-
ers than litigation. Putting third-party effects aside, this too is
not problematic: if arbitration is better than litigation, the cus-
tomer should choose it, and if it is not better, yet the customer
has been fooled into thinking it is, the right public policy re-
sponse may then be to ban the clause. Without comprehension
standards, the arbitration clause can be slipped silently into a
contract with an unwitting consumer, and the firm avoids public
engagement with the question whether the clause should be
permitted. Comprehension standards would thrust an evalua-
tion of transaction features currently controlled entirely and si-
lently by firms squarely into public discussion, facilitating dem-
ocratic control.
On the other hand, one could imagine poorly constructed
tests that might allow a firm to teach its customers the right
way to answer the questions without teaching them about the
underlying substance of the transaction. A parallel here would
be to firms' responses when emissions performance standards
were originally rolled out: firms built higher smokestacks so
that the emissions monitors at ground level would produce lower
readings, allowing the firms to pass the tests without reducing
their emissions. Regulators responded by changing the manner
in which emissions performance was calculated, by taking both
the ground level emissions readings and the height of the
smokestack into account. 300
300 See Air Quality: Information on Tall Smokestacks and Their Contribution to In-
terstate Transport of Air Pollution *2 (US Government Accountability Office, May 2011),
archived at http://perma.cc/BHM5-DUCB.
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To address such sleights, comprehension tests ought to be
fashioned so as to impede consumers from mindlessly reaching
correct answers. Take personal-data collection and use. To cor-
rect for the reflexive "I agree" click, the test would need to in-
clude control questions (questions that ask about data collec-
tion and use not engaged in by the firm) and questions in
flipped format (in other words, questions asked in the negative
such that "no" or "false" is the correct answer). For a firm that
uses individual consumer information to target marketing and
sells consumer information to third parties without use re-
strictions, for example, the test might ask the following
true/false questions:
* "This firm will use information about you to deter-
mine which web pages to show you." (Answer: false)
* "This firm will not use information about you to sell
you products." (Answer: false)
* "This firm will sell your information to other firms
that can use that information to determine what
price to charge you for products." (Answer: true)
Regulators should also regularly test the testing itself, for ex-
ample, through in-depth interviews with small samples of
consumers.
Suitability tests will encounter evasion attempts that paral-
lel the tactics used by firms to foil design rules. Just as firms de-
sign high-cost, small-dollar, short-term loans to fall a few dollars
or a few days outside the definition of a regulated payday loan
and thus avoid design rules that restrict payday lending, firms
might sell products to consumers for whom the products are not
suitable, even though the customer (just barely) meets the indi-
cations/contraindications suitability test imposed on the trans-
action. Performance regulations will need to evolve to meet chal-
lenges as they are discovered. But, particularly if paired with
adaptive regulation, suitability standards can adapt more quick-
ly than design rules can.
2. Discrimination.
Performance standards could have adverse class, race, age,
and gender impacts. For comprehension testing, variations in
literacy and numeracy as well as the experiences of stereotype
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threat and test aversion could cause testing disparities.301 As
noted, firms might explicitly exclude consumers who provide in-
correct answers to incentivize consumer effort on the test. To the
extent that comprehension testing captures a true ability to self-
select products well, this disparate impact reflects social ine-
quality and does not increase it. But if results are driven by test
aversion or general literacy that does not correlate well with
consumer decisional autonomy and welfare, these disparate im-
pacts are a cost of comprehension standards. Further, to the ex-
tent that firms use segmented marketing to divert test-averse
and low-literacy consumers away from their products, and to the
extent that the segmentation relies on variables that correlate
with disadvantaged status and do not correlate perfectly with
test performance, the marketing could have additional adverse
impacts.
Disclosure mandates produce similar disparate effects.
When disclosures are effectively used at all, the effective users
are high-literacy consumers, with concomitant socioeconomic ef-
fects. 302 Well-off consumers derive disproportionate indirect ben-
efits from disclosures as well, in that the poor decisions of con-
sumers who are not helped by disclosures often subsidize the
consumers who use disclosures well.3o3
But rather than reinforce or amplify social and wealth dis-
parities, performance regulation might narrow them. If compre-
hension standards lead to increased fee salience, the consumers
who will benefit most will be those for whom fees are now the
least salient; these tend to be low-socioeconomic-status consum-
ers.30 4 Consumer experience with the CARD Act is telling.305
301 See Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual
Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J Personality & Soc Psych 797, 808 (1995)
(finding racial disparities in test performance that are uncorrelated with ability); Na-
tional Assessment of Adult Literacy: Demographics; Race/Age (Institute of Education
Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics), archived at http://perma.cc/33T2
-KHU5 (finding literacy differences by race and age).
302 See, for example, Russell L. Rothman, et al, Patient Understanding of Food La-
bels: The Role of Literacy and Numeracy, 31 Am J Preventive Med 391, 394 (2006) (find-
ing that income and education were positively correlated with accurate food-label use
and that being African American or female was negatively correlated with accurate food-
label use).
303 See Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know at 178-80 (cited
in note 3) (explaining how disclosures can help rich and well-educated consumers at the
expense of poor and poorly educated consumers).
304 See Mullainathan and Shafir, Scarcity at 173-76 (cited in note 21).
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That statute curtailed the use of nonsalient back-end fees,
meaning that issuers were forced to show consumers more of the
price of credit in the salient annual fee and APR. The result was
a dramatic decline in back-end fees paid by the lower part of the
credit-score distribution, which maps roughly onto low socioeco-
nomic status, and a slight increase in annual fees, which are
paid by all consumers. 306 The previously existing regressive cross
subsidy was therefore partially eliminated. Comprehension
standards might have the same effect.
Suitability performance measures could also have disparate
effects, but these effects again might benefit society. For exam-
ple, if a suitability standard specifies that certain products are
unsuitable for high-risk consumers and risk is inversely corre-
lated with socioeconomic status, then suitability prescreening,
whether by firms or by regulators, will have a disparate effect. If
the screening is accurate, the disparate effect is beneficial; with-
out the screening, more members of low-socioeconomic-status
groups might have purchased unsuitable products and suffered
as a result. But if the screening is inaccurate, disproportionate
numbers of low-socioeconomic-status consumers could be pre-
vented from engaging in transactions that would have benefited
them.The Gainful Employment Rule has grappled with this issue
because low-socioeconomic-status students disproportionately
enroll in for-profit schools subject to the Rule, and ending feder-
al funding will eliminate some of these schools-thus reducing
college enrollment for low-socioeconomic-status students. How-
ever, without the Rule, low-socioeconomic-status students would
disproportionately pay for a worthless education.
Again, substantive design regulation can have disparate
effects too. If a product is banned that would have dispropor-
tionately harmed (or benefited) low-socioeconomic -status con-
sumers, the ban has a disparate beneficial (or detrimental) ef-
fect. Performance-based regulation would not necessarily
result in larger disparate effects. Instead, it would make these
effects more apparent.
Finally, the enforcement structure for performance-based
consumer law would produce fairer outcomes than prescriptive
305 See Part I.C.
306 See Agarwal, et al, 130 Q J Econ at 52 (cited in note 27).
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rules with complaint-driven enforcement. As previously ex-
plained, those who complain tend to be better off than those who
do not. In contrast, enforcement in a performance-based system
is based on tests of all consumers or random samples thereof, or
even on tests of only (or an oversampled slice of) vulnerable con-
sumers. Firms thus would have an incentive to ensure compre-
hension and suitable use with respect to all their customers, not
only those most likely to complain.
3. Stagnation.
Another potential objection to performance-based consumer
law is that it could impede innovation that might have benefited
consumers. Comprehension and suitability standards avoid
some of the brute limits on innovation imposed by product-
design regulation. But performance standards could chill inno-
vation because it always takes time for consumers to understand
a new product or feature and to determine for themselves
whether a new product or feature is suitable for their needs and
preferences. The question, then, is how the learning period
ought to be regulated.
When a performance standard is put into place, firms' first
responses will likely be innovations that help consumers under-
stand products and use them suitably, such as through dash-
board simplification of the products. Imagine a firm that then
wants to bring a new product to market that could benefit con-
sumers but which consumers will require some time to under-
stand. Performance-based regulation, at least when firms have
the option of meeting comprehension or suitability standards,
would likely lead firms to aim for suitable use of the new prod-
uct achieved through channeling appropriate consumers toward
the product and channeling consumers for whom the new prod-
uct is not suitable away from the product. After general compre-
hension of the new product has developed among consumers, the
firm might switch to meeting comprehension requirements. For
each product-design change, the cycle might repeat.
This cycle is common in markets in which consumers have
good information and thus firms and consumers have well-
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aligned interests.3°1 If consumers understand that they (or oth-
ers like them) have had a bad experience with a new product
and are able to use that understanding to make future shopping
decisions, firms will have every reason to ensure that only con-
sumers for whom an innovative product is suitable buy it. Oth-
erwise, the new product would quickly garner a bad reputation
and demand would evaporate. As consumers become more famil-
iar with a product over time, firms can rely more on consumer
comprehension and self-selection and reduce their channeling
efforts. Performance-based consumer law would bring this virtu-
ous cycle to product purchases for which consumer and firm in-
terests would otherwise not be well aligned.
B. Benefits of Trying Performance-Based Consumer Law
Performance-based consumer law might fail to produce
dramatic gains in consumer comprehension or marked declines
in unsuitable use. Alternatively, it might produce increased
comprehension or suitability but only at a very high cost. How-
ever, information gleaned through the exercise of developing and
implementing comprehension standards could yield valuable
dividends for other, more-tractable forms of regulation.
1. Benefits of establishing standards.
Establishing performance standards would promote clarity
on regulatory goals, deeper thinking about the value of consum-
er decisional autonomy, and dialogue on the suitability parame-
ters of various products.308 Take overdraft, for example: What is
the goal in regulating this product? Is it to stoke competition
over this account feature, which is currently lacking because
consumers do not consider overdraft when they open their ac-
counts? Is it to eliminate mistaken use, meaning situations in
which consumers, had they known about the fee, would have
chosen instead either not to engage in the transaction or to use a
different method of payment? Is it ultimately to minimize the
307 See generally Vijay Mahajan and Eitan Muller, When Is It Worthwhile Targeting
the Majority Instead of the Innovators in a New Product Launch?, 35 J Mktg Rsrch 488
(1998) (describing diffusion-of-innovation marketing cycles).
308 See Coglianese, Nash, and Olmstead, 55 Admin L Rev at 716 (cited in note 68)
("[Tihe decision to consider using performance standards can offer benefits simply in
terms of 'shaking things up' or focusing the policy dialogue on the ultimate objectives
and the underlying uncertainties.").
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incidence of this high-cost credit product? Each goal implies a
different performance standard. The first calls for a comprehen-
sion standard applied at the opening of the account; the second,
a comprehension standard applied when the fee is incurred; the
third, a suitability standard or even a ban.
Developing comprehension standards would spotlight the
choices that regulators implicitly make when mandating disclo-
sures. While fact after fact can be stuffed into a disclosure, com-
prehension standards require judgment calls about what con-
sumers really need to know to make good decisions, tempered by
a realistic assessment of what consumers can actually under-
stand. Take consumer retirement investments, for example.
Fleshing out what consumers need to know to engage in good
portfolio risk diversification exposes the enormity of the burden
placed on consumers. One implication is that consumers should
not make these decisions at all and that alternative methods, ra-
ther than disclosure, are needed to protect retail investors.
Establishing suitability standards requires similar judg-
ments regarding what uses of products are suitable. This re-
quires a dialogue that occurs surprisingly rarely. For example,
those who debate payday loan bans appear to assume that no
uses are suitable or that all uses are suitable, without delving
into which uses they are imagining. Some consensus on suitable
uses would facilitate more-informative disclosure and perhaps
more-focused product-design regulation. Even without reaching
agreement, an open discussion could provide information that
would be helpful in the democratic process or that could be used
in assessing whether individual products or terms are unfair,
deceptive, or abusive.
2. Benefits of field-testing consumers.
Field-testing for comprehension and suitability would give
regulators, lawmakers, and the citizenry a tremendous amount
of information about how the marketplace is actually function-
ing. This information could level the regulatory playing field, in-
crease regulator accountability, and empower consumers in their
roles as both consumers and citizens. Ultimately, this infor-
mation is necessary for law that is grounded in reality rather
than in models or myths about how the market functions.
Today, firms-for their own purposes-collect data on
how consumers understand and use their products. Regulators
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obtain this information on a sporadic and partial basis, such as
through ad hoc surveys, investigative news reports, and con-
sumer complaints. This data-collection process is often insuffi-
ciently comprehensive to give regulators the information they
need to formulate policy based on what is truly happening in the
marketplace. Moreover, when they do receive performance data,
regulators do not envisage themselves as having the responsibil-
ity to respond decisively and fix problems revealed by the data.
For example, in 2003, well before the mortgage meltdown,
regulators knew from market reports that banks were "mass
market[ing]" option adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) as "af-
fordability products" to homeowners who, in a few short years,
would not be able to make the monthly payments. 309 By 2005,
regulators knew, again from market reports, that consumers
with option ARMs were defaulting at a very high rate.310 Regula-
tors waited another year before their first tentative responses:
(a) "guidance" suggesting that lenders sell the product only to
borrowers who could make the higher payments that would be-
come due, 311 and (b) their first consumer-education pamphlet on
option ARMs.312 But regulators did not use their power to police
unfair or deceptive acts or practices to rein in sales of the
product.
Without an institutionalized system of their own consumer-
transaction data collection, regulators did not conceive their role
as requiring prompt responsive action. When the problem sur-
faced in 2003, regulators sat back to allow firms and consumers
to take care of themselves. Even in 2005, as defaults spiked, one
banking regulator explained his agency's inaction as follows:
309 John C. Dugan, Remarks by John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, before
the Consumer Federation of America *10 (Dec 1, 2005), archived at
http://perma.cc/W5HK-K4LH. On more than 70 percent of option ARMs outstanding in
2005-2006, homeowners made only the minimum payment, guaranteeing that their
payments would increase dramatically within a few years. See Mara Der Hovanesian,
Nightmare Mortgages, Business Week 70, 73 (Sept 11, 2006).
310 See Susan Schmidt Bies, Remarks by Governor Susan Schmidt Bies at the Na-
tional Bankers Association Annual Convention (Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, Oct 12, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/X7PW-ZURY.
311 Department of the Treasury, Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage
Product Risk, 71 Fed Reg 58609, 58610-11 (2006).
312 See Agencies Provide Consumer Information on Nontraditional Mortgage Loans
(FDIC, Oct 18, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/9XG5-X6RZ (announcing the availabil-
ity of a consumer handbook entitled "Interest-Only Mortgage Payments and Payment-
Option ARMs-Are They for You?").
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"We have the most vibrant housing and housing-finance market
in the world, and there is a lot of innovation. Normally, we think
that if consumers have a lot of choice, that's a good thing."313
Regulators' models and myths about the market, rather than
data, dictated policy.
Lawmakers and citizens currently lack sufficient infor-
mation on the effectiveness of regulation. Performance testing
would reveal not only which market transactions are not meet-
ing regulatory goals but also which regulations and regulators
are failing to meet regulatory goals. Comprehension testing, for
example, would expose limits on what consumers can be ex-
pected to comprehend and the concomitant limits on regulators'
ability to rely on disclosure to facilitate consumer decisional au-
tonomy. If demographic data were collected, testing would also
reveal the distributional effects of consumer law. Provided that
performance-testing results were made publicly available, these
results could help citizens put pressure on legislators and regu-
lators to improve regulation.
Finally, testing never merely reveals information about
people; it also changes them. For example, comprehension test-
ing for privacy policies would almost certainly raise awareness
and understanding of those policies, potentially both changing
consumer behavior and motivating consumers to enter the polit-
ical process to set an agenda for substantive privacy regulation.
Suitability testing for payday loans, if deployed using consumer
testing, would educate consumers about suitable and unsuitable
high-cost-loan use; this would give consumers information that
they could use in their roles both as consumers deciding whether
to take a payday loan and as citizens deciding whether to sup-
port payday loan regulation.
3. A cumulative benefit: crowding in better regulation.
As with any regulatory response to a problem, there is al-
ways the possibility that performance-based consumer law will
crowd out better regulation. Resources of regulators and policy-
makers who seek to improve the consumer law landscape are
limited. But on closer analysis, the process of developing and
313 Edmund L. Andrews, A Hands-Off Policy on Mortgage Loans (NY Times, July 15,
2005), archived at http://perma.cc/4F62-385Q (quoting Steve Fritts, then Associate Di-
rector for Risk Management Policy at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
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implementing performance-based consumer law seems particu-
larly likely to crowd in improved regulation.314 Regulatory oppor-
tunity costs are likely to be outweighed by regulatory synergies.
This potential is most likely to be realized if performance-based
consumer law is deliberately paired with adaptive manage-
ment-a mandate that regulators regularly review, and take
action in response to, incoming data about how current law is
performing.
a) Improved disclosure and related regulation. Performance-
based consumer law could improve disclosure mandates in at
least four ways. First, regulators would learn how best to edu-
cate consumers by observing the successes and failures of firms'
educational efforts. Rather than spending years developing dis-
closures in laboratory conditions with limited external validity,
regulators could observe the results of firms' field-testing of var-
ious messaging forms. While not all of these forms will be avail-
able to regulators (for example, the bikini method suggested
above315), some will be.
Disclosure mandates could also benefit from performance-
based consumer law because standardized disclosure formats
would help firms reach performance standards. During the regu-
latory development of disclosures, firms today have an interest
in sabotaging disclosure's potential effectiveness. The existence
of performance standards would spur firms to determine when
and how disclosure can best serve a coordinating and education-
al function and could cause firms to advocate for the necessary
changes.
Third, establishing comprehension standards would demon-
strate the boundaries of disclosure's effective use. If a product is
so confusing or counterintuitive that firms cannot make con-
sumers understand it, no regulator will be able to achieve con-
sumer comprehension. This would suggest that other forms of
314 However, the performance-based consumer law discussed here is in some tension
with public health approaches suggested by Professor Sugarman and his coauthor
Sandman. See note 10. Comprehension and suitability standards could reinscribe con-
sumer law's focus on individual-consumer decisional autonomy and individual-consumer
welfare. But it may be that at least some problems in consumer law ought to be ap-
proached from a public health or social cost perspective instead. This Article suggests
adding performance-based regulation to the consumer law toolbox, supplementing rather
than supplanting other approaches. But performance-based regulation could have a
crowding-out effect on the public health approach.
315 See text accompanying note 91.
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regulation are needed instead, such as suitability standards, de-
sign rules, or learned intermediaries placed between the con-
sumer and the product. For example, OTC-drug performance
testing can reveal when a prescribing doctor ought to screen,
guide, and monitor consumer use of a drug. Alternatively, some
incomprehensible features might simply be banned, as the law
has done for some complex credit card billing and payment-
allocation practices.316
Fourth, performance standards may well be necessary to fa-
cilitate the latest innovation in disclosure: smart disclosure. The
idea is that firms will, in real time, publicly release complete
price, feature, and performance data for all of the firms' products
and release to individual customers their own past product-use
history. Consumers can then input their past use data and their
individual preferences into online- or mobile-app choice engines
that can recommend the products that will best meet those pref-
erences. 17 In theory, smart disclosure would facilitate consumer
decisional autonomy and welfare, particularly for those consum-
ers who are currently the least able to use disclosures well.
But without performance regulation, firms are likely to
outsmart smart disclosure as they do with Internet search en-
gines today.318 Firms might withhold or misreport data so as to
move their offerings to the top of choice-engine recommendation
lists and to keep profitable consumers,8 19 Choice engines could
become corrupted, using consumer data to target consumers for
particular products or pricing tricks rather than being used by
316 See Ben S. Bernanke, Financial Innovation and Consumer Protection (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Apr 17, 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/DD9H-3GCK (explaining that, no matter how the Federal Reserve Board
attempted to explain the credit card-issuer practices of allocating payments to the por-
tion of the balance carrying the lowest interest rate and of double-cycle billing, both were
unintelligible to consumers).
317 See Cass R. Sunstein, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies: Informing Consumers through Smart Disclosure (Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Sept 8, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/LN83-LX7E.
318 See Nick Bilton, Friends, and Influence, for Sale Online (NY Times, Apr 20,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9NVW-A83D; David Segal, The Dirty Little Secrets of
Search (NY Times, Feb 12, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/5ZUJ-U7UJ.
319 See Treasury Report Recommendations to Curb Predatory Home Mortgage Lend-
ing *6-7 (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2000), archived at
http://perma.cc/JN75-XFLF (noting that some subprime-mortgage lenders failed to re-
port positive payment history to credit bureaus, which prevented profitable customers
from refinancing at a lower rate).
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consumers to locate the best products and cheapest pricing.320
Suitability standards could give firms incentives to participate
in smart disclosure without cheating or exploiting loopholes. If
one goal of firms were to ensure that their customers buy the
products most suited to their needs-and particularly if bench-
marks were set at what decision aids can produce in the lab-
smart disclosure could help them meet that goal.
b) Improved design regulation. Performance-based regu-
lation has the potential to suggest improvements in design rules
as well. Results from comprehension testing would illuminate
when comprehension (and thus disclosure) is insufficient, and
thus when suitability standards or design rules are needed.
Suitability-standard performance data could then help regula-
tors to compare the relative costs and benefits of performance
standards versus design rules.
Further, just as performance-based regulation would lead
firms to determine when standardized disclosures are needed
and could incentivize firms to advocate for these disclosures, it
could do the same for standardized terms. Consumer compre-
hension of mutual-fund fees, for example, seems unlikely if firms
can structure these fees in innumerable ways. To meet consum-
er-comprehension and suitable-use benchmarks, firms them-
selves would need the universe of potential fee structures to be
limited and standardized. Design regulation could solve the col-
lective action problem that would otherwise prevent firms from
establishing fee-structure standardization on their own.
Finally, as firms react to the implementation of performance-
based regulation, they are likely to experiment with and discov-
er product-design changes that regulators might then look to in
establishing industry-wide design rules. Tort liability can lead
to product-design changes that tell regulators what product
designs are feasible and regulators can use this feasibility in-
formation to develop good design rules.321 Comprehension and
suitability standards might have a similar effect. The perfor-
mance-regulation paradigm gives firms the discretion to decide
320 See Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels (Wall St J,
Aug 23, 2012), archived at http://permacc/UA9S-4XSX.
321 See Jon S. Vernick, et al, Role of Litigation in Preventing Product-Related Inju-
ries, 25 Epidemiologic Rev 90, 96 (2003) (describing the cycle in which tort litigation acts
in advance of regulators, reveals industry information during discovery, attracts public
attention, and leads to regulatory change).
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when product simplification is the best way to meet benchmarks
and when complex features are sufficiently valued by consumers
such that education is worth the payoff. Firms' choices would
provide regulators with market-tested product designs on which
to base design-regulation decisions.
c) Adaptive management. The crowding in of better dis-
closure and design regulation could be a spontaneous response
to performance-based consumer law, as regulators and legisla-
tors observe firm educational efforts and product-design changes
and receive data on the (in)effectiveness of disclosure and the
(un)suitability of consumer product use. But regulatory im-
provements are more likely to occur more quickly if regulators
are given the power and responsibility to systematically review
and respond to performance data. "Adaptive management" or
"smart governance" refers to a system in which regulators have
the responsibility and authority to routinely review the per-
formance of regulation and to make continuous adjustments to
steer regulation closer to its goals.322 While a fulsome treat-
ment of the application of adaptive management to consumer
law is beyond the scope of this Article, an important benefit of
performance-based regulation is that the data it would produce
would facilitate adaptive management. It is thus in keeping
with what Professor William Simon calls a postbureaucratic vi-
sion of administrative law, in which regulators govern through
the use of auditing and continuous adaptation to diverse and
changing environments, rather than with static rules enforced
through the adjudication of individual complaints.323
Like performance-based regulation, adaptive management
has been conflated with "collaborative" regulation that has
produced regulatory gridlock instead of adaptation, but there is
no necessary link between adaptive regulation and deregula-
tion.24 Instead, regulators could use the test results produced
322 "Smart governance" is the term frequently used for adaptive management in the
public sector. See, for example, 21-t Century Regulation: Putting Innovation at the Heart
of Payments Regulation *2 (PayPal and eBay), archived at http://perma.cc/Z87S-WUNE.
"Total quality management" is one of the terms used in the private sector. See, for exam-
ple, Barrie G. Dale, Ton van der Wiele, and Jos van Iwaarden, eds, Managing Quality 1
(Blackwell 2007).
323 See William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 78 L
& Contemp Probs 61, 69-70 (2015).
324 See Doremus, et al, Making Good Use of Adaptive Management at *3 (cited in
note 196).
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by performance-based regulation to iteratively revisit the ques-
tion of how poorly understood consumer product features and
unsuitably used products ought to be regulated.
CONCLUSION: PUTTING CONSUMERS AT THE CENTER OF
CONSUMER LAW
At one level, performance-based consumer law is a techno-
cratic exercise-one that seeks to engineer an alignment of in-
centives between consumers and firms when the market fails to
do so. It also seeks to let firms do what firms do best and let
regulators do what only regulators can do. Big data and the
prevalence of technological devices intermediating consumer
transactions bring us to a place in which performance-based
regulation is both more possible and more necessary, given that
firms use these tools to analyze and experiment with real con-
sumers so as to adaptively manage the design and marketing of
consumer products in real time.
Performance-based consumer law takes recent regulatory
trends toward empirically informed lawmaking to a new level by
harnessing our improving abilities to measure what is happen-
ing in the world. It recognizes that with new empirical tech-
niques, the law need not rely on regulatory and judicial models
or myths about the "reasonable," "average," or even "vulnerable"
consumer. Instead, we can measure what actual consumers
know and do so as to ground the law in a more objective meas-
ure of what is reasonable. Performance-based consumer law is
ambitious about what the law should attempt.
But performance-based consumer law is also circumspect
about what the law can achieve. It does not imagine that by ex-
pecting consumers to act "reasonably," the law will make them
do so. It does not imagine that new empirical tools will lead reg-
ulators to scientifically produce a perfected set of legal rules. In-
stead, the performance-based legal paradigm conceives of regu-
lation as a purposeful experiment-one that provides
institutionalized monitoring and feedback about its own utility,
which can inform regulators, policymakers, and citizens, thereby
helping regulation evolve over time. Performance-based con-
sumer law thus facilitates adaptive management of the consum-
er marketplace.
This experimental approach to regulation will require both
technical changes in administrative law and a new vision of how
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law ought to be made. CBA will no longer be a single, penulti-
mate step before a regulatory finale but instead a continual
Bayesian process taking place alongside evolving regulation.
Performance-based consumer law also overcomes the long-
standing consumer law divide between regulation of the con-
sumer transacting process and regulation of the substance of
consumer transactions. Comprehension and suitability stand-
ards, while facially reflecting this duality, reject it. To regulate
the process of transacting, we must grapple with the substance
of transactions. Consumer decisional autonomy demands dash-
board product simplicity and usability, which necessarily imply
substantive restrictions on product design. Conversely, for
consumers to select suitable products independently requires
simple, useable information from firms during the transaction
process.
At a deeper level, performance-based consumer law adopts
and nurtures a new--or perhaps an old-normative perspective.
Comprehension and suitability standards situate consumers and
citizens as principals, and firms and regulators as their agents.
The performance paradigm does not fight new governance, but
sings it in a regulatory rather than a deregulatory key.325 This
works against some recent trends in consumer law jurispru-
dence, including cases which have awarded firms the power to
unilaterally set and modify consumer contract terms326 and have
distended the First Amendment to constrain the government's
power to protect consumers. 327 But it is consonant with the goals
of recent legislation governing consumer law, including both the
Dodd-Frank Act and the CARD Act.
Currently, firms take consumers where they find them-and
sometimes take them for a ride. Performance-based consumer
325 See Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from
Financial Regulation, 2010 Wis L Rev 441, 483-87.
326 For an extensive discussion of such cases, see Horton, 57 UCLA L Rev at 623-44
(cited in note 51).
327 See Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, 131 S Ct 2653, 2672 (2011) (applying the First
Amendment to strike down a state law prohibiting the sale by pharmacies of physicians'
prescription records to pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes); R.J. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Co v Food & Drug Administration, 696 F3d 1205, 1221-22 (DC Cir 2012)
(applying the First Amendment to strike down disclosures viscerally warning consumers
about the dangers of smoking); National Association of Manufacturers v Securities and
Exchange Commission, 748 F3d 359, 373 (DC Cir 2014) (applying the First Amendment
to strike down the requirement that firms using conflict minerals publicly disclose
whether the minerals they use have been found to have conflict-free origins).
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law reflects the normative position that the law should take con-
sumers where it finds them, rather than imagining or requiring
consumers to be more or less than they are-but we can know
where consumers are only by testing them.

